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This thesis considers how Georges Bataille’s theory of sacrifice can be used to prompt 
a creative project. I address this both through an exploration of Bataille’s notion of 
sacrifice, and through a collection of five interconnected short stories. The exegesis 
Quoniam Si Voluisses Sacrificium (“For if thou hadst desired sacrifice” (Psalms 
50:18)) analyses and contextualises Bataille’s theory of sacrifice. Although sacrifice 
has long been consigned to the past – theoretically, religiously and culturally – 
Zachhuber and Meszaros contend that sacrifice has always haunted the European 
mind. Bataille, who was preoccupied with the problem of sacrifice, developed his 
theory out of the newly established disciplines of anthropology and comparative 
religion, and drew from nineteenth-century theological and philosophical declarations 
of the death and absence of God. I argue that, for Bataille, the modern world’s 
simultaneous repugnance towards and fascination with sacrifice signaled the way that 
sacrifice deeply troubled the modern European imagination. At the heart of Bataille’s 
notion of sacrifice is the assertion that sacrifice is a communicative act, which, after 
the fall of man (that Bataille felt emerged out of the subject/object divide), functions 
as a non-productive form of expenditure that unites a community. According to 
Bataille, the disenchantment of the modern world disabled human communication and 
effectively isolated people from one another. Bataille proposed that a return to 
sacrifice could enable people momentarily to recapture a sacred form of 
communication and communal unity now lost in modernity. Bataille, who realised 
that ancient sacrificial practices that required the brutality of dismemberment and 
death were consigned to the past, proposed, instead, that people could pierce the 
isolation that separated them through excessive and unproductive forms of 
expenditure – eroticism, laughter and literature.  
Bataille believed that only literature that inhabited ‘the edge’ could rupture 
utilitarian language, thereby constituting a form of symbolic expenditure, which 
bordered on the sacrificial. Ever the paradoxical philosopher, Bataille nevertheless 
realised the impossibility of communicating sacrifice, the loss of the self, or death, 
through fiction because fiction is always representational. I have contemplated 
Bataille’s notion of the impossible through the sacrificial and self-sacrificial bodies of 
the characters in my stories: characters who desire their own annihilation; characters 
who position both protagonists and readers as spectators at a sacrifice. The 
 
 iv 
impossibility of experiencing sacrifice through fiction has prompted me to examine 
the form of the parable – or what Kermode describes as a narrative that is at once a 
similitude and yet also a riddle; a story that reveals as it hides. Through these five 
thematically linked long short stories, which I have collectively entitled Parables of 







































































1. Introduction: Setting the Scene 
You have memorised the instructions. It is the night that you have all agreed on, a 
summer evening in 1937, and you have just caught a suburban Paris-Saint-Lazare line 
train. You pass from carriage to carriage, seeing people that you know, but trying not 
to catch their eyes, because you’ve been warned against it. You find yourself a seat in 
the last carriage. Here, there are only one or two other commuters that you recognise 
– you were introduced to them only recently at a café about a week ago, but you can’t 
remember their names. You all avoid each other’s gaze. Except for the noise of the 
train, the silence is perfect. No talking. That was one of the rules. It is an hour-long 
trip. You will stare at your lap the whole time. When the train arrives at its final 
destination, the Gare Saint-Nom-la-Bretèche, some 30 kilometres west of Paris, you 
disembark with your fellow commuters, and cross the train tracks. Walk up the 
footpath and you will notice that there are small groups of people on the roadside. 
You will recognise them as the people who invited you to the group: there is the man 
with dark hair, the one you had that awkward conversation with at the café, the 
conversation about decapitation: Monsieur Bataille; and the woman with the elegantly 
exhausted face, the one who told you that she was writing a story about the priest who 
molested her sister, but wouldn’t let you read it: Mademoiselle Peignot. You hear that 
they are lovers, Bataille and Peignot. They were not on the train. They were waiting 
for you. Walk past them, they are marshals, they will make sure that you do not get 
lost. Walk with deliberate slowness. They have warned you not to rush. Leave plenty 
of space between yourself and everyone else. Apparently you want to avoid drawing 
any suspicion or unwanted attention, although you cannot tell why this caution is 
necessary. Do they really intend to do something ghastly tonight?  
The lights of the town will begin to flicker and fade behind you. You will 
notice how dark it is getting. And then you will come across the entrance to the forest. 
Don’t be scared, even if you can’t see the person ahead of you. They will be there. 
Step into the forest, leave the town behind. In the forest now, dark night overwhelms 
you. You have been walking for quite some time. Only thin beams of moonlight 
occasionally slip between the leaves of the trees to show you the path. There is the 
cracking of twigs ahead of you, the only sign that someone else is out there. You try 
not to worry that you’ve gone off the track, that maybe you should have taken the 
other path – the one that had been clearly signposted a little further up. You want to 
stop, to turn back, but you force yourself to walk for another few minutes, just so you 
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can confirm that you are well and truly lost. You begin to count the seconds between 
the sounds of twigs snapping under the feet of what you assume are the people ahead, 
like counting the seconds between lightning and thunder. You think that you catch 
sight of someone. A flash of movement that may have been human or animal. Where 
are they? You wonder. Where are they? You’re sure you’ve lost the other members of 
your party. Are there really guides behind you? But you are not Orpheus, and you 
don’t dare look back. Did you read the instructions carefully? The lights from the city 
have completely dissolved beyond the thicket; the night is an enveloping blind spot. 
And that’s when you come to it. Just as the instructions said – “Sur un sol 
marécageux, au centre d’une forêt, […] se trouve un arbre foudroyé.”
1
 It is a partial 
clearing, where the earth becomes marshy. There is a fallen tree, blackened on one 
side. They say it was struck by lightning. Its roots are sticking halfway out of the 
ground. Everyone is there, silent and waiting for you, all twenty-something of them. 
There is the snap of branches behind you. You know that there are only a few more of 
you to come. The marshals were there, right behind you, the whole time. There are 
lights here, candles and torches. At the foot of the fallen tree is what they have called 
a ‘Greek fire.’ The clearing is filled with a smell that you do not recognise. Perhaps, 
you imagine, they are burning sulfur. Perhaps they are invoking the smell of war, of 
Mars, of Hell. This is where your night begins. 
Extrapolating from twentieth-century French pornographer, mystic-without-
God and anti-philosopher Georges Bataille’s Dante-esque essay “Instructions for 
‘meeting’ in the forest” (Brotchie 14-17), this is the way that I imagine a night may 
have begun for an initiate of the sacrificial secret society Acéphale.
2
 The public face 
of Acéphale was a journal that consisted of some four or five issues that were 
published between 1936 and 1939, and featured works of art and articles by 
“luminous” (Biles 127) and “adept” (Stoekl, Introduction, Visions xx) figures of the 
French avant-garde.
3
 While members of the journal and the secret society overlapped, 
Bataille’s biographer Michel Surya says that simply knowing the authors of the 
                                                        
1 Trans. “On marshy ground at the center of a forest, [ . . . ] is a tree struck by lightning” (Bataille 
Œuvers Completes II: Écrits posthumes 1922-1940 77-78).   
2 It is worth noting the possible link between the secret society’s name and the ancient Pauline 
Acephali heretics.  
3 Including artist André Masson, philosophers Jean Wahl, Roger Caillois, Pierre Klossowski, writer 
and later film director Jean Rollin, and Bataille himself. 
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journal will not shed any light on the secret society (238).
4
 Instead, it is through 
interviews with, and the work of, Bataille’s on-again off-again friends, the 
philosophers Roger Caillois and Pierre Klossowski, that we have any idea of what 
went on at the society’s meetings.
5
  
Laura Wittman, in conversation with Stanford University professor Robert 
Harrison, says that Bataille’s creation of the secret society Acéphale was an attempt to 
develop a sui generis religion that diverged from all established and institutional 
religions, yet still embraced, at its core, a form of sacrifice. She says that Acéphale, 
which translates as “without a head,” involved “the critique of all forms of authority. 
That’s what the image of ‘having no head’ comes down to” (Harrison). The cover art 
of the first issue of Acéphale (1936) boasts André Masson’s depiction of an 
acéphalic-man: an upright, headless Vitruvian Man, arms and legs spread-eagled, 
with a knife in his left hand, a flaming heart in his right. His nipples are stars, and his 
intestines are visible though his flesh. He wears his skull at his crotch.  
I have described Acéphale as a ‘sacrificial’ secret society, which, while it 
may sound flamboyant, is certainly not far from Bataille’s vision for the group. Of all 
the things that were said to have occurred at the society’s meetings, there was one 
proposed ritual that, while never performed, has not only captured the imagination of 
Bataille scholars, but has continued to fascinate scholars of modern French and 
continental thought: the rumour of a ritual beheading – a literalisation of the very 
name of the society, the journal, and Masson’s l’homme-acéphale.
6
 Rumour had it 
that Bataille, among others, offered himself as a victim, but no one was willing to 
play executioner, and so the society eventually disbanded (Harrison; Stoekl, 
Introduction, Visions xx; Noys, Georges Bataille: An Introduction 9).  
The secret society, which has remained shrouded in mystery until today, 
has led Surya to claim that “Acéphale is part of the Bataille legend” (237). 
Bataille, in his own lifetime, was notorious for his alleged double life – a humble 
                                                        
4 Surya says that, other than Bataille, his lover at the time, Colette Peignott, and friends Caillois and 
Klossowski, society members may have included “Jacques Chavy, René Chenon, Henri Dubief, Pierre 
Dugan, Dussat (?), Jean Dautry (and others we do not know)” (247-48). 
5 For more information, see Bernard-Henri Lévy’s 1991 work Les Aventures de Liberté, in which he 
interviews Bataille’s friend, and former Acéphale member, Pierre Klossowski.  
6 The society’s rituals were said to include readings of and meditation on the works of Nietzsche 
and de Sade, the refusal to shake hands with anti-Semites, and the commemoration of the execution of 
Louis XVI, which involved soaking a human skull in brine and placing it at the base of the obelisk in 
the Place de la Concorde – the Parisian square where Louis XVI was beheaded – and then notifying 
the press that the king’s skull had reappeared (the last of these rituals was never carried out) (Stoekl, 
“Commentary on the Texts” Visions 263). 
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archivist by day, a pornographer and member of a secret society by night – and 
for his staggering transition from pious seminarian, to his rapid deconversion 
and subsequent transformation into a ‘mystic without God.’ It appears that 
Bataille not only underwent his own self-reassessment, but that posthumously 
his works have also undergone significant re-examination. In his own day, 
Bataille was marginalised by the Surrealists, the existentialists and the Catholics. 
However, his legacy lives on today. It was only when he was taken up by 
Foucault, and later Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari, and Kristeva, that Bataille’s 
work was incorporated into postmodern thought.7 In recent years, Bataille’s 
work has been the subject of extensive analysis by such scholars as Benjamin 
Noys, Nick Land and Patrick ffrench. Since the theological turn in 
postmodernism, Bataille’s theories have also gained a new lease of life – we need 
only think of the work of postmodern scholars of Christian thought John D. 
Caputo and Gianni Vattimo. Such renewed interest in the philosophy of religion, 
Christian apologetics, and theology has seen Bataille’s work often coupled with 
that of René Girard, whose notions of mimetic desire/rivalry and the scapegoat 
                                                        
7 While I am no doubt aware of the apparent significance that Bataille’s work had for the group of 
theorists whom we might class as ‘the poststructuralists’ (Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva, Lacan, Blanchot, 
Baudrillard, and Deleuze and Guattari), as well as the importance that their critique of Bataille’s 
thought would play in postmodernity, I will not be directly drawing from their work, and nor will I be 
forming an explicitly poststructuralist reading of Bataille. I realise, of course, that my argument 
possesses a poststructuralist bent – that I am attempting to form a non-essentialising, non-structuralist 
reading of sacrifice, and that accordingly neither Bataille nor I suggest that sacrifice is universal or 
transhistorical. However, I believe that it is also important to consider Michael Richardson’s position 
that, while there are no doubt legitimate reasons for postmodernists and poststructuralists to see a 
thematic pre-figuration in Bataille’s work, it would be appropriative and anachronistic to either read 
Bataille’s thought through a postructuralist lens or to read Bataille as a poststructuralist (Richardson 
reminds the reader that Bataille died before structuralism had even become a methodology) (Georges 
Bataille 4-5). It is, however, also worth noting Benjamin Noys’ argument that while Bataille was not a 
poststructuralist, he can be seen as something of an ‘anachronism’ – he was “thinking poststructuralism 
before it was even named” (Georges Bataille: A Critical Introduction 16). But for all the significance 
that Bataille’s thought had for the poststructuralists – the one or two times that Deleuze and Guattari 
explicitly refer to Bataille in either Anti-Oedipus or A Thousand Plateaus, Lacan’s fleeting reference to 
Bataille in his seventh seminar, or the scant mention that Kristeva makes of Bataille (important though 
it may be) in Powers of Horror – Richardson proposes that the only one of these figures who seems to 
have any real understanding of Bataille is Baudrillard (and, of all the poststructuralists, it is Baudrillard 
who seems to have written the most about Bataille and sacrifice). The attempt to grapple with 
Bataille’s asystematic thought has produced something of a fragmentary (albeit understandably and 
perhaps necessarily fragmentary) reading of Bataille. That is, aside from the popular and 
predominant focus on Bataillean eroticism in the English-speaking world, the poststructuralists 
made their own specialized readings of Bataille: while Nancy and Blanchot write about Bataille’s 
notion of community, Foucault focuses on Bataille’s interpretation of transgression, and Kristeva, in 
her Lacanian exploration of the abject, examines Bataille’s thoughts about heterogeneity. Indeed, 
perhaps one of the best resources to demonstrate the specialized readings of Bataille’s theories is 
Botting’s and Wilson’s collection of essays – essays predominantly written by ‘the poststructuralists’ – 
in Bataille: A Critical Reader.  
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mechanism have greatly influenced contemporary philosophical and 
anthropological approaches to interpreting ritual sacrifice. Bataille’s work 
continues to inform countless philosophical, theoretical and creative 
movements: Bataille has clearly influenced theorist Eugene Thacker’s 2011 
‘horror of philosophy’ series, theorist Ben Woodard’s work with the notion of 
‘dark vitalism,’ theorist Timothy Morton’s 2009 creation of the concept ‘dark 
ecology,’ and the curious Romanian collective, Bezna (which emerged in 2013), 
and their theoretical/performance-based concepts of ‘unsorcery’ and ‘dead 
thinking.’8 Also indebted to Bataille are Iranian author Reza Negarestani and his 
2008 essay-novel (which incorporates elements of dark ecology and dark 
vitalism) Cyclonopedia, the works of British visual artist brothers Jake and Dinos 
Chapman, and the ‘speculative realism’ movement, which emerged out of a 2007 
conference that was attended by theorists Ray Brassier, Graham Harman and 
Quentin Meillassoux.9 The life and work of Bataille has also become a subject of 
discussion in Australian media, with David Rutledge of ABC Radio National’s 
program Encounter presenting various episodes that encompass Bataille’s 
writing (often in combination with Girard’s) on religion, the sacred and 
sacrifice.10 Although I will not be using Bataille’s notion of sacrifice to read all forms 
of ritualistic or religious violence in the pre-modern, modern, and postmodern worlds, 
it is nevertheless important to note that the language and discourse surrounding 
sacrifice has changed not only in modernity and postmodernity, but that it has also 
changed once again in light of the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers in 
America. While an in-depth discussion of 9/11 goes beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, I believe that it is possible to use Bataille to investigate the multiple ways 
that the violence of 9/11 (and subsequent acts of terror) has been, curiously, both 
described as and denied the title of ‘sacrifice,’ and its perpetrators, ‘martyrs.’ Indeed, 
the advent of contemporary terrorism (which Saul Newman dates as 11 September 
2001), and the proliferation of politically volatile terms like ‘suicide bomber,’ ‘war on 
                                                        
8 For more information consult Thacker’s 2011 In the Dust of this Planet – Horror of Philosophy, 
vol. 1; see darkecologies.com or Woodard’s 2013 On an Ungrounded Earth: Towards a New 
Geophilosophy; Morton’s 2007 Ecology Without Nature or his 2010 The Ecological Thought; and 
bezna.blogspot.com.au.    
9 For more information please consult Harman’s 2010 Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and 
Lectures.  
10 See the 2001 Encounter episode “Georges Bataille,” and the 2014 episodes “Not Peace but a 
Sword,” and “Are Religion and Violence Two Sides of the Same Coin?”  
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terror,’ and ‘axis of evil,’ has once again brought into focus the fragility of the term 
‘sacrifice,’ and the problematic ways of discussing the nature of a form of religious 





2. Sacrifice: Haunting the European Imagination 
Bataille’s personal fascination with sacrifice, however, didn’t emerge in theoretical 
and cultural isolation. Among the multifarious currents of modern French thought, 
amid the population of atheist existentialists, and their inheritance of post-
Enlightenment rationality, there was a strong neo-Catholic revival in twentieth-
century France, as well as a renewed, secular interest in religion, and in sacrifice as a 
pre-modern practice/phenomenon.
12
 It is impossible to understand why sacrifice was 
so central to Bataille’s thought unless we understand how and why sacrifice haunted 
the modern European mind.
13
 Yet in proposing that sacrifice ‘haunts’ the modern 
                                                        
11 It is this very inability to consider or articulate ‘sacrifice’ in postmodernity (or to use the term to 
explain the actions of the perpetrators of 9/11), that continues to make Bataille’ theory of sacrifice so 
significant: while there are certainly modern, postmodern and poststructuralist interpretations of 
sacrifice, I believe that Bataille was one of few modern theorists to take the question of sacrifice 
seriously. For Bataille, it seems that there is no language in our contemporary discourse to even think 
of the concept or role of sacrifice in the modern and postmodern worlds. In his discussion about 
terrorism (specifically, his focus on 9/11 and the post-9/11 world) in Power and Politics in 
Poststructuralist Thought Saul Newman argues that dominant discourse and ideology have come to 
define the political realities of the post-9/11world (100). Newman argues that when the peoples or 
groups that have been designated the title ‘terrorist’ invoke the term ‘sacrifice,’ the word swiftly 
becomes bound up with Orientalist discourse (that is, with a paralleling of the terrorist with the 
‘barbarous’ and the ‘primitive’); with a simplistic discussion of religious fanaticism; with a diagnosis 
of mental or social instability (at either an individual or cultural level); or, with the argument that a 
certain peoples or religious group do not really ‘understand’ sacrifice. Newman proposes that it is 
therefore possible to use Bataille’s notion of heterogeneity to reread both ‘sacrifice’ and the way that 
the term is used in light of 9/11, and to develop a serious discussion about the continuation and 
presence of sacrifice in postmodernity (111-115).  
12 Modern France was, at this time, a secular, capitalist nation, free of its older feudal and 
monarchical chagrins; a nation where the authority of the church had been greatly diminished. 
13 While it is certainly possible to examine Bataille’s notion of sacrifice through the immanent 
connection that Bataille believes it shares with eroticism, I would like to propose that a historical 
contextualization of sacrifice in modern and postmodern thought is also necessary if we are to 
develop a broader and more extensive reading of Bataillean sacrifice. This contextualization is 
significant because Bataille so clearly draws on and uses earlier interpretations and definitions of 
sacrifice to shape his own (for example, he examines Mauss’ and Hubert’s structuralist reading of 
sacrifice, among others). Indeed, a historical contextualization of the writing of sacrifice brings 
much to an analysis of Bataille’s though. Such a reading makes an example of Bataille’s non-
strucutralist approach to sacrifice (it is demonstrative of Bataille’s own non-essentialising 
interpretation), and of the ways that Bataille’s theory of sacrifice has been (and may be) used in 
both historical and contemporary discussion about sacrifice (for example we might consider 
Baudrillard’s and Newman’s interpretation of 9/11).  
Through this historical contextualization I also attempt to avoid falling into the trap of only 
restating and rehashing what has already been written about Bataillean eroticism. I seek to avoid 
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mind, I am not suggesting that thinkers sought to offer an intellectual explanation of 
sacrifice. What emerged in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was 
a push to develop a secularised comparison of world religions and to collect and 
analyse folk tales. Out of these preliminary studies and investigations into modern and 
pre-modern worlds and religious practices, the fields of comparative religion and 
anthropology were born. It was out of this sociological and anthropological context 
that Bataille’s work emerged. At the heart of this exegesis is my contention that 
sacrifice was of significance to modern thinkers not only because so much of Europe 
was Christian, but also because so many theorists and artists identified and became 
fascinated with the themes and currents of sacrifice in Christianity. Consider Johannes 
Zachhuber’s and Julia Meszaros’ introduction to their 2013 anthology Sacrifice and 
Modern Thought. Sacrifice, they propose, has always preoccupied the European mind,  
partly because of its controversial assessment in Christian theology, 
partly because of its central importance for Greek tragedy, partly 
because of its evident centrality to so many different historical 
religions. (v)   
Zachhuber and Meszaros believe that, aside from late antiquity and the modern era, 
there has never been more enchantment with, and motivation to explore, theories of 
sacrifice and the theological, ethical and social implications of religious and ritualistic 
violence (1). Nevertheless, the reason for the popularity of sacrifice in modern 
thought is “ambiguous” (2). It is a fascination that is, they say, “emblematic for 
modernity’s general attitude to its traditional past from which it seeks to break free 
while being fearful, at the same time, about consequences of its potential loss” (2). 
Thus the fascination with and fear of sacrifice formed an ironic rift: as in the 
Enlightenment, the modern world attempted to break free from the pre-modern world 
while at the same time trying to avoid losing the energy and virility that had become 
associated with the pre-modern. But Zachhuber and Meszaros say that what most 
concerned modern theorists was the fear of and lamentation for the loss of the 
sacred.
14
 According to Niklaus Largier in his 2009 lecture “Refiguring Religious 
                                                                                                                                                              
suggesting that it is only possible to read Bataille (and therefore Batailean sacrifice) through his 
notion of eroticism. I argue that to only read Bataille through eroticism would limit Bataille’s 
thought and would be to suggest that there is a central core to Bataille’s philosophy – a limitation 
that Bataille certainly rejected in his quest to develop a non-specialised, non-totalising form of 
non-savoir (nonknowledge).  
14 Richard Wagner tried to capture this sense of the loss of the sacred (and the loss of community 
and communality) in his 1882 opera Parsifal. Parsifal concerns the quest of a brotherhood of the Holy 
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Experience: Georges Bataille’s Inner Experience,” the modern era witnessed the 
breakdown of all the structures that the Romantics had forged, namely, the idealised, 
romanticised image of the Gemeinschaft – or pre-modern life – as being a world (or 
‘umwelt’), or ‘community,’ in which humans were embedded in nature and steeped in 
the sacred. Largier believes that, while ritual sacrifice binds the community to the 
sacred, the ‘Modern Condition’ constitutes the alienation from, the loss of, and 
nostalgia for this sense of communality and the sacred.
15
 In the modern world, Largier 
says that we submitted ourselves to a neurotic and pathological culture where we lost 
not only the Dionysian, but also a form of ‘virility’ attributed to primordial ‘man’ and 
primordial civilisation. One of the attractions of sacrifice in the modern era was the 
very fact that, despite the domination of Enlightenment rationality, sacrifice signaled 
the survival of the so-called ‘primitive’ (the energy and virility attributed to the pre-
modern might also explain the development of neo-primitivism or fauvism, or 
currents in twentieth-century classical music, like Stravinsky’s 1913 The Rite of 
Spring).
16
 Nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy and anthropology attempted 
to define sacrifice beyond the confines of Christianity and to explain its significance 
in other cultures. Modernist thinkers also tried to reread the crucifixion through new 
definitions of sacrifice, and to review Christianity in light of the development of an 
anthropology of religion, which involved comparative and syncretic interpretations. 
What is unique about Bataille’s position in this framework is the curious connection 
he forms between the sociological and the subjective. For Bataille, as I will discuss in 
due course, was not only a member of the French collective the Collège de Sociologie 
(and so engaged in scientific enquiries into religion and the sacred), but also suffered 
a pervading sense of alienation and a perennial sense of despair at the irrevocable loss 
of the sacred.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Grail. In a 2013 production at Covent Garden, the ‘Holy Grail’ was, controversially, presented onstage, 
as a pre-pubescent boy, who was naked but for a loincloth. The ‘drinking of the chalice’ was, even 
more shockingly, performed through the sacrifice of the boy – like Christ, the boy was stabbed in the 
side. The soldiers then took turns touching and drinking from the boy’s wound (White; Maddocks).  
15 It must be noted that the nineteenth- and twentieth-century sociological and philosophical notions 
of ‘the sacred’ comprise a tragic vision of sacredness. ‘The sacred’ was not understood as something 
necessarily ‘good,’ but as something brutal and vicious that had been lost to the safety and comforts of 
secular bourgeoisie life.  
16 I realise that the term ‘primitive’ is highly problematic. By ‘primitive,’ I am not referring to “an 
early or ancient period; simple, unsophisticated, or crude things or people as a class” (“Primitive”), nor 
am I referring to the derogatory use of the term. Rather, I am using ‘primitive’ through the lens of the 
Enlightenment, in which the term referred to a pre-Christian world.   
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2.1 The Powers of Horror: Christianity, the European Imagination, and 
Repugnance Towards Sacrifice        
  
And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith 
is also vain. 
1 Corinthians, 15:14, King James Bible 
                                                          
I have stressed the importance of contextualising Bataille’s thought: that, in order to 
understand his stance on sacrifice we need, first, to understand the intellectual and 
religious background out of which he emerged. We need not only to grasp the 
Christian orthodoxy that he repurposes in his work, but also to comprehend the very 
narrative of sacrifice – the sacrifice of both human and God – that is at the heart of 
Christianity. We need, also, to consider the way that this narrative of sacrifice 
affected (and continues to affect) the European mind. According to religious historian 
Ivan Strenski, sacrifice deeply troubles the European imagination. There is a 
particular horror invested in human sacrifice that is not present in the sacrifice of 
objects or even of animals. It is a horror that has persisted into the present day and has 
retained a place in the popular imagination. There is a general consensus that human 
sacrifice belongs to a ‘primitive’ world (consider the works of Renan, Tylor, Frazer, 
Durkheim, Mauss, Hubert), and that civilisation is judged by both its disgust with and 
rejection of human sacrifice.
17
  
Yet it may be this very link with the so-called ‘primitive world,’ as well as the horror 
aroused by the very idea of human sacrifice, that has maintained sacrifice’s place in 
the popular imagination; we are intrigued by something so terrifying that we almost 
cannot speak about it.
18
 In “Sacrifice as Refusal” Gavin Flood says that sacrifice 
confounds our sensibilities and opposes our drive to live. Sacrifice, he says, 
“confronts us with the naked aporia of human life” (Sacrifice in Modern Thought 
                                                        
17 In a recent article in the New York Review of Books, Mary Beard reviews Joan Breton Connelly’s 
2014 book The Parthenon Enigma, noting her controversial reinterpretation of the central scene of the 
east frieze of the Parthenon. The frieze, which classicists once thought depicted the presentation of a 
newly woven robe to the goddess Athena, Connelly proposes, instead tells of an early Athenian myth in 
which an oracle has told the legendary King Erechtheus that in order to save Athens from invasion he 
must sacrifice one of his daughters. Connelly’s and Beard’s rereadings of the frieze do not simply posit 
that historical critics were wrong in their original interpretation of the sculpture, but rather that we need 
to completely revise our whole notion of the disparity between barbarism and civilisation, between 
primitivity and democracy. 
18 This ‘unspeakable’ terror of human sacrifice, has entered the realm of popular culture; for 
example in the form of the 1973 and 2006 remake of the film The Wicker Man.  
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115). Zachhuber and Meszaros agree, saying that the West has attempted to purge 
Christianity of the ‘taint’ of sacrifice. This attempt, to cleanse the crucifixion of its 
barbarity, first gained momentum during the Reformation when the Protestants argued 
that, because Christ’s death was the one true sacrifice, Christianity had to become a 
non-sacrificial religion (Zachhuber and Meszaros 1). Zachhuber and Meszaros also 
suggest that eighteenth-century intellectuals rejected sacrifice on the basis that it was 
cruel, uncivilised and incompatible with religion (1). However, in “Sacrifice in 
Recent Roman Catholic Thought,” Philip McCosker maintains: “sacrifice simply is 
central to Catholicism” (Sacrifice and Modern Thought 132). Like McCosker, 
Strenski, Zachhuber and Meszaros argue that it is impossible to think of the Bible (or 
of Abrahamic religion) without thinking of sacrifice: specifically, without thinking of 




But is it possible to think of sacrifice without thinking of Christianity? Such 
a question inevitably leads to the problem of whether Christianity is, at heart, a 
sacrificial religion, and whether the crucifixion can even be called a sacrifice. In The 
Other Christs: Imitating Jesus in Ancient Christian Ideologies of Martyrdom Candida 
Moss argues that the very term ‘sacrifice’ may be problematic when discussing the 
death of Christ and the subsequent deaths of the martyrs. “Whereas we might be 
tempted to use the term ‘sacrifice’ for martyrs as a way of communicating that they 
‘gave up’ their lives,” she says, “the same could not be said of the ancient world” 
(77). Moss argues that paralleling the concept of ‘dying for’ something with 
‘sacrifice’ is a relatively recent association – an association that did not exist among 
ancient understandings of sacrifice.  
The very uncertainty of what was sacrificed at the crucifixion further 
complicates the link between Christianity and sacrifice. It is this uncertainty that leads 
to the question of the nature of Christ.
20
 Orthodox theology, which triumphed in the 
Nicene Creed (325 C.E.), demands that followers believe that Christ was both fully 
divine and fully human, as though cut from the same cloth as God, but sent to live and 
suffer like a human. Today, the Nicene Creed is always recited as part of the Christian 
mass (in both Catholic and Protestant churches), in which Christ, the only son of God, 
                                                        
19 For a complete account of the history of human sacrifice in Abrahamic religion and the Middle 
East see Carol Delaney’s 2000 book Abraham on Trial: The Social Legacy of Biblical Myth.    
20 In Jesus Wars Jenkins explores the theology, the accusations of heresy and the warfare that came 
out of religious debates like the 325 CE Council of Nicea and the 451 CE Council of Chalcedon.  
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is said to be “eternally begotten of the Father, God from God, Light from Light, true 
God from true God, begotten, not made, of one being with the Father” (The Book of 
Common Prayer 326). It is a declaration of faith, and a dogma that nineteenth-century 
and twentieth-century French liberal Protestants and Roman Catholics followed. 
Nevertheless, it is important to clarify that all theology, and the theologising of the 
crucifixion, is retrospective. The theology of the crucifixion is, more than anything, a 
rationalisation of the popular mythical narrative of the dying/resurrecting god. 
Throughout Christian history there have been countless disputes about the nature of 
Christ – disputes that have led to bloodshed and accusations of heresy. While the 
nature of Christ is still problematic, such arguments have become arcane, outdated; a 
feud that ‘smells of the oil lamp,’ so to speak.
21
 The results of these early debates, 
however old fashioned, clearly have implications for how people both understand and 
practice Christianity. In order to interpret what happened at the crucifixion, why it 
happened, and whether or not we can call the event a sacrifice, we must first ascertain 
exactly what was crucified. In Jesus Wars: How Four Patriarchs, Three Queens, and 
Two Emperors Decided What Christians Would Believe for the Next 1,500 Years 
Philip Jenkins stresses the significance of this question when he asks: “how, in fact, 
had Christ suffered on the cross – had God really died?” (emphasis in original, 
location 82). What is so powerful about Christ’s crucifixion, Jenkins says, is that 
according to orthodox theology it is not just a man who is killed, it is also a god – the 
death of God.  
The debate over the nature of Christ and the subsequent theories of sacrifice 
that emerged out of the Nicene Creed also formed the foundations of what set the 
Catholics and the Protestants – like other sects of Christianity – apart.
22
 For it was out 
of the debate about the nature of Christ that a theological dilemma arose: Eucharistic 
theology.
23
 The nature of the Eucharist became one of the great theological disputes 
of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, with the Protestants denying the ‘Real 
                                                        
21 While the nature of Christ is still perplexing, what results from orthodoxy’s triumph is that 
modern Christianity tends to emphasise Christ’s humanity.  
22 The differences between the fields of theology and anthropology are here clarified: in 
Christianity, the issue of Christ’s divine/human nature becomes a doctrinal problem, whereas in 
anthropology it becomes a ritualistic problem.   
23 The Eucharist is the bread and wine shared at mass, and is typically symbolic of the Last Supper 
that Christ shared with the Apostles before he was betrayed, imprisoned and executed. While some 
Lutherans and Anglicans accept the theology of consubstantiation – that the body and blood of Christ 
are present alongside the bread and wine, but do not become the bread and wine – for Catholics, the 
bread and wine, when consecrated, are more than just a memorial supper: they change, or 
transubstantiate, and become the Eucharist or, the actual flesh and blood of Christ.  
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Presence’ of Christ in the communion wafer or wine, and the Catholics believing that 
they were eating the literal flesh and drinking the blood of their saviour. It is therefore 
fascinating that, while Catholics and Protestants remain separated on the doctrine of 
the Eucharist (a doctrine with which Bataille, a lapsed Catholic, was familiar), they 
largely cohere on the significance of the crucifixion.   
“Along with the Catholics,” Strenski says, “the ‘orthodox’ Protestants of 
France never ceased believing in Jesus’ death as a kind of penal atonement” that was 
enacted “to satisfy divine anger and in expiation for human sin” (Theology and the 
First Theory of Sacrifice 69). We must, however, remember that ‘penal atonement’ or 
‘penal substitution’ is a distinctly Protestant doctrine, even if it is one that shares 
many similarities with the Catholic notion of redemptive expiatory sacrifice. For both 
the Catholics and Protestants, the significance of Christ’s death is in its being a 
substitutionary sacrifice, where Christ died for the sins of humanity, through which he 
effectively washed away or removed the human burden of inherited sin. For both the 
Catholics and Protestants, the crucifixion is an act of both redemption and atonement. 
For Catholics, however, the crucifixion is largely understood as an expiatory or 
‘propitiatory’ sacrifice – a sacrifice in which divine retribution is avoided through an 
act of atonement. Curiously, the theology of expiation came under both Catholic and 
Protestant scrutiny in the twentieth century, where it was criticised as being both 
needlessly violent and in opposition to civic and moral forms of sacrifice. 
Nevertheless, Strenski argues that the Catholic Eucharistic version of sacrifice 
demands, to this day, the fulfillment of two elements: the total annihilation (or death) 
of the victim, and the expiation of sin, which was brought about through the 
immolation of the victim (Theology 35). The first element, the victim’s total 
annihilation, can be found in the Catholic narrative of the crucifixion, where sacrifice 
is extreme and uncompromising: there is nothing partial about it (Theology 36).  
According to Nicene orthodoxy, the crucifixion is the means by which Christ 
paid off the debt of sin that humanity had accumulated since the fall of Adam.
24
 This 
‘payment’ was not only a metaphorical means of washing away the sins of humanity 
(of being washed in the blood of the lamb), but also acted as a paradoxical form of 
manumission: for while the faithful are freed from their sin debt, they become a slave 
                                                        
24 In his 2009 book Sin: A History Gary Anderson proposes that the crucifixion functioned as a ‘sin 
offering.’ While sin was originally seen as a weight or a burden, such a metaphor is, Anderson says, 





 This belief is put forward in Corinthians: “For the one who was a slave 
when called to faith in the Lord is the Lord’s freed person; similarly, the one who was 
free when called is Christ’s slave” (7:22). At the same time, ironically, believers are 
freed by and yet also become a slave to Christ (Christ also declares himself a slave). 
They are freed, metaphorically, from their positions as slaves, although they are not 
freed literally. In Christian orthodoxy, therefore, the crucifixion is ‘good’ because, 
even though it demanded Christ’s suffering (which is ‘evil’), it was a salvific moment 
that opened the gates of heaven – because Christ atoned for our sins, the believer is 
saved (given salvation).
26
 According to the catechisms of the Catholic Church, the 
believers’ “salvation flows from God's initiative of love for us, because ‘he loved us 
and sent his Son to be the expiation for our sins,’” (“Part One: The Profession of 
Faith”). Thus the church explained expiation as a sign of love and compassion. Both 
Strenski and Moss have argued that, for Catholics, Christ’s death is understood as 
‘settling a score,’ as repaying a cosmic sin-debt, as appeasing godly wrath, and as 
‘paying with blood’ (Strenski, Theology 35-39; Moss, The Other Christs 77).  
Despite the efforts of twentieth-century Christianity to ‘clean up’ the blood 
and brutality and expiatory nature of the crucifixion, it is worth noting, as Moss and 
Jenkins have, that the image of the martyr has persisted in Catholicism, not least 
because the martyr’s death mimics Christ’s, but because the martyr becomes another 
Christ (Moss, The Other Christs 77; Jenkins, page 8, location 351). In The Amazing 
Colossal Apostle Robert M. Price says that, at its core, Christianity relies on the 
narrative of the sacrifice, death and rebirth of the god. Price maintains that, without 
this link between God and sacrifice, the fundamental values of Christianity could not 
and would not make any sense. There is a general consensus among most Christian 
sects that there is a link between the Christian God and sacrifice. However, the 
significance and ‘ways of seeing’ the sacrifice are not the same among all sects: while 
iconography, the importance of Christ’s wounds, and the stations of the cross are all 
central to Catholicism, Protestants regard these icons as little more than superstitious 
adornments. But the significance of martyrdom in the Catholic tradition, Moss says, is 
that their deaths are not a new and original phenomenon, but rather, “[their] sacrifice 
                                                        
25 See Revelation 7:14: “And he said to me, These are they which came out of great tribulation, and 
have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb.” 
26 Today, however, there is a wider spectrum of belief. While Catholics might believe that their god 
died on the cross, there is a hesitation in calling Christ’s death an expiatory sacrifice because of the 
negative, barbaric, and ‘primitive’ implications of the ‘blood debt’ sacrifice.    
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appears to be a repetition and a commemoration of the original sacrifice of the god” 
(89). 
Though the nature of Christ, the importance of Real Presence, the death of 
God, and the significance of the crucifixion may seem tangential to my broader 
research, this theological investigation is directly relevant to my work because of the 
continued centrality of sacrifice in both Catholic and Protestant Christianity. I aim to 
show that, while these debates about Christ emerged centuries ago, the debate is never 
quite over. While Christ’s death is, in Catholic Eucharistic theology, called the ‘one 
true sacrifice,’ his death is repeated constantly through the Catholic mass. Both 
Strenski and Moss posit that the language and narrative of sacrifice are at the centre of 
the Catholic mass, which is based on the Eucharist. Philip McCosker says that the 
proceedings of Jesus’ Paschal Mystery – the Last Supper, his crucifixion, and his 
resurrection – are the essence of the Catholic faith, and that believers replay this 
mystery through the mass (132). Through their participation in the communion meal, 
the faithful are made ‘holy’ – an interesting link to the etymology of the term 
‘sacrifice.’ Strenski says that in Catholic theology the mass represents the death and 
resurrection of Jesus, and that, while Christ’s death on the cross is understood as the 
‘one true sacrifice,’ the mass perpetuates his death and makes it ever-present 
(Theology 39).  
It is the ever-present nature of Christ’s crucifixion that informs Moss’ work 
on Christ, martyrdom and sacrifice. In The Other Christs, Moss poses two questions: 
what does it mean for the uniqueness of Christ’s death if there were imitators whose 
deaths achieve similar outcomes? And, is it conceivable that some ancient Christians 
understood Christ’s death as the first, rather than the only true sacrifice? (Moss 77). 
While the first of these questions is answered through Moss’ exploration of 
Eucharistic theology, both of these questions were debated in nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century French intellectual spheres. The significance of such questions 
emerged alongside the nineteenth- and twentieth-century French obsession with 
invoking the images of martyrs, saints and mystics to provoke political and social 
reform. Indeed, the French fascination with martyrology and mysticism persisted not 
only among the religious (Simone Weil, for instance), but also among secular and 
atheist thinkers (Simone de Beauvoir, for example) who not only used the image of 
the saint and the martyr, and the significance of the saint and martyr, as one who 
suffers for God, to call for revisions within the church and to protest war, but also 
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2.2 La séparation des Églises et de l'État: Sacrifice in Twentieth-Century French 
Political and Christian Thought  
The significance of sacrifice (in the forms of martyrdom and mysticism) among 
religious and secular French thinkers is unsurprising for Strenski, who believes that 
sacrifice is particularly salient in modern French thought. In Contesting Sacrifice: 
Religion, Nationalism and Social Thought in France, Strenski charts the French 
obsession with sacrifice from its origins in the early seventeenth century, where, in 
response to the Protestant Reformation, French Catholic theology attempted to offer a 
new theory of Catholic sacramental sacrifice. He contends that sacrificial imagery 
went on to characterise the French Revolution, the Dreyfus Affair, and France’s 
involvement in World Wars I and II (Contesting Sacrifice 3). And it was during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, he says, that Catholic theology became so 
entrenched in French thought that it came to be the point of reference for all 
contemplation on sacrifice (49). In Contesting Sacrifice, Strenski reasons that the 
Catholic vision of sacrifice was so embedded in French culture that it even shaped 
French political thought (6). While French thought adopted the Catholic view of 
sacrifice, there was a challenge to doctrine, which emanated from French Liberal 
Protestant thought (which was antagonistic to Catholic doctrine). The Protestants, 
who believed that French universities were clerical institutions, dominated the 
academic realm, their attempt to theorise the crucifixion falling under the category of 
what they called ‘Christian Science.’
28
 While the purpose and function of the 
university had been a matter of debate since the eighteenth century (consider Kant and 
the university metaphysicians), and universities had become increasingly secularised 
over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Strenski says that the Liberal Protestants 
                                                        
27 In her 2002 work Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History, 
Amy Hollywood argues that the fascination with martyrdom and medieval mysticism that interested 
otherwise secular and atheist French theorists including Simone de Beauvoir, Jacques Lacan, Luce 
Irigaray, Hèléne Cixous, and Simone Weil was predominantly an interest in gender and feminism (de 
Beauvoir and Irigaray, she says, focused on the mystical association with women, and what it meant 
that most medieval mystics were women – people like Angela de Foligno and Teresa of Avilia).  
28 According to Strenski, the French liberal Protestants did not distinguish science from theology 
but rather saw the two as leading to union with God (Theology 9).  
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didn’t see their religious affiliation as divorced from secular investigations into 
religion.  
Yet we must keep in mind that whatever dominant position the Church might 
have had in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century France (civically, institutionally 
(in universities), and scientifically) this position would come under fire after 
December 1905. The 1905 Séparation des Églises et de l’État (Separation of the 
Church and State) was a French law that effectively put an end to the funding of 
religious groups by the state and, as Marcel Fournier says, put the teaching of 
religious science (essentially, theology) “in jeopardy when faculties of protestant 
theology were eliminated in 1906” (133).
29
  
In the modern era, sacrifice also took on a nationalistic quality – sacrificing 
oneself for the good of one’s nation became a popular mode of understanding 
sacrifice, and with this mentality came the formation of ‘brotherhoods’ where people 
were willing to ‘die for the cause.’
30
 Sacrifice therefore became a way for both the 
individual and the state to make sense of war. The implication of sacrifice, 
nationalism and militarism is the subject of Jesse Goldhammer’s 2005 The Headless 
Republic: Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought, in which Goldhammer 
argues that, from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, the French linked war and 
revolution with the founding violence of Roman and Christian myths. He proposes 
that the French Revolutionaries not only saw their actions as comparable to Romulus’ 
killing of Remus or Christ’s crucifixion but that French theorists of the twentieth 
century (people like Joseph de Maistre, Georges Sorel, and even Georges Bataille) 
also interpreted the revolutionaries’ actions as sacrificial. Because of the sacrificial 
rhetoric employed in these explosive historical moments, Strenski finds it 
unsurprising that sacrifice fascinated modern French theorists. However, he maintains 
that this interest only exposed the problematic nature of sacrifice: beyond the ethical 
dilemmas raised by ritualistic killing was the problem of theorising sacrifice itself.  
 
  
                                                        
29 While it is unclear whether Mauss and Hubert played any part in the discussion surrounding this 
law, Durkeheim for one is known to have taken an active role. In a 1905 debate about the law, 
Durkehim explicitly voiced his opinion of Christianity saying that “[f]rom a sociological viewpoint, the 
Church is a monstrosity” (11). 
30 This attitude characterised not only modern France, but also modern Europe (Nazi Germany was, 
of course, its disastrous climax). 
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2.3 “These good, but badly informed souls”: Secular Anthropology and the Task 
of Defining Sacrifice  
In Theology and the First Theory of Sacrifice Strenski argues that there still remains 
no consistent or totally persuasive definition of ‘sacrifice.’ For, while we can speak of 
sacrifice in terms of ritualistic immolation, today the term is more commonly invoked 
metaphorically and secularly: we speak of civic or social sacrifice, sacrifice in war, or 
sacrifice in interpersonal relationships (Strenski, Theology 1). Philip McCosker 
agrees, aptly stating: “like the category of ‘religion,’ there is no one universally 
functional definition of sacrifice” (133). For Strenski, sacrifice has “fallen on hard 
times”: it is a word that is at once heroic and yet repellant (Theology 1). Sacrifice has 
gained a bad reputation, not only because, in the post-Enlightenment attempt to 
explain the ‘savage mind,’ it has been associated with ‘the primitive,’ but also 
because of its connection with war.
31
 How, Strenski asks, can we speak of a concept 
that overshadows Western history (it appears in Abrahamic religion, in Greek and 
Roman history and myth) when we cannot use the term consistently? Clearly, the 
metaphorical use of the term ‘sacrifice’ to describe interpersonal relationships in the 
twenty-first century is a far cry from the so-called ‘disturbing’ and ‘primitive’ bloody 
sacrifices of the Ancient Aztecs. Although the etymology of ‘sacrifice’ – sacer 
meaning ‘sacred’ or ‘holy’ or ‘religious’ – doesn’t help us explain modern uses of the 
term, this etymology is integral to Strenski, when he discusses what he sees as the 
first real theory of sacrifice; what he sees as the first definitive theory to emerge out of 
either religious or secular enquiry.
32
  
According to Strenski, the first serious effort to define and theorise sacrifice 
was the work of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century French sociologists 
Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert. Strenski says that their 1899 work of comparative 
anthropology, Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function, can be called the first theory of 
sacrifice, not least because it is a full-length enquiry into the subject, and remains the 
                                                        
31 Indeed, the connection between war and sacrifice has never really gone away – ‘The Holocaust,’ 
for example, no doubt refers to the mass genocide of six-million Jews during World War II (although 
in Hebrew, the Holocaust is referred to as Shoah or ‘catastrophe’ or ‘calamity’) but it is also a term 
that, Biblically, refers to a sacrifice in which an offering is “consumed by fire; a whole burnt offering” 
(“Holocaust”).        
32 I am aware that the definition of ‘religion’ is also problematic, but for the purpose of this 
exegesis I will adopt Émile Durkheim’s definition of religion which appears in his 1912 work The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life, because it aligns with my interest in anthropology and sociology. 
In Religious Life, Durkheim says that religion: “is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to 
sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden” (47).  
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most influential work ever written about the topic (Theology 19). Through their 
secular approach to theorising and defining sacrifice, Mauss and Hubert steer clear of 
restricting the study of sacrifice to discussions about the ‘primitive,’ and instead 
attempt to study it as an objective phenomenon. The sociologists also avoided 
condemning religion and sacrifice, instead working to understand the significance and 
function of religious violence in the development of human civilisation. Such is the 
intention of Bataille, who, like Mauss and Hubert does not try to occlude or erase the 
violent origins or religions the way that religions do themselves.  
While Mauss and Hubert signpost a single definition of sacrifice, Nick Allen 
argues that Mauss and Hubert in fact offer two different, although complementary, 
definitions (“Using Hubert and Mauss to Think About Sacrifice” 155). The first 
definition – the definition that Mauss and Hubert flag as their only definition – 
describes sacrifice as “a religious act which, through the consecration of a victim, 
modifies the condition of the moral person who accomplishes it or of certain objects 
in which that person is interested” (Sacrifice 13). What makes a sacrifice a sacrifice is 
the making holy, the consecrating, of the victim – an action that reflects the 
etymology of sacrifice.
33
 By this definition, Allen maintains that Mauss and Hubert 
understand sacrifice as a religious act where (although they do not use the term 
‘destruction’), the destruction of the victim is the means by which the victim is 
consecrated. Something is then imparted to the spectators through the victim’s 
oblation. The victim of the sacrifice, according to Mauss and Hubert, can be plant, 
animal or human (Sacrifice 151-155).  
The second definition – the definition that Allen suggests is the stronger of 
the two – is found in Mauss’ and Hubert’s conclusion, where they contend that 
sacrifice  
consists in establishing a means of communication between the 
sacred and the profane worlds through the mediation of a victim, 
that is, of a thing that in the course of the ceremony is destroyed. 
(Sacrifice 97) 
                                                        
33 It is important to clarify just what Mauss and Hubert mean by ‘consecration,’ especially if we are 
to differentiate it from the term ‘sacrifice.’ According to Mauss and Hubert: “sacrifice always implies a 
consecration; in every sacrifice an object passes from the common into the religious domain; it is 
consecrated” (9). They propose that the transformative nature of death in sacrifice ‘sacralises’ the 
victim and extends this sense of consecration – this connection with the world of the sacred – onto the 
spectators of the sacrifice.      
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This definition, Allen argues, better expresses the nature and function of sacrifice 
because it refers to the procedure by which a victim is used to establish 
communication between the realms of the sacred and profane (155). In exploring the 
nature and function of sacrifice, Mauss and Hubert employ Durkheim’s definitions of 
the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane.’ Durkheim’s definitions of the sacred and the profane 
were inextricably linked to his theory of religion, and he explored all three concepts in 
his 1912 work The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. In Religious Life Durkheim 
says that all religious thought divides the sacred from the profane (37). The sacred is 
that which represents the unity and strength of the community, the profane being that 
which represents individuality.
34
 This sacred/profane dichotomy clarifies Durkheim’s 
conviction that at its core, religion is a social (communal, and therefore sacred) tool 
that maintains cohesion between and control over the (profane) individuals within a 
society. When Durkheim says that “sacred things are simply collective ideals” (“The 
Dualism of Human Nature and its Social Conditions” 159), he is arguing that, if 
individuals are left to their own devices, their beliefs will falter – what is needed to 
strengthen and maintain the beliefs of individuals is community and society. Religion, 
for Durkheim, is the ‘glue’ that holds society and culture together. A division between 
the concepts of the sacred and the profane, Durkheim argues, manifests itself through 
a hierarchy of objects, where the sacred object is ranked higher than the profane 
object, for example in the way that a chalice might be removed from the world of the 
profane, sanctified and dedicated to sacred wine. Following Durkheim, Hubert and 
Mauss believe that every sacrifice demands this movement from the profane to the 
sacred. They also contend that sacrifice is necessarily a religious task. It is a task that, 
at its core, is concerned with the unification of a community through the 
communication between what they call the ‘sacrifier’ – the spectators, the desirers, of 
the sacrifice – and the victim, and the communication between the profane and the 
sacred:  
The purpose of the whole rite is to increase the religiosity of the 
sacrifier. To this end he had to be associated as closely as possible 
with the victim, because it is thanks to the strength that the act of 
consecration has built up in the victim that he acquires this desired 
                                                        
34 It is important to note that, for Durkheim, ‘individual’ does not mean the same as “a single 
person or thing; or some one member of a class” (“Individual”), but rather refers to a being that is 
separated, alienated, or isolated from others. 
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characteristic. In this case, we may say that the characteristic whose 
transmission is the very aim of the sacrifice passes from the victim 
to the sacrifier. (Durkheim, Religious Life, emphasis in original 52) 
For Allen, and, it would seem for Mauss and Hubert, the sacrificial victim’s 
consecration and subsequent destruction are the two most significant elements of the 
sacrificial ceremony, not only because such ceremonial violence allows the victim to 
move from the realm of the profane to the world of the sacred, but because the 
destruction of the victim allows the spectators (the sacrifier), who belong to the realm 
of the profane, to commune with the world of the sacred.  
While Mauss’ and Hubert’s intention in Sacrifice is to define the nature and 
social function of sacrifice, they also admit that defining sacrifice is not only 
problematic, but that their definition will not encompass all cases because of 
variations of sacrificial practices and their multiple meanings in different cultures and 
eras (Sacrifice 19). Theirs is not a totalising definition, but it is, they assert, broader 
than the Catholic notion of expiatory or Eucharistic sacrifice. It is through this 
definition, they say, that they hope to glean the essential human nature, or human 
qualities, of sacrifice. Mauss and Hubert also concede that, while sacrifice doesn’t 
appear in all cultures (for example, they say that there are no sacrifices in Australian 
Aboriginal cultures), sacrifice isn’t a religious phenomenon confined to Europe. Thus 
their work is filled with instances of sacrificial practices in Hindu, Vedic, Ancient 
Greek and Roman, Jewish, Mexican and Christian cultures. 
 Although extrapolating a single definition of sacrifice from a global practice 
may seem a daunting task, this is exactly what Mauss and Hubert do in creating their 
theory of ritual sacrifice. Here I say ‘ritual sacrifice’ rather than ‘human’ or ‘animal’ 
sacrifice, because Mauss and Hubert believe that victims are defined by their 
‘victimisation’; by their destruction rather than by their nature (Sacrifice 12). Thus, 
they claim that a sacrificial victim can be anything from plants, food, animals or 
humans, so long as it is destroyed in a sacrificial ceremony, a ceremony that is both 
ritualistic and a public spectacle (12). The sacrificial ceremony, they say, involves 
three major players: first, the sacrifier, or the individual, the family or the crowd who 
gain something from the sacrifice (the sacrifier belong(s) to the realm of the profane 
and gains momentary admission into the world of the sacred through the destruction 
of the victim). Second, they define the sacrifice as the priest or official executioner 
who is the link between the sacred and the profane worlds. Third, the victim, or that 
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which, through being destroyed, binds the sacred with the sacrifier. Mauss and Hubert 
argue that in sacrifice the victim and sacrifier fuse through the victim’s destruction, 
and it is their destruction (for example, the desecration of sacred plants or objects, or 
the victim’s death) that restores a divine principle. This ‘divine principle,’ according 
to Mauss and Hubert, is found in ritual sacrifices that involve the victim’s death, 
where the victim’s most sacred possession – their life – is imprisoned in their 
(profane) body, and it is only through death that their (sacred) spirit is released into 
the world. This release restores communication between the realms of the sacred and 
the profane, and between the victim and the spectators (19-45). 
While cultural and political notions of sacrifice in modern France were 
largely informed by the Catholic notions of Eucharistic and expiatory sacrifice, or the 
Protestant branch of ‘Christian Science,’ Mauss and Hubert believed that neither 
sect’s interpretation of sacrifice was more convincing than the other’s. Strenski tells 
us that this “motley” group of “agnostics, atheists and rationalists” (the sociologists) 
relished in provoking their religious opponents (Theology 10, 20). In one 1898 letter, 
Hubert, referring to their intentions with their then-upcoming publication Sacrifice, 
wrote to Mauss saying that: 
We shouldn’t miss a chance to make trouble for these good, but 
badly informed souls [the Christian theologians]. Let’s stress the 
direction of our work, let’s be clear about our aims so that they are 
pointed, sharp like razors, and so that they are treacherous. Let’s go! 




It was these badly informed souls, namely, the Protestants, that Mauss and Hubert 
believed had no right to call their investigations into sacrifice and the crucifixion 
‘scientific’ (Strenski, Theology 11). The sociologists felt that despite the Protestants’ 
“sincere intentions,” their attempt to scientifically theorise sacrifice “turned out to be 
more confessional and theological than universally human” (11). 
But the sociologists didn’t simply reject what they saw as the quasi-scientific 
Protestant method of enquiry into sacrifice, they also disagreed with the Christian 
theology of sacrifice. In “The Sacrifice of God,” Mauss and Hubert say “it is in the 
                                                        
35 For Strenski, what was also so daring about Mauss’ and Hubert’s sacrifice was that it “was one of 




sacrifice of the divine personage that the idea of sacrifice attains its highest 
expression” (Sacrifice 77). That is, beyond the horror of animal sacrifice, beyond the 
extremity of human sacrifice even, is the supreme sacrifice of the god: something so 
powerful that it has, Mauss and Hubert say, been the cataclysmic point on which 
countless religions have based their origin stories. Mauss and Hubert believed that, as 
in the Christian tradition, there were countless cases of the sacrifice of a god, in which 
a human takes on the role of the victim-deity. While a human victim may be 
sacrificed, “it is still the god who undergoes the sacrifice; he [sic] is not a mere 
character in it” (Sacrifice 88). Thus Mauss and Hubert contend that to overlook the 
connection between a god and a sacrifice is to drain the sacrifice of power and 
significance. This, as we shall see, is a position that Bataille would go on to contest in 
his own theory of sacrifice. Yet in order for a god to be sacrificed, Mauss and Hubert 
say that many religions have held that the god must first “descend to the role of a 
victim” (77); must, in the case of Christ, take on a human form.  
Mauss and Hubert also reject the Catholic notions of Eucharistic and 
expiatory sacrifice. They argue that, in contrast to the Catholic belief that sacrifice is a 
‘giving up’ of the self, sacrifice is instead a ‘giving of.’ While they believe that 
sacrifice demands ‘destruction,’ they don’t believe that total annihilation or death, as 
is the demand in Catholic sacrifice, is at the heart of sacrifice. Mauss and Hubert 
voice their position in Sacrifice when they say that the “sacrifier gives up something 
of himself but he does not give himself” (100). Their stance on sacrifice also rejects 
the Catholic requirement of expiation, for, according to Mauss and Hubert, expiation 
alone does not function as a “real type of sacrifice” (Sacrifice 14). Mauss and Hubert 
argue that expiation is only an occasional factor in sacrifice and not at the very heart 
of sacrifice.  
But perhaps their boldest argument against the Christian interpretation of 
sacrifice was Mauss’ and Hubert’s questioning whether Christ’s crucifixion was a 
sacrifice at all. Durkheim, Mauss and Hubert believed that Christ’s death at Calvary 
was no more than a representation or idea of what a perfect sacrifice could be: it was a 
blueprint, a model of sacrifice that was built on older traditions of sacrifice (Strenski, 
Theology 52). Mauss and Hubert, who understood the allegorical implications, and 
the literary, mythic and literal qualities of sacrifice, would have come to this 
conclusion through their reading of the first chapter of Sir James Frazer’s 1890 The 
Golden Bough. In the chapter “The King of the Wood,” Frazer outlines the 
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mythological trope of the king who dies for the sake of his people, who then 
resurrects or is replaced by a worthy rival who continues the king’s legacy. Frazer 
sees the death and rebirth of the ‘king’ (that is, God) as allegorical, whereas in 
Christianity the death and rebirth of the ‘king’ must be literal. Frazer claims that this 
allegory was popular in many mythical, legendary, and religious stories and was not 
unique to Christianity.  
 
3. Assenting to Life, up to the Point of Death: An Introduction to Bataille and 
Sacrifice 
While the sociologists and anthropologists tried to decentre Catholic theology from 
public discourse about sacrifice, and while the Catholics maintained that their visions 
of expiation and Eucharistic theology were unique, the residual impact of the 
sociologists and the Catholics went on to inform new thinkers and new theories of 
ritual sacrifice. It was out of their combative positions that French philosopher 
Georges Bataille developed his theory of sacrifice. What makes Bataille an apostate 
figure for my study is that the proposals that I have just made – of the sociological 
and Christian interpretations of sacrifice, of the sacred/profane dichotomy, and of the 
significance of sacrifice in modern French thought – all coalesce in his work. For 
Strenski, “[c]ontrary to what one might conclude from his well-deserved reputation as 
a pornographer, Georges Bataille really fits nicely into a tradition of French Catholic 
religious thought about religious sacrifice” (Theology 33). Bataille fits so well into 
this discussion because although he was invested in the sociological and 
anthropological enquiry into sacrifice: he wrote on Mauss’ notions of ‘the gift’ and 
‘potlatch,’ and he went on to form the Collège de Sociologie, and he also worked to 
reevaluate classic Catholic notions of sacrifice.
36, 37
 Bataille’s experience of growing 
up with France’s Catholic cultural inheritance (as well as his own, for Bataille 
                                                        
36 Potlatch is a Native American practice where objects are exchanged in a unique form of gift-
giving. In potlatch, rival forces give ‘gifts’ to opposing sides. Every gift that is given must be returned 
in some way so that there is a perpetual cycle of exchanges. Sometimes the return must be of equal 
value, and other times the return must be of greater value. Bataille clarifies that this gift-giving 
ceremony also possesses a sacrificial element, in which the ‘giver’ demonstrates their wealth by 
willfully destroying their own possessions in front of their rival. 
37 The Collège de Sociologie was a small group of French intellectuals who met between 1937-39. 
Members included Bataille, Callois, and Klossowski, among others. The sociologists’ discussion, 
which revolved around the sacred, ritual, sacrifice and communal experience, informed their positions 
on French politics, war, religion and the growing menace of fascism (1). For more information refer to 
Michèle H. Richman’s 2002 Sacred Revolutions: Durkheim and the Collège de Sociologie; Denis 
Hollier’s 1988 The College of Sociology 1937-39; or Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi’s 2011 Rethinking 
the Political: The Sacred, Aesthetic Politics and the Collège de Sociologie.    
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converted to Catholicism at seventeen only to suffer a deconversion a year later) is 
something that he worked within. It is the combination of this Catholic cultural 
inheritance as well as his sociological inheritance that allowed Bataille to develop a 
new approach to the interpretation of sacrifice. Bataille, I believe, is indebted to both 
his religious and secular forebears and contemporaries, without which his theory of 
sacrifice would not work. For it was across this religious/secular divide that Bataille 
developed a theory and practice in which he attempted to reinvigorate the significance 
of sacrifice without relinquishing the Christian God or any other god. Thus Bataille’s 
approach both to his writing and his very life isn’t secular: the secular and the 
religious were held in productive tension rather than blended.  
Bataille was aware that the term ‘sacrifice’ does not possess a routine or 
singular definition because of the countless possible variations of sacrifice. Whatever 
orthodoxy or religious doctrine may say, when theorists of comparative religion 
investigated sacrifice, they found no standard definition. Sacrifice is associated with 
certain rituals and has many motives and functions, but there is no singular function 
of sacrifice. But whatever form it takes, and for whatever purpose, sacrifice inevitably 
requires the following of rules. Across different cultures and societies, sacrifice tends 
to incorporate people of religious authority and so, whatever purpose it serves or 
ritual it follows, sacrifice can be regarded as a form of religious violence, even if not 
all forms of religious violence are necessarily sacrificial.  
It was this very connection between sacrifice and religious violence or, we 
might say, the religious narrative of a sacrificial death as securing life, that made 
sacrifice so significant for Bataille. According to Tiina Arppe, Bataille saw sacrifice 
as “a means of sharing the experience of death which constitutes the repulsive core of 
human community” (31). Bataille, Arppe believes, takes a phenomenological 
approach to his reading of sacrifice. Bataille believed that the exacerbation of 
humanity’s repulsive, violent, core (in the form of the spectacle or festival of 
sacrifice) also allowed people to momentarily break free from their mundane 
existence. This momentary explosion of violence in the otherwise utter monotony of 
everyday life was never more important, Bataille believed, than in the modern world 
where, because of the triumph of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois Christianity, people 
had lost their connection with an older, primordial world. Bataille also uses his 
investigation into sacrifice as a way of explaining the origins of human civilisation, 
culture and society. Thus it was possible for Bataille, even as an atheist, to value 
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sacrifice: he understood sacrifice as a form of excess and therefore in opposition to 
modern capitalism (although in postmodernity the relationship that he saw as existing 
between excess and capitalism would change); he believed that like religion it needed 
to be explained; it functioned as a peculiar and specific form of religious violence; he 
believed that it signaled the survival of the pre-modern world while nevertheless 
remaining central to modern Christianity; but he believed that the Christian attempt to 
explain sacrifice was a failure; and he believed that sacrifice was a way of renewing 
modern life because it was, paradoxically, the most definitive aspect of being alive: it 
was a confrontation with death.
38
   
 
3.1 The Fundamentals of Bataillean Sacrifice: Modern Life, Individuation, and 
Religion 
We know that Bataille, like Mauss and Hubert, subscribed to the etymological origins 
of ‘sacrifice,’ which he says in his essay “The Notion of Expenditure” is “nothing 
other than the production of sacred things” (Visions of Excess 119). Jesse 
Goldhammer argues that Bataille’s view of sacrifice changed before and after World 
Wars I and II, supporting my view that Bataille never stopped thinking about sacrifice 
all his life.
39
 It is also worth noting that before he attended the seminary Bataille was 
conscripted for service in World War I.
40
 While I will say more in due course about 
his involvement with and position on war, and the links he draws between war and 
sacrifice, it is important to note that Bataille theorists (among them, Surya, Noys and 
Hegarty) believe that Bataille saw war, although catastrophic and disastrous, as a sign 
of the horrific violence inherent in humans.  
Though Goldhammer is correct – that Bataille’s vision of sacrifice changed 
between the wars and over the course of his life – for obvious reasons I will not cover 
every avenue of Bataille’s theory of sacrifice in this exegesis. I will begin by asking 
what Bataille understood as the nature of sacrifice. According to Bataille, sacrifice 
                                                        
38 Benjamin Noys, among others (Jean-Joseph Goux, Fred Botting and Scott Wilson), proposes that 
Bataille’s critique of twentieth-century capitalism does not reflect twenty-first century capitalism. 
Bataille, Noys says, could only write about his experience of capitalism – he could not have predicted 
the ways that capitalism shifted and changed in postmodernity (Georges Bataille: An Introduction 
118). I will say more about the critiques of Bataille’s interpretation of capitalism in due course.  
39 Before World War II, Bataille believed that the modern incarnation of sacrifice could be found in 
what he referred to as the ‘waste products’ of eroticism, literature and laughter, whereas after the war, 
Bataille applied his pre-war notion of sacrifice to what Goldhammer sees as utilitarian projects – the 
Marshall Plan, and the prevention of nuclear war (Headless 153-54). 
40 Bataille never fought, but was sent home after developing tuberculosis. 
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above all is violent, as it was in Christian, Roman and ‘primitive’ societies. However, 
unlike the sacrificial violence in these societies, Bataille resists attempts in the present 
to consign sacrifice to the past (or to an exclusively ‘primordial world’). In an effort 
to overcome the loss of sacrifice and the sacred in the modern world, Bataille seeks to 
disrupt secular bourgeois values that he believes leads to the loss of the sacred.  
The significance of sacrifice, for Bataille, was its power: its ability to 
overturn and overthrow the humdrum everyday life that had emerged out of the 
triumph of the middle class in the nineteenth-century. The bourgeoisie privileged (and 
fantasised about) a world of security and rationality, of economic and financial 
stability, as well as moral and ethical decency. In his 1986 work Heterologies: 
Discourse on the Other, French Jesuit and theorist Michel de Certeau tracks the 
origins of the bourgeoisie and rationality in modern society. He argues that, in order 
for a society to be ‘rational’ or ‘modern,’ it must be populated by individualists: 
individualism de Certeau says, “was born with modernity itself” (209). While 
individualism is the very mark of the bourgeois, it might not be immediately clear just 
how the individualism of the bourgeois is connected to this discussion of sacrifice. It 
is important to recall Durkheim’s discussion on pre-modern religion and society, and 
his belief that individualism was tied up with the profane, whereas the community’s 
sense of communality are bound up with the sacred (where the strength of the religion 
and the conviction in belief reside in communality, and the unification of a 
community was secured at an enormous social cost). It is fascinating that this sense of 
separation would be of such significance to Bataille; Bataille, who went on to claim 
that individuation was one of the most crippling forces of modern society, and that it 
was only through the decimating horrors of sacrifice that we could hope to pierce our 
‘individuality’ – that is, the isolating prison of the self – and communicate openly and 
sincerely with one another. It must be made clear, of course, that Bataille isn’t 
supporting the quasi-religious interpretation of sacrifice that a nation like France 
(among others) adopted during World War I.
41
    
According to David Krell, Bataille’s rejection of secular modern society is 
not only a rejection of the modern world’s attempts both to control the natural world 
                                                        
41 It must also be made clear that, while Bataille’s fascination with sacrifice, which was perhaps at 
its highest during both World Wars I and II, saw him ostracised from an intellectual community that 
opposed war and, on occasion, saw Bataille’s contemporaries mistakenly label him as a Nazi-
sympathiser, Bataille, in actuality, opposed both wars and was vehemently anti-Fascist. I will discuss 
this further in due course.  
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and yet also remove humans from the natural world (to form a rational, calculating 
society), but is a rejection of modern society’s distancing itself from (or overcoming 
of) older religious and sacred worlds (ix). Bataille believed that even the church 
wasn’t exempt from the secularising modern world: Christianity, he argued, had 
become the religion of the bourgeoisie, the religion of the middle class. In modernity, 
Bataille felt that Christianity had gradually shifted from a religion represented by a 
wrathful god who demanded blood, sacrifice and expiation, to a merciful religion, 
where, to foreshadow the significance of Nietzsche’s belief that Christianity was the 
religion of the weak, Christ’s meekness trumped violence, where depictions of 
sacrifice were no longer horrific but were now seemingly clean and bloodless. It is 
important to keep in mind that Bataille never suggests that Christianity has ‘gone 
away,’ but rather that modern Christianity – the Christianity of the bourgeoisie – has 
distanced itself from its sacrificial, mythical origins.
42
  
And if this was the fate of Bataille’s era – the disenchantment of the world, 
the rationalisation and calculation of society, the absence of myth – then it was a fate 
that was, as Bataille saw it, terribly boring. Bataille, who seems to have developed a 
nostalgic view of early Christianity, was bored by the bourgeoisie. In his introduction 
to Bataille’s 1945 work On Nietzsche, Sylvère Lotringer says that boredom 
characterised much of Bataille’s early adult life (viii). Because of their obsession with 
comfort and their pursuit of an unchallenging, risk-free, constraining and restraining 
life, the bourgeoisie rejected Bataille’s fundamental requirement for communication: 
that to connect or communicate with others demanded that one put oneself at risk.
43
  
Bataille actively opposed the safety and comfort of modern life: he lived his 
resistance not only through his frequenting of brothels and bars, but also through his 
creation of the secret society Acéphale and his plans to stage a ritual human sacrifice. 
What characterises Bataille’s life and work is his emotional investment in his theory 
and fiction; his drive to ‘live out’ and experience the very concepts that he worked 
                                                        
42 In an instance that is startlingly reminiscent of Nietzsche’s death of God thesis, Bataille proposes 
that, in secularised modernity, we suffer the ‘absence of myth.’ It is possible, of course, to historically 
and intellectually locate Bataille’s ideas, for Bataille it seems developed his declaration of the death of 
myth out of Max Weber’s 1917 proclamation that: “[t]he fate of our times is characterised by 
rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the ‘disenchantment of the world’” (Weber qtd. 
in Koshul 11-12). 
43 Consider Christopher Forth’s work on masculinity, civilisation, and the modern west. Forth 
explores the common apprehension that idealised masculinity cannot persist in modernity, where a 
general softening and feminising of society has replaced the primal brutality of masculinity in the past 
(be this a true or a false impression of the past), where forests and mountains and savagery have been 
replaced by cities, politeness, and the pursuit of comfort.  
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with. Although Bataille knew that it wasn’t possible to carry out ritual sacrifices in the 
modern world, he nevertheless believed that sacrifice was one way of escaping 
bourgeois life.
44
 It was this very drive to overcome the ‘safe distance’ that separated 
theory from practice that led Bataille to reassess the theorists who had originally 
informed his work. In a 1939 letter to friend and fellow philosopher, Michel Leiris, 
Bataille expresses his feelings of disillusionment, not only with nineteenth-century 
anthropologists and sociologists, but also with the Collège de Sociologie. Bataille says 
that, while he is compelled to practice his theory, such motivations stand in direct 
contrast with the rules of Durkehim, Mauss and Hubert, who abided by the “rules of 
sociological methodology that exclude lived experience as the basis of analysis” 
(Bataille, Georges Bataille, Michel Leiris: Correspondence 128).      
Yet Bataille’s rejection of the scientific method didn’t mean that the 
Christian theology that informed his theory triumphed. Although Bataille’s theory is 
no doubt primed by his time at the seminary, we mustn’t suppose that for Bataille 
sacrifice demands the annihilation of the victim as it did for the Catholics. While 
Strenski is right to say that Bataille’s view of sacrifice, like the Catholics’, “runs to 
the extreme” (Theology 55), it is important to stress that, although Bataille explicitly 
states that “[t]he principle of sacrifice is destruction” (Theory of Religion 43), he goes 
on to clarify that  “the destruction that sacrifice is intended to bring about is not 
annihilation” (my emphasis 43).
45
 That is: “[k]illing in the literal sense is not 
necessary” (45).  
According to Bataille, it would be wrong to assume that the only violence in 
sacrifice is the execution. Instead, Bataille believed that the violence of sacrifice 
emerges out of the community’s collective horror at their desire for sacrifice. In “The 
Phaedra Complex” Bataille says that “[i]t is obviously the combination of abhorrence 
and desire that gives the sacred world its paradoxical character” (Accursed Share Vol. 
II and III 95). Thus the sensation of the sacred which, in Bataille’s system, is brought 
about through sacrifice, is the sensation of an ambivalent, simultaneous and violent 
                                                        
44 Bataille is, however, vulnerable to a critique of modernity. As I have said, Bataille lived out his 
resistance through attending brothels and bars. And, while he may have contemplated the possibility of 
staging a ritual sacrificice, Hegarty reminds us that Bataille: “does not propose a return to human 
sacrifice” (45).  
45 Bataille offers a beautiful clarification of this when he compares sacrifice to the experience of 
standing at a great height: “We draw near to the void, but not in order to fall into it. We want to be 
intoxicated with vertigo, and the image of the fall suffices for this” (Accursed Share Vol. II and III 





 This conflicted sensation is what Bataille refers to as ‘anguish.’ 
Sylvère Lotringer says that, according Bataille, anguish is always on the “threshold to 
ecstasy” (xi), a threshold, he says, that is crossed in sacrifice. Bataille says that we 
may find it hard to imagine that we would not withdraw from the things that disgust 
us, from bloody images of sacrifice. However, he posits that our withdrawal comes 
about from our desire for the things that disgust us (Accursed Share Vol. II and III 
95). In a collection of notes that follow his diary-esque 1943 work Inner Experience, 
Bataille cries out to his readers: “SACRIFICE IS THE COMMUNICATION OF 
ANGUISH” (emphasis in original 194). Desire and horror, ecstasy and anxiety – 
anguish – are, for Bataille, what is communicated in sacrifice. 
 
3.2 Achieving the Dialect: Sacrifice as Communication 
It may seem peculiar that Bataille understands sacrifice as enabling, of all things, 
communication, even if it is the communication of anguish. Yet communication is 
central to Bataille’s theory of sacrifice. Certainly, Bataille was not referring to 
contemporary semiotic notions of communication, to sign systems or to theories of 
language that we find in the earlier works of people like Locke or Saussure. Bataille 
didn’t believe that it was possible to ‘communicate’ in day-to-day life. Because 
language had already capitulated to utilitarianism (and I will say more about Bataille 
and utilitarianism shortly), Bataille felt that it was impossible for people to engage 
with one another within the realm of productivity – a realm that sapped all meaning 
from communication. Instead, Bataille argued that it was only through undergoing 
experiences in which individuals were at risk that people were able to communicate 
with one another (Unfinished System 29), where senseless waste and expenditure (the 
waste and expenditure of a human being sacrificed) were what facilitated 
communication. Humans can only communicate, Bataille says, when they put 
themselves at risk, when they render themselves “penetrable to one another . . . thus: 
all ‘communication’ partakes of suicide and crime” (Unfinished System 30). That is, 
the community’s mixed desire and horror at the violence of a sacrifice allows the 
community to experience a rift in their day-to-day lives. By putting themselves at 
                                                        
46 Phaedra is a tragic Ancient Greek figure who appeared in the work of Roman poet Seneca the 
Younger in 50CE, and before that, in the work of Greek dramatist Euripides in 428 BCE. The tragedy 
of Phaedra is centred on queen Phaedra’s uncontrollable and incestuous passion for her stepson, 
Hippolytus. What is so compelling about this narrative is that the Ancient Greeks and Romans were no 
doubt aware of the power of erotic desire – of its potential to excite both extreme joy and horror.  
 
 31 
risk/being put at risk, the spectators at a sacrifice communicate with one another 
through their shared desire and horror, and their shared vulnerability. Sacrifice, 
Bataille believes, is therefore always a form of self-sacrifice: of putting oneself at 
risk. 
Bataille’s notion of sacrifice required a reinterpretation of the crucifixion. 
Bataille argues that the faithful initially understood Christ’s wounding as the bridge 
that closed the gap in communication between God and humans, and, in the twentieth 
century (after the death of God), sacrifice, or the essence of sacrifice (which for 
Bataille was not restricted to violence and blood, but could also be transformed into 
and understood through eroticism, literature (poetry) and laughter) closed the 
inevitable gap in communication between humans and humans. That is, after the 
death of God, Bataille understood communication as a way of connecting with others 
and as a way of attempting to escape the isolating prison of the self. It was this 
centrality of communication both in sacrifice and in religion that was central to 
Bataille’s decision to leave the seminary.  
While there are various accounts of Bataille’s deconversion, Michael 
Richardson posits that Bataille’s renunciation of faith was not rooted in his belief that 
Christianity was too oppressive or austere, but rather in his conviction that 
Christianity was not religious enough.
47
 Bataille, Richardson says, saw Christianity as 
denying an element that was essential to all religions: Christianity refused 
communication, and communication, Bataille believed, was at the heart of ‘the 
sacred,’ and therefore of religion (176). While early Christians, Bataille says, 
understood the crucifixion as a form of communication, he believed that modern 
Christianity’s attempt to remove itself from the ‘primitivity’ of sacrifice had created a 
“watered down” version of Christianity that denied communication.
48
 It is for this 
reason, Bataille says in his 1957 work Erotism, that of all religions Christianity is 
“possibly the least religious” (Erotism 32). Though Bataille here is talking 
                                                        
47 Biographer Michel Surya admits that “we do not know why” (23) Bataille left the seminary, but 
suggests that Bataille’s correspondence with one ‘Miss C.’ may have led to his renunciation of the faith 
(45-47). While Stuart Kendall says that Bataille abandoned the seminary in favour of a scholarly 
vocation (Introduction, Unfinished System xiii), Jeremy Biles proposes that between Bataille’s reading 
of the ecstasy of the mystics and his reading of Medieval eroticism he made the decision to abandon 
the church (89). Still others – Michael Richardson for one – say that Bataille “lost his faith and his 
vocation during a stay at a Benedictine monastery on the Isle of Wight because ‘his Catholicism caused 
a woman he loved to shed tears’” (Georges Bataille 20; see also Inner Experience 199).     
48 According to Wittman, a lot of Bataille’s work has to do with “the subversion of Christianity, or, 
he would say, in actuality, a more authentic experience of Christ’s dereliction that a lot of the history of 
Christianity has sort of watered down and made us more comfortable with” (Harrison). 
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specifically of Christianity’s rejection of eroticism, his interpretation of eroticism as a 
modern form of sacrifice necessitates the centrality of communication: that eroticism 
– which according to Bataille demands, like sacrifice, the loss of individuality – gives 
way to communication.  
Bataille’s position on sacrifice, anguish, communication and the crucifixion 
stands in contrast to the view of French historian and philosopher René Girard, whose 
ideas and theories of sacrifice are much better known than Bataille’s. In a comment 
that makes Bataille’s notion of sacrifice stand brilliantly apart from Girard’s, Strenski 
says that, far from showing sympathy for the suffering victim or disgust at the 
injustice of victimisation, “Bataille projects what may seem a theatrical perversity in 
meditating [ . . . ] on sacrificial (and other) violence and then even celebrating it” 
(Theology 55). Unlike Girard, who bases his understanding of sacrifice on the 
experience of the hapless victim, Bataille is more interested in the unification of a 
community through sacrifice. What leads this experience away from the individual 
and into the community is the individual’s awareness that the crowd they are 
immersed in is feeling the same way: both experience horror and desire – anguish – at 
witnessing the sacrificial victim’s death. As Goldhammer says: “[s]acrifice cultivates 
community by fostering a nondiscursive communication between human beings 
whose sundered individuality permits the formation of an ecstatic bond” (Headless 
163). It is this shared experience that maintains and strengthens community. And 
what is being ‘sacrificed’ at a sacrifice, according to Bataille, is not just the victim, 
but also individuality and individuation. What is created out of this destruction is 
communality and community, albeit a community founded not on gain and 
accumulation, but rather a community that is unified through loss. In Inner 
Experience Bataille says that for a group that is experiencing the motions of anguish 
at a sacrifice, there is “no longer either isolation or death. Isolation is resolved in the 
communication of anguish. And death can only strike the isolated individual [the 
victim], it cannot annihilate the group” (196). Thus isolation and individuation are 
destroyed; the individual, the victim, dies to facilitate communion within the 
community. And so, death cannot touch the community because it is unified through 
its shared anguish. 
 
3.3 Only Lovers Left Alive: Bataillean Sacrifice and Community 
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It may seem odd that, of all things, Bataille believes that a community is created or 
maintained through sacrifice. Nevertheless, Jesse Goldhammer argues that other 
French theorists, like de Maistre and Sorel, believed that community was forged from 
the fires of sacrifice, and that modern society was void of community. But despite 
these conservative Christian criticisms of modernity, Bataille largely departed from de 
Maistre’s and Sorel’s positions on sacrifice and community. Instead, Bataille believed 
that the violence of sacrifice led to “unrecoverable loss” rather than, as de Maistre and 
Sorel believed, to the revival of a persisting social order or the creation of a new order 
(Goldhammer, Headless 162). Laura Wittman says that, when Bataille talks about a 
community that is founded on the shared experience of sacrifice, it is a very different 
concept of community than what we understand as community today. Goldhammer 
agrees, saying that sacrifice cannot form communities that are based on 
“republicanism, monarchism, or anarcho-syndicalism,” because such communities 
bury their sacrificial origins by attempting to reinstate authority, or a head, which 
Bataille, as we have seen with his creation of Acéphale, is so adamant to cut off 
(Headless 163).      
The sort of sacrificial community that Bataille envisioned clearly did not 
exist in modern France.
49
 Nevertheless, Niklaus Largier argues that Bataille wasn’t a 
nostalgic or romantic theorist who longed to return to an earlier sacrificial world. 
Rather, Largier sees Bataille as a theorist who accepted his life in modern France, but 
who nevertheless critiqued and challenged the modern condition. For Zeynep Direk, 
Bataille’s talk of a ‘return’ to communality, or what Bataille refers to as a return to 
‘lost intimacy,’ is his desire to acquire “the self-consciousness of what we already are 
in our historical forgetfulness” (Direk, “Erotic Experience” 100). That is, Bataille 
does not delude himself into thinking that we can return to a past sense of 
communality through sacrifice as the conservative Catholics believed, or as was 
believed during World War I (with the drive to reinforce a sense of ‘national 
community’). Instead, Bataille, who positions himself very much outside of these 
theories, believes that our desire for a state of communality is something that we can 
never fully return to because such a state may never have existed. As Direk says, 
Bataille felt that the desire that we feel in sacrifice, as in eroticism, is the desire “to 
                                                        
49 But of course it is easy to see how Bataille could have imagined or even pined for a sacrificial 
society without an authority, without a head, for over a century earlier the people of France had 
beheaded their monarch, King Louis XVI.   
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regain an intimacy that was always strangely lost, and that intimacy that we have ‘the 
consciousness of having lost’ is our own animality” (emphasis in original 100).  
 
3.4 Sacrifice as a Return to Intimacy: An Introduction to Bataille’s Sacred and 
Profane 
In his posthumously published 1973 work Theory of Religion, Bataille attempts to 
explain his notions of animality, intimacy, communication, and sacrifice through an 
anthropological rereading of religion, and his theorisation of the history of the origins 
of society. Bataille begins his investigation by reinterpreting the relationship between 
humans and matter, that is, by redefining the religious concepts of the sacred and the 
profane. I have already said that for Durkheim the sacred is that which represents the 
unity and strength of the community and, likewise for Bataille, the sacred and the 
communal were interwoven. Bataille believes that the realm of the sacred is the world 
of intimacy that persisted while primordial humans lived alongside animals and 
within the world, without the knowledge that they were somehow separate from either 
the animals or the world around them. Here, Bataille introduces his astonishingly 
beautiful metaphor of unity, immanence, and intimacy – an intimacy, a community, 
that persisted when humans, animals and the world, were as indistinguishable from 
one another like “water in water” (23).  
The profane, then, according to Bataille and Durkheim, is that which 
represents individuality and individuation, as well as the processes, as we shall see, 
that facilitate individuation. Such processes, as Bataille saw it, were the everyday 
worlds of work and productivity – Bataille’s belief is curious when we compare it to 
the Benedictine rule:‘labore est orare,’ that ‘to work is to pray.’ In an interview, 
Stuart Kendall clarifies that Bataille saw the profane as “a world of separation and 
alienation,” but nevertheless it is also the “world that we live in most of the time” 
(qtd. in Rutledge, “Not Peace But a Sword”). Such a division between sacred and 
profane, as Durkheim says, might be assigned through ‘valuation’ or a hierarchy of 
objects, where one object is considered to be, or considers itself to be, superior, or to 
possess a subject-hood in comparison to another object. Bataille believes that the 
division between these ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ emerged from the moment that 
humans first understood themselves as distinct from animals: when humans first 
understood themselves as subjects and animals as objects that were subordinate to 
their authority. This new hierarchy of power, Bataille says, generated the profane 
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world: what Bataille interchangeably calls the world of transcendence and, as I have 
said, the world of work. 
While Bataille agrees with the traditional anthropological 
(Maussean/Durkheimean) and, up to a certain point, even the Christian notions of the 
sacred and the profane, he also radically redefines this Christian binary. I have already 
proposed that, for Bataille, the sacred is the world of intimacy and animality, whereas 
the realm of the profane is the everyday world of work and productivity. In “The 
Dualist Materialism of Georges Bataille” Denis Hollier argues that Bataille was 
fascinated by religious dualisms: the distinctions between good and evil, the 
transcendent and the immanent (that is, between the divine as outside of the material 
world (transcendence) and the divine as manifest in the material world (immanence) 
(as in Spinoza’s theory of immanence), and the sacred and the profane. Hollier 
defines Bataille’s theory of the sacred and the profane in these words: “existence is 
profane when it lives in the face of a transcendence, it is sacred when it lives in 
immanence” (“Dualist Materialism” 131). But, Hollier goes on to say, for Bataille, the 
sacred and the profane are at once worlds apart and yet indelibly connected. These 
two worlds (in one) are characterised by the presence or absence of the subject:  
the profane [is the world] in which we live, and the sacred [is the 
world] in which we die, the world of the presence of I, and the 
world of the absence of I, of my absence, the world where I am not, 
where there are no I’s. (Hollier 132)  
Like the experience of the spectators at a sacrifice, Bataille believed that the 
destruction of the isolated, individual subject opened into the realm of the sacred. 
According to Hollier, the world of the sacred is not so much the opposite of the world 
of the profane but rather is “the alteration of its identity” (132).   
It is important to note that Bataille’s redefinition and inversion of these 
dualist notions (good/evil, sacred/profane) become much more apparent in his 
discussion of sacrifice, specifically in his meditation on the crucifixion. I will explore 
this inversion later, in my section on Nietzsche, the death of God, and the crucifixion 
as the greatest evil and the greatest good. 
 
3.5 The World of Work and the Creation of a Profane God 
According to Bataille, work is essentially productive, a means to an end. Bataille 
believes that before this ‘fall from grace,’ when humans had existed in the world like 
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‘water in water,’ they had been no more aware of the finality and limitation of death 
than other animals. But with the institutionalisation of work, humans realised that, 
like work projects, they too had ‘ends’ and limitations, both in the form of death, but 
also in being eternally separated from one another. Out of this fear of an end, humans 
developed the concept of an afterlife, something that dissolved the limitations of death 
and gave human existence a sense of continuity. And yet to maintain morale and 
productivity societies manipulated their communities into believing that the afterlife 
was not a right but a privilege; that salvation was something people had to ‘work for’ 
in life. Bataille proposes that the ruler and giver of this salvation – God – was created 
out of the profane world. While the creation of God was supposed to assign a value to 
things (for example, in Christianity it is believed that God is of the highest ‘value’), 
Bataille argues that what really occurred was an impoverishment because of the 
inherent paradox in value: if there is a distinction between the value of things, then 
one thing is necessarily of a higher value than another, thereby forming an inequality 
or a ‘devaluation’ of things. Bataille argues that God’s higher value is baseless (it is 
no greater than humans or animals) because God, as Feuerbach theorised, was created 
by humans. Therefore, he suggests that humans, animals, and God are all of equal 
value. The profane world is an example of the loss of value because it is the loss of 
the sacred, and the creation of God is thus an aspect of loss (Surya 384).  
 
4. Bataillean Sacrifice and the General Economy 
I have proposed that Bataillean sacrifice can only emerge out of a community’s lack 
of unity: out of humanity’s no longer being like water in water. I have also proposed, 
above, that, according to Bataille sacrifice unsettles the profane world – the world of 
economic stability, of rationality, of utility, of knowledge, and of modernity. To 
explain this, I would like to draw on Bataille’s Marxist proposal that modern, secular, 
capitalist societies reduce “what is human to the condition of a thing (of a 
commodity)” (Accursed Share Vol. I 129). Curiously, Bataille arrives at this point 
through his belief that religion and economy emerged “in one and the same movement 
from that which indebted them to one another” (Accursed Share Vol. I 129). Yet it is 
nevertheless important to consider Bataille’s reading of religion and the political 
economy because it allows us to examine his theory of sacrifice through another lens: 
his interpretation of sacrifice through his notions of the ‘general economy’ and the 
‘accursed share.’ While Bataille discusses these concepts throughout many of his 
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works, he explores them in greatest detail in his 1949 three-volume work La Part 
Maudite (The Accursed Share). In The Accursed Share Bataille explores what may, at 
first, seem an odd field of scholarship for a theorist who was otherwise preoccupied 
with eroticism and violence. Bataille puts forward a new economic theory: what he 
calls the ‘general economy.’ For Bataille, the general economy overturns the 
conventions of conservative economic theory or the ‘restricted economy.’ Unlike a 
restricted/conservative economy that is run on production, accumulation and gain, 
Bataille’s general economy is based on his Blakean concept of the non-returnable 
expenditure of excess energy – the ‘accursed share.’
50
 Bataille believes that if a part 
of wealth (that is, energy) cannot be used productively it is more logical to squander 
or consume this ‘commodity’ without expecting any form of return. In contrast, a 
restricted economy would not allow anything to ‘go to waste’ or escape production 
and productivity or, presumably, efficiency.
51
  
Bataille believed that the laws of the general economy extend from the 
natural world to human society. In the natural world there is an enormous amount of 
energy available to both individual organisms and to whole communities: specifically, 
there is a superabundance of biochemical energy that is available to the earth in the 
form of solar energy. “The origin and essence of our wealth,” Bataille says, “are given 
in the radiation of the sun, which dispenses energy (wealth) without any return. The 
sun gives without ever receiving” (28).
52
 Living beings on earth receive this energy 
and make use of it for growth (both plants and animals alike). However, Bataille says 
that if an organism has reached maximum growth or is somehow limited in its growth 
then it must squander any excess energy (32-33). Thus even solar energy cannot be 
used for entirely productive ends. When limits of accumulation are met, Bataille says 
that any remaining energy must be spent willingly and gloriously, or else risk erupting 
into disaster (Noys, Bataille 114). Bataille here is attempting to resacralise the world, 
materiality and our lived experience in the world. He celebrates natural surplus and 
expenditure, rather than a surplus that is tied up with capitalism. What is curious 
                                                        
50 Bataille’s philosophy of the accursed share is based on a Blakean concept of energy. Bataille 
opens the first volume of his work quoting a passage from Blake’s The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: 
“Exuberance is Beauty” (255). 
51 We must also remember that Bataille’s economic philosophy emerged out of the philosophy of 
the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – a philosophy that was based on 
efficiency.  
52 It is, however, always important to remember that Bataille is the master of paradox: for, while he 
proposes that the sun “gives without ever receiving” he nevertheless maintains that the sun ‘consumes’ 
(Accursed Share Vol. I 34). For more information see Bataille’s essay “Rotten Sun.”   
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about Bataille’s narrativising of the use and expenditure of natural energy is the way 
that he creates a myth about the origins of energy and life.  
For Bataille, this natural/solar cycle of energy is repeated in the human 
world: “a society always produces on the whole more than is necessary to its 
subsistence, it disposes of a surplus” (Accursed Share Vol. II and III 143). Bataille 
observes that it is the way this surplus is used that determines the structure and 
priorities of that society, since it is this very surplus that causes disturbances within 
society. Like the Marquis de Condorcet, William Godwin and Thomas Robert 
Malthus, who discuss the origins of agricultural surplus and the ‘fall of man,’ Bataille 
too explores the notion that surplus or excess energy is both detrimental to but 
necessary for an existing economy. That is, the outpouring of excess threatens 
prevailing systems, but “neither growth nor reproduction would be possible if plants 
and animals did not normally dispose of excess” (Accursed Share Vol. I 27). 
According to Bataille, the ‘accursed share’ is thus the necessary, non-returnable part 
of the economy that must be consumed. And, this non-returnable part must be 
consumed in one of three ways: luxuriously (for example, through eating), erotically 
(and therefore non-reproductively, for Bataille does not see eroticism as connected to 
reproduction), or through death. 
 
4.1 Societies of Consumption: The General Economy and Ancient American 
Sacrifice  
In the opening of “General Economics and Postmodern Capitalism,” Jean-Joseph 
Goux makes the observation that it is not the factory, nor the store, the workshop nor 
bank from which Bataille’s principles of the economy emerge. Rather, Goux says: 
in the blood that spurts from the open chests of victims sacrificed to 
the sun in an Aztec ritual, in the sumptuous and ruinous feasts 
offered to the courtiers of Versailles by the monarch of divine right, 
in all these mad dissipations is found a secret that our restricted 
economics has covered up and caused to be forgotten. (196)   
In The Accursed Share Vol. I Bataille talks of ‘societies of consumption,’ specifically 
Ancient Aztec and Mexican communities and the significance of ritual sacrifice for 
these communities.
53
 Yet Bataille, we must remember, was not an ethnographer. As 
                                                        
53 I would like to stress that I have only marginal knowledge about Ancient Aztec and Mexican 
societies and so my exploration of human sacrifice is based purely on Bataille’s reading of these 
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Tiina Arppe says: though Bataille incorporates many historical communities and 
cultures as examples for his theory of sacrifice, the primordial society that he 
discusses in his work cannot be fully reduced to any of these historical societies (42). 
Bataille begins his analysis by clarifying that the Ancient Aztecs and Mexicans were, 
socially and morally, “poles apart from us” (46). Bataille believed that: 
“[c]onsumption loomed just as large in their thinking as production does in ours. They 
were just as concerned about sacrificing as we are about working” (46). The 
significance of sacrifice, for the Aztecs and the Mexicans, Bataille believed, was its 
status as a form of consumption. The very nature of sacrifice therefore inverts and 
overthrows what Bataille in the mid-twentieth century understood as capitalism – a 
restricted economic system of production without consumption.   
Bataille offers several lengthy summaries of the particularities of Mexican 
human sacrifice, but what he is careful to draw his readers’ attention to each time is 
the way that sacrificial victims (who were often either slaves or prisoners of war) 
were, in the months, weeks or days leading up to their immolation, treated humanely, 
or often like gods. The sacrifice thus acted as a continuation and release of the energy 
and tension that has gathered over time; energy and tension which demanded release 
through death; through the catastrophic and spectacular consumption of sacrifice. 
Bataille’s description of the sacrifice is as follows: a Mexican priest would lead their 
victim to the top of a pyramid where, beneath the sun, the victim was stretched over a 
stone altar, struck in the chest with a stone knife, and, through the deft actions of the 
executioner, remained lucid enough to witness their still-beating heart being extracted 
from their body, being offered to the sun (49). But the apparent barbarism of such 
sacrificial practices, Bataille says, possesses a deeper social, spiritual and economic 
foundation; this sort of sacrifice, Bataille argues  
restores to the sacred world that which servile use has degraded, 
rendered profane. Servile use has made a thing (an object) of that 
which, in a deep sense, is of the same nature as the subject, is in a 
relation to the intimate participation with the subject. (55)      
I have already discussed Bataille’s belief that the profane realm emerged out of the 
human need to distinguish and distance itself from the world, from plants, animals 
and ‘things.’ Although this division was initially a means of dividing humans from 
                                                                                                                                                              
practices. I would also like to make it clear that Bataille’s reading of the practices of these ancient 
societies isn’t necessarily accurate or current.  
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animals, the same division emerged between humans: between subjects (masters) and 
objects (slaves). Bataille suggests that the sacrificial victim, who over the course of 
their life has been degraded and rendered profane (that is, they have been reduced to 
the level of an object or a ‘thing’ because of their status as a slave or prisoner of war) 
is, through the rapturous violence of sacrifice, removed from the realm of the profane 
and returned to the sacred. The subjects of the sacrifice are the spectators, the 
spectators who desire the sacrifice of the victim, whereas the object of the sacrifice is 
the sacrificial victim. The subjects therefore witness the sacrifice of the object (the 
victim, the slave, the prisoner). Of course, as Bataille notes, there is nothing that 
inherently separates the object from the subject (they are of the same nature 
(humans)) but over the course of their lives they have assumed different roles. In the 
sacrifice, the victim is ‘repaid’ for their role as an object, and this repayment comes 
both through the shattering (the literal destruction and killing) of their servility, their 
‘objectness,’ and in the form of their admission into the realm of the sacred (their 
being freed from their role as a slave or prisoner).
54
  
Therefore, at the heart of his sociological analysis of sacrifice, Bataille 
argues that, rather than being given salvation (as in Christianity), the sacrificial victim 
is saved or ‘freed’ from utility; they are released from their position as objects, or as 
slaves in their lifetime through their death (The Accursed Share: Vol. I 58; Theory of 
Religion 49). For Bataille it is by reaching this limit of death that the sacrificial victim 
and the spectators are able to experience a moment of freedom – freedom which 
Bataille understands as “nothing if it is not the freedom of living on the edge of limits 
where all comprehension breaks down” (The Impossible 40). It is therefore a violent 
freedom that is brought about through the rapturous immediacy of death. The 
sacrificial victim is restored (‘freed’) to a world of intimacy, but it is the executioner 
and spectators who “receive sacred communication from [the sacrifice], which 
restores [them] in turn to interior freedom” (Accursed Share Vol. I 57-58). Thus 
through the victim’s movement from the profane world to the sacred, the spectators 
are able to experience the victim’s death themselves – they are momentarily offered a 
glimpse of the sacred.  
 
                                                        
54 Of course, it is important to note that Bataille did not believe that the Ancient Mexicans 
understood their actions in this way. Rather, Bataille is interpreting the actions of the Ancient 
Mexicans through his economic theory. 
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4.2 Labore est orare: Productive and Unproductive Expenditure, and the Origins 
of Religious Taboo 
In the shadow of people like Max Weber and R. H. Tawney Bataille believed that 
there was an undeniable link between religious taboos, the economy, and capitalism. 
Taking an anthropological approach to his study of pre-capitalist societies, Bataille 
examined the way that religious notions of good and evil, taboo, transgression and sin 
were used to direct a society’s productivity and therefore its economy. In The 
Accursed Share, Bataille notes the way that attitudes towards wealth have changed in 
various religions (specifically, in Protestant and Catholic Christianity) and 
Christianity’s preoccupation with accumulation and efficiency through practices of 
self-denial and labor.
55
 Underpinning Bataille’s comparative reading of the origins of 
Christian taboos and the accursed share are his notions of sacrifice and eroticism, and 
the link he sees between these two excessive practices.  
Bataille believed that eroticism, like sacrifice, is excessive and transgressive 
because it is essentially unproductive, ‘perverse’ and non-reproductive (Noys, 
Bataille 113). For Jonathan Dollimore, Bataille’s notion of erotic transgression is not 
simply the erotic attraction to the forbidden, but the belief that prohibition, inhibition, 
horror, and disgust all heighten the intensity of erotic pleasure (252). According to 
Bataille, human experience is bordered by limits, and these limits are defined by our 
awareness of the extremes of eroticism and death (Erotism 24). Bataille sees erotic 
transgression as intimately tied up with death, and as especially linked with sacrifice, 
saying that eroticism is “a violation bordering on death, bordering on murder” 
(Erotism 17). In erotic acts, participants experience the anguish, ecstasy and 
uninhibited communication associated with the little death of orgasm. The association 
of eroticism with death is not new; we need only think of the concept of la petite 
mort, which pre-existed Bataille’s erotic theory. Like eroticism, Bataille says that the 
participants and spectators of a sacrifice experience the anguish, ecstasy and 
uninhibited communication associated with the death of the victim (Erotism 170). 
Bataille believes that sexual activity can be either productive and procreative, 
or non-productive and pleasurable, just as death is also either productive (for example 
through hunting for food) or unproductive (a momentous and bloody sacrifice). In 
cultures where excess and expenditure were associated with evil or ‘primitivity’ – and 
                                                        
55 Consider, for example, the sparseness and simplicity of Protestant churches in comparison to the 
grand cathedrals of the Catholics.   
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Bataille felt that Christianity was one religion that associated excess with evil – 
Bataille says that sacrifice and eroticism were denied on the grounds that they were 
seen as purposeless and the opposite of work, and therefore as ‘sinful.’ Such views of 
eroticism and sacrifice as purposeless and therefore as aligned with sin have clearly 
shaped modern western attitudes towards these practices. Nevertheless, it is these very 
forms of non-productive expenditure (sacrifice and eroticism) that, Bataille says, 
“ultimately connect life with the senseless luxury and excess of death” (Accursed 
Share Vol. I 34-35). Bataille argues that death is an ‘excess’ because it is the complete 
negation of productivity and the very essence of ‘nothingness.’ Bataille also believes 
that it is the horror of death that promotes productivity and a motivation towards 
‘purposefulness.’ To protect their people from the terrifying awareness of death, 
Bataille believed that early Christian societies distracted their populations by stressing 
the importance of the utilitarian notion of ‘work,’ through which parishioners could 
avoid temptation, only perform ‘good deeds,’ and therefore secure a spot in heaven 
(Erotism 44). To protect work from falling into disorder, pressures of guilt and 
prohibition became modes of regulation. Bataille argues that taboos were introduced 
to protect society because life is essentially violent disorder and “the main function of 
all taboos is to combat violence” (Erotism 41). And violence, Bataille remarks, “is 
what the world of work excludes with its taboos” (Erotism 42).  
Bataille believes that by its very nature, excessive, unproductive outbursts of 
energy, like sacrifice, must in some way transgress taboos. That is, eroticism and 
sacrifice can only be transgressive and excessive if they in some way transgress the 
austerity of everyday life while reflecting that austerity, even as they transgress it 
(Erotism 54). Thus in sacrificial societies, sacrifice took an ambivalent position: 
Bataille says that when a primordial society’s economic needs were met, sacrifices, 
festivals, and luxurious practices were permitted as a means of absorbing excess 
energy. Yet the aftermath of these sacrifices or festivals gave way to a sense of 
wrongdoing, thereby reinforcing the taboo that had been transgressed (Accursed 
Share Vol. I 120). Just like the momentary and directed violence that leads a 
community to sacrifice a virgin on the first day of spring, a community cannot 
sacrifice a virgin every day of the week in the same way that every day can’t be a 
festival. Bataille believed that sacrifice must be a momentary fracture in a system. 
Sacrifice, Bataille says, cannot be anything other than momentary, otherwise it runs 
the risk of becoming mundane, institutionalised, commoditised, and therefore profane. 
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Bataille believed that, in his day, the institutionalisation and commoditisation of 
things like religions had led to a weakening and watering-down of religious 
experience – specifically, to the abolishing of the celebration of ritual sacrifice. 
 
4.3 Sacrificing the Present for the Future: The General Economy and the 
Modern World 
What is striking about Bataille’s study of excess, the economy and human society is 
his frightening, albeit unoriginal, conclusion: that taboos became an internalised part 
of human psychology and became forms of regulation that were not enforced by 
outside powers but from within.
56
 In a passage that clearly echoes Marx, Bataille says 
that through work people turn themselves into tools, objects, or slaves: “[t]he world of 
practice is a world where man is himself a thing” (Accursed Share Vol. II and III 
213). Bataille believed that people reduced themselves to ‘things’ through their 
dedication to the project of work, and that they therefore perpetuated individuation 
and a lack of meaningful communication. Bataille believes that in work, human desire 
is misplaced – work does not allow people to experience life in the present, but rather 
forces people to fixate only on the future and on preparing for the future.
57
 It is this 
inability to be ‘present’ that disables communication. When people have become 
‘means’ to ‘ends,’ just as work is a means to an end, Bataille believes that 
communication is impossible. And it is only through the rapturous forces of sacrifice 
and eroticism that people can be ‘returned’ to the present; that through their inherent 
violence and excessiveness, sacrifice and eroticism immediately arrest individuals, 
forcibly returning people to the goings on of the present and stopping people from 
focusing on an abstract future.   
For Leslie Anne Boldt, the devotion to the world of production and 
productivity (the world of work) constitutes a manifestation of the death of God 
(Kendall, Introduction, Unfinished System xii). While I will say more about Bataille’s 
investment in Nietzsche’s death of God thesis shortly, it is important to mention 
Boldt’s argument that, for Bataille, the death of God is brought about through the 
neglect of the sacred. We must, of course, keep in mind that Bataille argued that the 
sacred is communication and communality. Therefore Bataille understands non-
                                                        
56 It is important to note Bataille’s influence on Foucault, who would go on to explore this form of 
self-censorship in his panopticon metaphor.   
57 In Christianity, this ‘future’ is the afterlife, heaven.  
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productivity and excess expenditure not only as experiential ways of attempting to 
shatter the isolation that imprisons us, but also as a way of critiquing and rejecting 
capitalism. In the first volume of The Accursed Share Bataille offers an example of 
this form of consumption without return:  
[t]he man of leisure destroys the products necessary for his 
subsistence no less fully than does fire [ . . . ]. We obtain the same 
result if we ingest a substance, such as alcohol, whose consumption 
does not enable us to work more – or even deprives us, for a time, of 
our strength to produce. [Alcohol has] the advantage of consuming 
without return – without profit – the resources that they use: they 
simply satisfy us; they correspond to the unnecessary choice that we 
make of them. (119)  
In the moments we surrender to our desires, Bataille believes that we are briefly 
removed from our state of worker-servility, and experience what he calls a ‘sovereign 
moment.’ According to Habermas and Lawrence, Bataillean sovereignty “means not 
to let oneself be reduced, as in labor, to the condition of an object, but to free 
subjectivity from bondage” (90). Borch-Jacobsen says that Bataillean sovereignty “is 
that which does not serve anything and no purpose other than itself, that which is not 
a means [ . . . ] in view of an end” (745). This is perhaps a more accurate 
interpretation of Bataille’s notion of sovereignty, for Bataille also says: “what is 
sovereign in fact is to enjoy the present time without having anything else in view but 
the present time” (Accursed Share Vol. II and III 199). Sovereignty, like sacrifice, is 
something that is only experienced momentarily; it is an instant that, Bataille holds, is 
associated with what he sees as the excesses and ‘waste’ products of sacrifice, 
eroticism, poetry, excrement, war and madness, and the refusal to turn this 
consumption into production or therefore to think of it in terms of the future.
58
 In 
Literature and Evil Bataille says that sovereignty is something which escapes all of 
us, and which “nobody has seized and which nobody can seize for this reason: we 
cannot possess it, like an object, but we are doomed to seek it [ . . . ] never can we be 
sovereign” (193-94). Thus, while it is impossible for humans to ‘be’ or to ‘possess’ 
                                                        
58 Bataille says that ‘poetry’ is synonymous to ‘expenditure’ because it is the least intellectualised 
form of a state of loss (Visions of Excess 120). Indeed, one only needs to think of the work of poets like 
Hans-Georg Gadamer or W. H. Auden. Consider the lines from Auden’s poem “In Memory of W. B. 
Yeats,” in which he says: “For poetry makes nothing happen: it survives / in the valley of its making 
where executives / would never want to tamper” (Auden). 
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sovereignty, Bataille says that we may be able to experience moments of sovereignty 
through openness and exposure that lead to a radical form of communication. 
 




I MYSELF AM WAR. 
Bataille, “The Practice of Joy Before Death,” Visions of 
Excess, 239  
 
With all that I have said on Bataillean sovereignty, it may therefore come as a surprise 
to learn that, for Benjamin Noys, Bataillean sovereignty must be understood as a 
reflection of Bataille’s war experience (Bataille 10). According to Noys, war (World 
Wars I and II, the Spanish Civil War and the Cold War) as well as the very idea of 
war not only demonstrated a dominating and domineering form of violence, but also 
signaled a destruction of limits (10). Like eroticism and sacrifice, Bataille understood 
war as an unproductive form of expenditure: as a “catastrophic expenditure of excess 
energy” (Accursed Share Vol. I 23). In Accursed Share Vol. I Bataille proposes that 
human life is nothing other than a “field of multiple destructions,” and that our 
ignorance of the inherent violence of human nature is what causes war to erupt (23). 
If we do not consciously destroy excess energy, Bataille says, “it is this energy that 
destroys us; it is we who pay the price of the inevitable explosion” (24). While 
ancient societies may have averted war and resorted, instead, to sacrifice or festivals, 
or to building pyramids or other ‘purposeless’ monuments, in the modern world, “we 
use the excess to multiply “services” that make life smoother, and we are led to 
reabsorb part of it by increasing leisure time” (24). However, this reabsorption of 
energy is, Bataille says, nothing more than a diversion: a diversion through which we 
do not release any excess and which therefore leads to the war.
60
  
According to Michel Surya, war fascinated Bataille. But, Surya is careful to 
add, war fascinated everyone in modern France (285). For John Hutnyk, we must not 
confuse Bataille’s fascination with war as a desire for war, because Bataille, Hutnyk 
says, was “clearly militant against the war” (279). More than the ravages of actual 
war, Surya says that Bataille was intrigued by the idea of war, which he believes 
                                                        
59 Curiously, Bataille’s name, in French, means ‘battle’ or ‘war.’ 
60 Bataille believes it was an ‘industrial plethora’ that facilitated both World War I and II (25).         
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Bataille saw as one of the great truths of the world, as horrific and destructive as it 
was (283). Surya says that Bataille was skeptical of what he understood as war’s 
‘opposite’ – peace. Bataille theorised that peace was a paradoxical, unnatural 
phenomenon. Because peace cannot tolerate death and destruction and squandering, it 
therefore cannot tolerate human nature. Peace, Surya observes, “falsely governs the 
world as if death did not exist” (285). In the past, sacrifice was one means through 
which a community was reminded of death; through which a community was united 
by death. In Surya’s view, sacrifice, “instead of expelling death’s power of 
dissolution, carried it to the highest point of intensity” (286). However, in the modern 
world, ‘evolved society’ seems to have wanted to forget this connection with death 
and destruction. Therefore in the modern world, “war takes revenge on this forgetting 
– hateful and ambivalent as the idea may be – [war, for Bataille,] is sacred” (286).  
While Surya notes that according to Bataille there exists an “equivalence 
between war, sacrifice and mystical life” (emphasis in original. Bataille qtd. in Surya 
287), Bataille nevertheless believed that there was a difference between war and 
sacrifice. The difference being ritual. In sacrifice,  
the ritualization of death links the living, through a sort of pact, to 
power of individual and social conflagration and of the irruption of 
death among them . . . War, on the other hand, unleashes outside 
ritual and pact; it is the free and uncontrolled unleashing of death 
suddenly and affecting all the living . . . (Surya 286)               
Thus war, which exists outside of a ‘pact,’ also exists outside of community; 
community, being central to Bataillean sacrifice.
61
 But while Surya’s account 
concerns the non-ritualised nature of modern war, it must be noted that Bataille saw 
pre-modern war as possessing a religious, perhaps even sacrificial, nature.  
 In the first volume of Accursed Share, Bataille argues that, while Ancient 
Mexican society was certainly shaped by warfare, “it was not a military society. 
                                                        
61 It is important here to consider whether Bataille understood the army as a ‘community.’ In 
“Contact and Communication” Alphonso Lingis suggests that soldiers do form a Bataillean, sacrificial 
community, and that they join the army with the intention of developing comradeship (The Obsessions 
of Georges Bataille 126). However, it is my contention that Bataille would have rejected the idea that 
the ‘military’ is a sacrificial community (unless we are talking of a pre-modern military – the military 
societies of the Ancient Aztecs or Mexicans, for example). Modern militaries/armies rely on a head, an 
authority – which is exactly what Bataille sought to decapitate. For further reading, see Bataille’s essay 
“The Psychology of Fascism,” or consider Surya’s thoughts on Bataille and the myth of Fascism (283-
299). Consider Denis Hollier’s Absent Without Leave: French Literature Under the Threat of War.   
 
 47 
Religion remained the obvious key to its workings” (54). Although shaped by war, 
Bataille believes that  
[t]he reasoned organization of war and conquest was unknown to 
[Ancient Mexican and Aztec societies]. A truly military society is a 
venture society, for which war means a development of power, an 
orderly progression of empire. It is a relatively mild society; it 
makes a custom of the rational principles of enterprise, whose 
purpose is given in the future, and it excludes the madness of 
sacrifice. There is nothing more contrary to military organization 
than the squanderings of wealth represented by hecatombs of slaves. 
(Accursed Share Vol. I 54-55)    
Although Bataille does not explicitly propose that these military/venture societies 
were either precursors to, or are modern societies, it is curious that he sees military 
and modern societies as possessing similar characteristics – of being governed by 
reason and organisation, of their quest for power, of their relative mildness and their 
exclusion of the squandering of excess through sacrifice, and of their continuous 
focus on production, productivity and the future. According to Benjamin Noys, it was 
the very obsession with progress and production in the modern west that led to such 
destructive twentieth-century warfare. Noys says that for Bataille, “[t]hese global 
conflicts [were] symptoms of the failure of capitalist economies to deal with the 
excess of the accursed share, except catastrophically” (Bataille 119). According to 
Bataille, it was this ‘industrial plethora’ that sparked the genesis of the two wars – 
particularly World War I (Accursed Share Vol. I 25).  
 
5. God and Country: World War I, Nietzsche, Bataille 
28 July 2014 marked one hundred years since the beginning of World War I. The 
centenary of this momentous occasion has once again reawakened debate surrounding 
the links between the war, religion and sacrifice – specifically, whether the deaths of 
the soldiers in the Great War can be interpreted as sacrificial, and whether their deaths 
were understood as a sacrifice at the time. In his 2014 work The Great and Holy War 
Philip Jenkins argues that the First World War was undoubtedly viewed as a religious 
war: a war that was not only fought by the world’s leading Christian nations, but also 
a war that borrowed religious rhetoric and imagery (particularly through descriptions 
of the war as a crusade, as apocalyptic, or as bringing about Armageddon). However, 
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Joseph Loconte (in his upcoming publication, God and the Great War) argues that 
World War I was not so much a religious war as it was a political war in which 
nations vied for power, domination, geography, and resources (Rutledge). Whether 
the Great War can be considered a religious war or not, it is certainly true that 
religious and sacrificial rhetoric was employed in war propaganda, was used to invoke 
a sense of nationhood, and was used post-war when memorialising the dead.
62
  
It is also worth noting that World War I was the context in which the work of 
Friedrich Nietzsche was gaining a wider readership. During the war, the text given as 
a gift to German soldiers alongside the New Testament and Goethe’s Faust, was 
Nietzsche’s 1883 Also Sprach Zarathustra (Thus Spoke Zarathustra). It may even 
have been through this dissemination of Nietzsche’s work that so many then-fledgling 
philosophers and thinkers were introduced to his theory: we know, for instance, that 
Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Ernst Jünger read Nietzsche during the war (possibly 
while serving in the war), although all three philosophers came to give very different 
accounts of the war, and developed very different war philosophies, they all 
connected war with religion and mysticism. With the widespread reading of 
Nietzsche’s work, it is unsurprising that Bataille was introduced to Nietzsche’s theory 
during his time at the seminary, which was not long after he served his conscription 
notice in World War I. Although he never fought in the war, confined, as he was, to 
his hospital bed, stricken with tuberculosis, Bataille was adamant that if he had been 
well, and if he had been called, he would have fought, not because he had a taste for 
the barbarities of war, but to responded to the call “as one responds to anguish when it 
becomes excessive” (Surya 24). It was in the wake of the destruction of the First 
World War and in the wake of the loss of his faith, that Bataille discovered the work 
of Nietzsche. According to Sylvère Lotringer, Nietzsche was perhaps the most 
important figure in the development of Bataille’s thought. It was Nietzsche who 
rescued Bataille, at age 23, from the crisis of Christianity, and who drove him to 
question his faith (Lotringer, Introduction vii). Although Bataille began reading 
Nietzsche while he was in the seminary, it was not until 1922, when he became 
friends with Ukrainian/Russian philosopher Léon Chestov (also known as Lev 
Shestov), that he became more thoroughly acquainted with Nietzsche’s work. Such 
                                                        
62 See Jay Winter’s 1995 Sites of Memory Sites of Mourning; see the cruciform soldier centrepiece 
sculpture – curiously entitled “Sacrifice” – at the ANZAC Memorial in Sydney’s Hyde Park. It is also 
worth noting that even contemporary commemorations of World War I continue to use religious and 
sacrificial imagery: consider the crucifixion imagery employed in Peter Weir’s 1981 film Gallipoli.    
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was his dedication to the German philosopher that, during World War II, Bataille was 




5.1 God, Disemboweling Himself: Nietzsche and his Sovereign Madmen 
Of all Nietzsche’s concepts, it was his death of God thesis that most informed 
Bataille’s thought and work. Nietzsche’s declaration of the death of God at the hands 
of humanity appears in several of the German philosopher’s parodic and parabolic 
works including his “Parable of the Madman” (“Der tolle Mensch”) from his 1882 
book The Gay Science, and in his quasi-religious 1885 Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
64
  
What is fascinating about Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God is 
that, in both Gay Science and Zarathustra, it is not Nietzsche who pronounces the 
death, but his protagonists. The preeminent passage in Zarathustra concerns the 
work’s central character, the sage Zarathustra: “But when Zarathustra was alone, he 
spoke thus to his heart: ‘Could it be possible! This old saint has not yet heard in his 
forest that God is dead!’” (41). Like Zarathustra, the madman in Nietzsche’s “Parable 
of the Madman” is another biblical figure – the madman who speaks the truth.
65
 “The 
Parable of the Madman” tells the story of a man running through a marketplace mid-
morning, carrying a glowing lantern.
66
 The madman tells the people at the market that 
he is looking for God, uttering the famous lines: “Gott ist todt! Gott bleibt todt! Und 
wir haben ihn getödtet!” (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft).
67
 Yet the people at the market 
are, Nietzsche says, atheists, who only laugh at the madman. The market goers are 
already on a path to a future where God is absent, and yet the madman sees that they 
are not aware of God’s death, of God’s murder, or of the fact that they have murdered 
God. The parable has been variously interpreted as an attack on Christianity and, in 
                                                        
63 This may also have been Bataille’s way of validating his fascination with excess, violence and 
fanaticism that he claimed the fascists had misappropriated. It is also important to note that the second 
issue of Acéphale was dedicated to Nietzsche and included Bataille’s lengthy article “Nietzsche and the 
Fascists,” in which Bataille attacks Nietzsche’s sister and her role in aligning Nietzsche’s thought with 
Nazi thought.    
64 By ‘parodic,’ I am referring to Nietzsche’s parodying of the Bible in Thus Spoke, which contains 
the “sermon on the mount” – a sermon that is given to cows, and which is clearly a parody of the 
“sermon on the mount” from Matthew 5 in the Bible, in which Jesus utters the famous lines: “blessed 
are the poor,” and “blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth” (5:3-5:5).  
65 Consider the madman among the tombs, Mark 5:2-20. 
66 The madman in Nietzsche’s story is reminiscent of the Ancient Greek cynic philosopher 
Diogenes, who was famous for, among other stunts, carrying a lantern during the daytime, claiming 
that he was looking for an honest man.  
67 “God is dead! God remains Dead! And we have killed him!” (The Gay Science 120). 
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contrast, as a reflection on humanity’s lost connection with God, and the madness that 
has set in because of this loss.  
For Paul Hegarty, Nietzsche’s announcement of the loss of God – the 
intensity of the idea of the god who remains dead – led Bataille to see Nietzsche as 
both a writer and a figure of sovereignty (72). Bataillean sovereignty, which Hegarty 
says “represents the status of the subject when caught up in general economy” (71), is 
the moment where the subject individual of the restricted economy is put at stake: 
where, like Nietzsche’s God, it loses itself through death. Invoking Bataille, Hegarty 
says that, when Zarathustra announces the death of God,  
man is left to his own devices, and becomes capable of genuine 
subjectivity. However, at exactly the same moment, subjectivity 
becomes impossible, because the guarantor of truth (and thus of 
identity) is gone. (73) 
The death of this guarantor of truth and identity – God – is of significance to Bataille 
who, Hegarty says, unlike Heidegger, is not interested in the ‘truth of the subject’ but, 
rather, is interested in the point at which the “subject loses its truth” (73). Bataille 
believed that God’s death enabled (or, Hegarty says, ‘requires’) humans to live 
sovereignly. However, only those who are aware of God’s death, only those who are 
aware of their role as a murderer of God can experience sovereignty. That is, if we are 
to experience a sovereign moment, we must plead guilty to the murder of God. For 
those who are not aware of God’s death, or for those who do not plead guilty to 
murder (consider the atheists that Nietzsche refers to in “Parable of the Madman”), 
life remains servile. But this servile existence in the wake of the death of God is even 
worse than before because people can no longer live to serve God (because God is 
dead), but instead “serve for serving’s sake” (Hegarty 74). Servile human life is a life 
governed by a restricted economy, where humans become means to ends, rather than 
sovereign beings that are ends in themselves, as ends without means.  
The death of God was therefore a moment to be both celebrated and 
mourned; celebrated because it allowed the possibility of human sovereignty, and yet 
mourned because it signaled the secularisation of the modern world, and therefore the 
loss of the sacred. Nietzsche too wrote of the loss and return of the sacred: through his 
death of God thesis, Nietzsche imagines not only society’s return to a hierarchical 
structure that resembled the Medieval Church, sans the Christian religion, but he also 





 Of course Nietzsche (like Bataille) did not believe that it 
was truly possible to return to the past – to an Ancient Greek or Roman world or 
community. Furthermore, the polytheism that Nietzsche spoke of was only a form of 
theism insofar as we become these gods. As Nietzsche’s madman asks: “must we 
ourselves not become gods?” (The Gay Science 181). For Nietzsche, the death of God 
demanded a change in humanity – it instituted a new, sovereign, ‘super-humanity’: a 
humanity that could not retain the Dionysianism of the past, one that rejected 
Christianity, and that therefore had to create or become something new (Fornari xiii). 
Nietzsche imagined two types of people emerging out of the death of God: the first, a 
group of ‘nauseated nihilists’ and atheists, the second, a group of super-humans, or 
‘new philosophers’. The nihilists and atheists – those whom Bataille would see as 
living lives of servility – either mourn a world that is empty of God, or “live as if God 
never existed” (Fritzsche 9). On the other hand, the super-humans, or ‘new 
philosophers’ (those sovereign individuals) recognise themselves as murderers and 
are liberated through the death of God; they are freed from any form of dogma, be it 
religious or scientific. Thus Nietzsche’s notion of the super-humans who emerge out 
of the death of God, and his madman’s question: “must we ourselves not become 
gods?” all clearly coalesce in Kendall’s proposal that Bataille’s fascination with 
sacrifice is a fascination with sovereignty, with “experiencing the world not in 
relation to God, but from the position of God” (Introduction, Unfinished System xxx).  
 
5.2 The Assumption of Body and Soul: Nietzsche, Bataille and the Death 
of God 
 
I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in 
grammar. 
    Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 16 
  
In order to explore Bataille’s reading of Nietzsche, and his interpretation of the Death 
of God, it is necessary to first say something about Bataille’s 1944 lecture on the 
German philosopher – what Bataille called his “Discussion on Sin.” In early 1944, 
Bataille’s book Le Coupable (Guilty) had gone to press, and the French cognoscenti 
                                                        
68 Before he began working as a philosopher, Nietzsche was a classical philologist (that is, he was a 
scholar of Ancient Greek and Roman textual criticism).  
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eagerly awaited the publication of his new work Sur Nietzsche (On Nietzsche). 
Bataille’s lecture, which preceded the discussion, was later to be entitled “Summit 
and Decline,” and appeared in Sur Nietzsche.  
Attending the discussion was the crème de la crème of the French 
intelligentsia: those who were associated with Bataille, including Blanchot and 
Klossowski, as well as Bataille’s close friend Leiris. There were the existentialists: 
Sartre, Hyppolite, de Beauvoir, Camus, and the discussion leader that day was the 
existentialist Maurice de Gandillac. Phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty also attended 
the lecture and discussion. Finally, there was a religious panel, which consisted of the 
Jesuit and future cardinal Father Daniélou, and the Catholic thinkers Gabriel Marcel 
and Marcel Moré, among others. The post-lecture discussion was divided into two 
competing panels: the Catholics and the existentialists. At Moré’s house, just after 
lunch, Bataille began his keynote lecture.  
In his lecture, Bataille discusses the nature of good and evil and thereby 
comes to the key theme of the discussion: sin. At the heart of Bataille’s lecture is the 
proposition that “the most equivocal expression of evil at the summit is Christ on the 
cross” (Unfinished System 28).
69
 It is worth noting that, while Bataille doesn’t 
mention Nietzsche in his lecture, he is clearly basing his work on Nietzsche’s death of 
God thesis, and also makes clear references to other passages from Zarathustra, and 
Nietzsche’s later works Genealogy of Morals and The Antichrist. Bataille raises 
several key points in his lecture: he speaks of his concepts of summit and decline, 
where, according to Benjamin Noys, Bataille understands the summit as “a place 
‘beyond good and evil’” or even, “beyond sense” (Bataille emphasis in original 67). 
Thus it is possible to reread Bataille’s thesis as “the most equivocal expression of evil 
at the [place beyond good and evil, beyond sense] is Christ on the cross.” But in doing 
so we come across another problematic term in Bataille’s lecture – the definition of 
evil.  
It is important to note that, despite his dedication to Nietzsche, Bataille both 
extrapolated and diverged from Nietzsche’s philosophy in several significant ways. 
We know that when he speaks of the death of God, Nietzsche is not referring to the 
death of Christ and therefore is not speaking of the crucifixion. Bataille, however, 
                                                        
69 We might even consider the links between Bataille’s proposition and Fornari’s clarification of 
Nietzsche’s stance on Christianity in The Antichrist: “Nietzsche nurtured hatred not only against 
Christianity but specifically against Christ himself, defined as ‘the idiot Christ on the cross’” (Fornari 
xii-xiii).    
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uses Nietzsche’s notion of the death of God, Nietzsche’s ‘transvaluation of all 
values,’ and his concept of ‘beyond good and evil’ to redefine Christian moral 
terminology (words like ‘good,’ ‘evil,’ and ‘sin’) through which Bataille rereads the 
sacrifice of the crucifixion. The transvaluation of all values is a concept that appears 
in Nietzsche’s 1895 book Der Antichrist (The Antichrist), in which Nietzsche argues 
that Christianity, not merely as a religion, but as a moral system, inverts nature. In 
Christianity, Nietzsche says, the weak are elevated and the strong are rejected.
70
 
Nietzsche unpacks his thesis – that Christianity acts in opposition to nature – when he 
pinpoints what is determined as sinful in Christianity: desire. In his lecture, Bataille 
addresses the transvaluation of all values when he talks of the crisis of God’s being in 
sacrifice (at the crucifixion), and the way that Christians desire God’s death: “A 
Christian mystic crucifies Jesus. His love even requires God to be at risk [ . . . ]. The 
saint’s crime par excellence is erotic” (Unfinished System 31). While Nietzsche didn’t 
write, at any great length, about eroticism, Bataille extrapolates from Nietzsche’s 
philosophy to propose that it is the erotic nature of mysticism and Christian worship 
that entices the faithful to desire Christ’s crucifixion.  
For Christian mystics, Bataille says, sexual desire awakens ecstatic moments 
(much the same as in erotic love), and the object of their love – Christ crucified – 
becomes synonymous with the mystic’s self-annihilation. That is, the mystic’s 
meditation on the crucifixion leads to the shattering of their sense of self. Bataille 
believed that the ecstasy of saints and mystics bordered on sovereignty; it was the 
ecstasy of stepping outside of the ‘self,’ of the loss of the subject.
71
 However, in his 
1943 work Inner Experience Bataille proposes that saints’ and mystics’ experiences 
could not have been ecstatic in the etymological sense (of standing outside of their 
‘self’) because the experience would have been tainted by the presence of God. 
Bataille argues that to propose a quest for God, or to describe an experience as being 
brought about by God, is to limit that experience. The very presence of the concept of 
God, he says, only serves to place boundaries around a mystical, indescribable, 
impossible experience:   
                                                        
70 Nietzsche rejects the decree in Matthew 5:5, that: “the meek shall inherit the earth”. 
71 Curiously, ‘ecstasy,’ the word that mystics and saints used to describe their experience of 
communicating and unifying with God, comes from the Greek word exstasis which means to 
‘displace,’ or to ‘put out of place,’ or, ‘to drive out of one’s mind,’ and is derived from ek- ‘out’ and -
histanai ‘to place,’ ‘to stand’ (“Ecstasy”). 
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If I said decisively: “I have seen God”, that which I see would 
change. Instead of the inconceivable unknown – wildly free before 
me, leaving me wild and free before it – there would be a dead 
object and the thing of the theologian – to which the unknown 
would be subjugated, for, in the form of God, the obscure unknown 
which ecstasy reveals is obliged to subjugate me. (Inner Experience 
4)  
What Bataille sought through his ‘use’ of Nietzsche’s transvaluation of all values 
(and, again, I must stress that Bataille’s motivations departed from Nietzsche’s) was 
the inversion of the Christian moral system and the development of an order in which 
eroticism and violence transcended moral condemnation and thereby existed beyond 
the Christian notions of ‘good’ and ‘evil.’ And it is here that Bataille discusses the 
connection between evil and sacrifice. Bataille believed that sacrifice was inherently 
connected with communication, and communication (and the desire to communicate) 
is, by definition, the desire to commit evil (Unfinished System 30). Bataille believes 
that communication is a source of life, and that therefore evil is also a source of life. 
And for Bataille being at ‘the summit’ involves not simply submitting one’s self to 
evil, but rather of wanting evil – of wanting sacrifice and therefore of wanting to 
communicate. Thus we may reread Bataille’s lecture proposition as: “the most 
equivocal expression of [communication] at the [place beyond good and evil, beyond 
sense] is Christ on the cross.” 
There were predictable criticisms of the lecture that day: from the Christian 
panel that, while Bataille invoked Christian terminology, his views were not 
Christian, and from the existentialists that, because God had never existed, there was 
little point holding a discussion on  the topic of sin. Sartre also made the judgement 
that Bataille was using the word ‘sin’ as a cover for his own idiosynchratic reading of 
the word. Indeed, Sartre’s assessment is, in part, correct. Bataille, however, didn’t 
want to blasphemously redefine the word ‘sin,’ but rather wanted to employ and 
redefine a whole theological lexicon. While calling the lecture a “Discussion on Sin” 
may well have led some to expect a discussion on orthodoxy, Bataille mediated his 
use of the term ‘sin’ through Nietzsche’s concept of the transvaluation of all values. 
During the post-lecture discussion he remarked:  
Sin is defined, on the one hand, by God’s commandments. It’s 
obvious that, from God’s commandments, I’ve only retained a part; 
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I have, on the other hand, elided the fact that I referred to a universal 
experience of the separation of acts into good and evil. (Unfinished 
System 57) 
Sartre wasted no time in responding: “That changes everything. There’s a good for 
you” (57). Of course Bataille believed in a good and an evil; this was, after all, a 
discussion on sin. But this good and evil was a reinterpretation of good and evil as 
inspired by Nietzsche – a good and evil that existed beyond these orthodox Christian 
terms, while nevertheless invoking these orthodox Christian terms. This was an evil 
that, for Bataille, was connected to the desire to communicate, and an ambivalent 
form of sin that positioned the crucifixion as the moment at which both the greatest 
good and the greatest evil were enacted.  
What may have perplexed Bataille’s audience at the lecture was the 
concessionary structure of his argument on sin. Bataille began his lecture by 
acknowledging the Christian reading of sin and then went on to reread the crucifixion 
through his own Nietzschean definition of sin. Bataille says that for Christians the 
murder of a man, let alone a god, is repugnant – is sinful – in the traditional orthodox 
sense.
72
 However, the crucifixion is not simply a murder, it is also a ritual sacrifice: it 
is a necessary killing of a God whose death, in the orthodox tradition, allowed the 
gates of heaven to open, allowed humanity to have their sins washed away (or paid 
for) and bridged the gap between humans and God – the crucifixion acted as a way 
for humans and God to communicate. According to Bataille, the inherent paradox in 
orthodox theology is that Christians must not only suffer the knowledge that they 
have killed their god, but they must also suffer their desire for his death, because 
without God’s death, the gates of heaven will not open, human sin will not be purged, 
and no one will be granted eternal life.  
Bataille believes that the crucifixion can be called a ‘sin’ because it was the 
moment that humanity attained the ‘summit of evil’ (Unfinished System 28) – the 
death (murder) of God – in which moral Christian norms (utility, servility) were 
overturned. Thus the crucifixion was a sin because it was a murder: 
The killing of Jesus Christ is held by Christians as a group to be 
evil. It is the greatest sin ever committed. It even possesses an 
unlimited nature. Criminals are not the only actors in the drama, 
                                                        
72 Indeed, the sixth commandment is: “thou shalt not kill.” 
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since the fault devolves on all humans. Insofar as someone does evil 
(every one of us being required to do evil), that person puts Christ 
on the cross. Pilate’s executioners crucified Jesus but the God they 
nailed to the cross was put to death as a sacrifice: crime is the agent 
of this sacrifice. (On Nietzsche 17-18)  
That is, the crime of a sacrifice precedes its sacrificial nature: the crucifixion was both 
the execution of a criminal and the crime of murder. It must also be noted that the 
sacrificial narrative of the crucifixion is retrospective, it wasn’t until later that the 
violence of the murder/execution gave way to a story of sacrifice and resurrection.  
In Bataille’s view, the criminal and sacrificial nature of the crucifixion still 
persists through the penitent’s observation of the crucifixion. Bataille proposes that, 
by identifying with Christ’s suffering, the spectators come to understand the 
sinfulness of the murder as ecstasy, as sacrifice. Bataille says that the crucifixion also 
opened up communication between God and humans because communication requires 
wounding, extreme openness and vulnerability. Here, again, Bataille diverges from 
Nietzsche’s disdain for things like vulnerability and openness, while nevertheless 
invoking Nietzsche’s interest in wounding and violation. The highest form of evil, 
which is the upturning and violation of moral norms (sin), becomes linked with the 
greatest good (communication). Sin, Bataille argues, is inherently linked to 
communication or the desire to communicate because of the relationship between the 
sinfulness of sacrifice and the necessary wounding that must be inflicted on beings to 
allow communication to take place: “communication happens only between two 
beings at risk” (Unfinished System 30). The good of the sacrifice is the 
communication that comes about through the evil that is committed; the sin of mutual 
wounding that occurs between God and humans as the worshippers suffer the death of 
their god, but rejoice through communication. Therefore, goodness and sin are 
intertwined: the good of communication cannot come about without the sin of murder.  
Such a rereading of the paradox of Christian desire and the crucifixion 
clearly stems from Nietzsche’s death of God thesis, but whereas Nietzsche’s market-
goers see themselves as innocent atheists (innocent, insofar as they believe that they 
could not kill God because they do not believe in God) Bataille’s Christians are 
perennially struck with guilt: they are forever agonised not only by the fact that their 
god is dead, that their god remains dead, and that they have killed him, but also that 
they have desired this death. Bataille explains the crucifixion as both the moment in 
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which humans committed the greatest sin, the ultimate taboo and transgression – 
deicide – and, thus attained the summit of evil, and, paradoxically, as the greatest 
good because it is an act of communication and the creation of new values that 
overturn Christian values (it is, according to Bataille, both community building and a 
resacralisation of communication).   
 
5.3 Death of Myth, Myths of Death: The Construction of Sacrificial Myths after 
the Death of God 
The difference between Nietzsche’s death of God thesis and the crucifixion of Christ 
is that, in the crucifixion narrative, the god is resurrected, whereas Nietzsche’s dead 
god remains dead. The concept of the unresurrecting God, the inversion of Frazer’s 
‘king of the wood’ myth, fascinated Bataille, and it is this very fascination that makes 
his reading of the death of God unique. Bataille interprets Nietzsche’s death of God 
thesis alongside the story of the crucifixion. Such a reading may not seem distinctive 
because contemporary theologians, such as radical evangelists Thomas J. J. Altizer 
and William Hamilton, have performed similar (although highly idiosyncratic) 
interpretations. Bataille, however, employs a ‘both/and’ tactic when reading 
Nietzsche: like Nietzsche, Bataille understands the death of God metaphorically, as a 
reference to the decentring of God and Christianity in modern Europe, yet he also 
repurposes Nietzsche’s thesis to form a new reading of Christ’s death at the 
crucifixion. Bataille attempts not only to write about a world that has been abandoned 
by god, but also writes about the continued significance of religion, religious practice 
and sacrifice after the death of God. Such a rereading of Nietzsche’s philosophy can 
be seen through Bataille’s creation of a godless religion and religious practice – the 
secret society Acéphale, in which a beheaded (sacrificed) human would never 
resurrect. According to Allan Stoekl, what Bataille attempted to do was create a 
Nietzschean religion; to form a religion through the death of god, in the absence of 
god (“A Commentary on the Texts” 263).   
The purpose of the secret society Acéphale (if we may say that it had a 
purpose without proposing that it was in any way a ‘project,’ since Bataille’s 
understanding of sacrifice was the negation of all forms of productivity) was to revive 
mythic forms of ritual and to perform a ritual sacrifice (Stoekl, Introduction, Visions 
xix). In attempting to revive mythic rituals, the secret society became something of a 
myth in its own right. As Wittman says, very little is known about what went on at 
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these meetings under the struck-down tree (Harrison), but knowing that there were 
secret meetings at a felled tree creates a myth in itself. The icon of this mythic society 
was, Stoekl says, the headless acéphalic-man – part dismembered Dionysus, part 
crucified Christ, and, curiously, part Nietzsche (Introduction, Visions xx). This final 
component of the acéphalic-trinity – Nietzsche – is no doubt a reflection of just how 
central Nietzsche was to Bataille’s philosophy. The ‘religion’ was only short-lived, 
but from its demise came both the journal and secret society. The first two issues of 
the journal featured articles on the German philosopher, the second issue being 
entirely dedicated to protecting Nietzsche’s name and ideas from fascism. Members 
of the secret society were said to have meditated on Nietzsche’s work and, according 
to Jeremy Biles, Bataille believed that sacrifice (and thus the sacrifice he hoped to 
hold in the secret society) would “activate a Nietzschean myth and concomitant 
experience of the sacred predicated not on the presence of the divine, but 
paradoxically on the death of God” (128). For Stoekl, the acéphalic-man not only 
illustrated Nietzsche’s death of God thesis, but also the death of the classical 
conception of man (as I have said, the acéphalic-man parodies da Vinci’s Vitruvian 
Man, an image that embodied classical human reason) (Introduction, Visions xx), and 
also personified what Bataille understood as the death and absence of myth in 
modernity. The seeming paradox here is that, while Bataille celebrated the death of 
God, he lamented the death of myth. This lamentation for the death of myth was 
synonymous with a form of lost communality in modernity, because myth is at the 
heart of religion and sacrifice, and is therefore bound up with the formation of 
community.  
 
5.4 After the End: The Significance of Sacrifice in the Absence of God 
Bataille’s theory of religion is written from the perspective of a world where God is 
absent: “If, in the night, the sidewalk vanishes beneath my feet, for a brief instant, my 
heart sinks: I have the weak idea of the absence of God” (Inner Experience 103).
73
 In 
the absence of God (where humans can no longer commune with god, but instead 
commune with one another) Bataille believes that, for communication to exist 
                                                        
73 In her chapter aptly titled “Does God have a future?” Karen Armstrong argues that twentieth 
century French atheism took a varied approach to a world absent of God – reactions ranged from 
apathy to utter relief. Sartre’s position on a world absent of God expressed a sense of necessary 
desolation: there was now a God-shaped hole in the human consciousness where, previously, God had 
always been (Armstrong, A History of God 378).  
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between humans, communication must be crucifixion-like: both parties must be 
willing to be made vulnerable and penetrated by the other, and to be wounded, cut, 
and traumatised, like Christ.
74
 It was Bataille’s contention that: “[w]e can’t rely on 
anything. Except ourselves [ . . . ]. In every regard, right up to the present, people 
have always relied on each other – or God” (On Nietzsche 4). For too long, Bataille 
believed, humans had been left, stranded, unable to communicate with one another: 
not only had Christianity overlooked the significance of the crucifixion as a form of 
communication between God and humans, but in mordernity, in the wake of the death 
of God, it was necessary for humans to rely on one another if there was to be any 
attempt to resacralise communication. Bataille observes that communication is 
something that all humans strive for and that the sinfulness of communication comes 
out of the desire to communicate: because we want to communicate (and 
communication is only possible through desecration and wounding – the crucifixion) 
we must want evil.  
Bataille believes that it is only through a metaphorical participation in 
suicide and crime – through an acknowledgement of our own suffering, of our limits, 
our refusal to hide away from our anguish and anxiety, and of our realisation of our 
own impending death – that we can engage in sacrifice, both of ourselves and of God; 
God, whom we must kill in order to summon (Boldt, Translator’s Introduction, Inner 
Experience xii).
75
 Foucault unpacks Bataille’s seemingly paradoxical interpretation of 
the death of God when he asks: 
what does it mean to kill God if he does not exist [ . . . ]? Perhaps it 
means to kill God both because he does not exist and to guarantee 
that he does not exist [ . . . ] to kill God to liberate life from his 
existence that limits it, but also to bring it back to those limits that are 




Bataille believed that, because religion was a human construction, so too was God. 
Thus Bataille, even as an atheist, felt that it was necessary to explore what the death 
                                                        
74 Interestingly, Žižek, who called Christianity the ‘religion of the cut,’ associated Christianity with 
trauma (Žižek qtd. in Pound 38).  
75 While the death of God is often attributed to the work of Nietzsche, it entered theological and 
philosophical consciousness through the works of Saint John of the Cross, William Blake, and Hegel. 
76 There is a curious parallel here, with Beckett’s play Endgame, where Hamm cries out: “The 
Bastard!! He doesn’t exist!” (The Complete Dramatic Works 119).  
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of God meant in a world where God was absent, where God, according to twentieth-




5.5 “The science of the Death of God”: Bataille’s A/Theological Agenda   
The structure that results from Bataille’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s death of God 
thesis is consistent with the philosophy of atheology, or what Bataille defines as “the 
science of the death of God” (Kendall, Introduction, Unfinished System xxxviii). 
According to Kendall, atheology is a ‘means to the impossible’; it is a philosophy that 
is against knowledge. Atheology, Kendall says, seeks the “place of God” (my 
emphasis xxxviii).    
While I disagree with Roland Champagne’s calling atheology a form of 
negative theology, I agree with his statement that atheology is a “theory of respect for 
the sacred that excludes God” (1). It is interesting to note that Bataille’s works Inner 
Experience, Guilty, and On Nietzsche all collected under the title La Somme 
Athéologique, which no doubt plays on and inverts St Thomas Aquinas’s magnum 
opus Summa Theologica (1265-1274). As Benjamin Noys suggests, the ‘a’ prefix in 
‘atheology’ is Bataille’s attempt at depriving theology of its ‘head,’ depriving it of 
God (Bataille 65).  
While atheology can be used as an umbrella term for Bataille’s thoughts on 
religion, its goal (if we may say that atheology has a goal) is sovereignty and inner 
experience. I have clarified that the ‘goal’ of the sovereign moment is the shattering 
of the isolation that deprives us of communication. This is also the goal of inner 
experience – the shattering of subjectivity in order to communicate. Of inner 
experience, Bataille says:  
the subject in experience loses its way, it loses itself in the object 
which itself is dissolved [ . . . ] it loses itself in human 
communication; as subject it is thrown outside of itself, beyond 
itself; it ruins itself in an undefined throng of possible existences. 
(Inner Experience 61) 
Therefore, inner experience is not, as it sounds, a turning inward to one’s self but is 
rather an experience of the outside, of a community. Noys observes that inner 
                                                        
77 For philosophers like the late Leszek Kołakowski, it was God’s silence and inaction that had 
become unbearable. In his 2006 essay, “Is God Happy?” Kołakowski poses this very question ‘is God 
happy?’ in an attempt to understand God’s silence in the face of human suffering.  
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experience consists of three major elements: first, it is a momentary experience that 
does not offer the hope of salvation or anything outside of the itself: this is what 
Bataille means by the word ‘inner.’ Second, the experience has its own authority. 
Third, the experience explores and then contests its own limits – be they the limits of 
language or subjectivity (Inner Experience 50). 
 
5.6 Is God Grumpy? Nietzsche, Bataille and the Laughter of an Absent God  
Two years before his 1944 “Discussion on Sin,” Bataille published the essay 
“Nietzsche’s Laughter” in the Belgian journal Exercice de silence. Kendall believes 
that “Nietzsche’s Laughter” is a preliminary work on which Bataille later based his 
books Inner Experience (1943), Guilty (1944), and On Nietzsche (1945). In 
“Nietzsche’s Laughter” Bataille outlines his notions of meditation and the 
annihilation of the self, where he describes a form of suffering that doesn’t fulfill any 
Christian project – no path to purity or salvation – and he proposes that this suffering 
leads to a form of communion with what he calls, ‘the impossible.’  
Bataille opens “Nietzsche’s Laughter” with an explanation of two concepts – 
the possible and the impossible. He writes that ‘the possible’ and ‘the impossible’ are 
two ‘states’ that persist in the world. The ‘possible’ is the sphere of organisms, the 
material world, the ‘real’ world, whereas the ‘impossible’ is the realm of destruction 
and death. Bataille believes that we, as living beings, situate ourselves within the 
realm of the possible. We imagine our lives in the possible world as being directed by 
a certain narrative of events or continuity. It is a world in which we imagine that we 
can ‘know’ things; it is a world in which we are given a sense of purpose and meaning 
because of belief in God and belief in salvation. The impossible is the very antithesis 
of this certainty, stability and knowledge.
78
 “Man’s [sic] limit,” Bataille says, “isn’t 
God, isn’t the possible, it is the impossible, the absence of God” (Unfinished System 
23).
79
 Nietzsche, Bataille believed, also wrestled with the possible and the impossible. 
And it is in Nietzsche’s statement on laughter that Bataille sees Nietzsche grappling 
with the possible and the impossible most clearly: “To see tragic characters founder 
and to be able to laugh, despite the profound understanding, emotion, and sympathy 
                                                        
78 To speak of a ‘knowable’ world inevitably connotes empiricism and scientific positivism. 
Bataille, curiously, does not position science and religion in opposition to each other but understands 
them both as ways of knowing and forestalling the instability of reality. 
79 Bataille notes something very similar in his 1944 work Guilty in which he says that “God is not 




that we feel: this is divine” (Nietzsche qtd. in Bataille, Unfinished System 22). Bataille 
sees this sort of laughter as a reaction to the ‘impossible.’ That is, we laugh when the 
sense of the impossible overcomes both indifference and sympathy, because, in order 
to laugh we cannot remain indifferent to or overly sympathetic with the thing that 
evokes laughter (23). Bataille, then, draws a beautiful and devastating comparison 
with Nietzsche’s death of God thesis: he describes a god that is slowly sinking – 
foundering? – to its death and all the while mocking the possible, laughing at the 
impossible (23). Simon Critchley calls Bataille’s interpretation of Nietzschean 
laughter the laughter of the ‘eternal return’: “there is the laughter of what Nietzsche 
calls ‘eternal return,’ the golden laughter of tragic affirmation” (Humor 105). This 
sort of laughter, Critchley says, is a ‘heroic’ form of laughter, the sort of laughter that 
comes in peals from mountaintops, manic and solitary, and as though the person 
laughing is on the brink of sobbing (Critchley 105). Critchley’s analysis of 
Nietzschean laughter is in accordance with Kendall’s reading of Bataille: the 
Nietzschean laughter that Bataille writes of is laughter that is “occasioned by the 
going under, the foundering that is death” (Introduction, Unfinished System xxiii). 
This is both laughter at the death of God, and the laughter of the dying god. As 
Bataille asks: “what does the divine attained by laughter mean if not the absence of 
God?” (Unfinished System 23).  
 
6. The Sacrifice of Laughter, The Sacrifice of Literature  
 
6.1 Bataille’s Sacrificial Laughter  
 
Laugh, laugh while you still can! For you will be crying for a very 
long time when you wash these clothes clean with your blood 




It may seem odd that Bataille sees any connection between laughter and his 
philosophy, let alone laughter, religion and the sacrificial.
81
 Yet Bataille wrote 
                                                        
80 According to Mary Beard’s reading of Cassius Dio’s Roman History (which she uses in the 
introduction to her 2014 work Laughter in Ancient Rome: On Joking, Tickling, and Cracking Up) the 
Ancient Roman politician and general Lucius Postumius Megellus (consul 305 BCE) uttered this threat 
when, at the start of hostilities between the Romans and Greeks in the Greek town of Tarentum, the 
Tarentines made fun of the formal Roman toga (4).  
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countless essays on the intersection between the two, and in his fictions his characters 
are often gripped by manic fits of laughter.
82
 For Kendall, Bataille produces a 
philosophy of laughter and a philosophy that is built on the very experience of 
laughter:  
[T]his laughter is the laughter that shatters all hierarchies, all 
distinctions. Laughter, finally, like tears, like art, like poetry, like 
meditation, like eroticism, like religious ecstasy, is one among many 
effusions, one among many deliriums, one among many means to 
the impossible. (Introduction, Unfinished System xxxix)  
But Bataille believed that it was this very pressure to seek out rapturous moments of 
self-negation that could stifle our touching on the impossible – after all, we cannot 
perpetually achieve ecstasy through sacrifice or eroticism. But it is in laughter that we 
can share moments of ecstatic joy, ecstatic communication:  
When the need to communicate through loss of self is reduced to 
that of possessing more, then we realize that nothing sublime can 
exist in man without its necessarily evoking laughter. Now, of all 
the sorts of intense communication, none is more common than the 
laughter which stirs us in (each other’s) company. (Bataille, 
“Sacrifice” 68)   
Laughter, for Bataille, is a communal activity, it can be shared between two people, 
and it can be rendered in a mass, and, like yawning, it is contagious. As with his other 
essays on laughter, “Nietzsche’s Laughter,” and “Nonknowledge, Laughter and 
Tears,” Bataille makes explicit reference to the theorists who have most influenced 
his writing on laughter; not surprisingly, Bataille is most influenced by the work of 
Henri Bergson. In “Nonknowledge, Laughter and Tears,” Bataille discusses the 
central image that Bergson uses in his 1900 work Le rire (Laughter): the comedic 
instance of a man falling over. Bataille asks: why do we laugh when we see someone 
fall? Do we laugh at them or with them? However, before I examine Bataille’s 
response to this specific question it is important to clarify that Bataille didn’t feel that 
Bergson’s work fully explained the nature or causes of laughter. Bataille felt that 
                                                                                                                                                              
81 For further reading see Bataille’s essays “Sacrifice,” “Nietzsche’s Laughter,” “Nonknowledge, 
Laughter and Tears,” “Unknowing: Laughter and Tears,” “To Die Laughing,” and the subsection of his 
book Guilty, entitled “The Divinity of Laughter,” which contains the chapters “The Need for Laughter” 
and “Laughter and Trembling.” 
82 See Bataille’s 1928 novella Story of the Eye and his 1941 short story “Madame Edwarda.” 
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Bergson didn’t so much offer an explanation of laughter as he did the comedic. 
Bataille believed that there are many other instances (other than comedy) where 
laughter is the response: “the laughter of the accidental meeting [of two old friends], 
the laughter of tickling, the child’s immediate laughter” (Unfinished System 134). 
Bataille saw all of these moments (the chance meeting of friends, tickling, or of 
watching someone fall) as conforming to his notion of ‘slipping between realms.’  
Bataille remarks that, we laugh very heartily when we pass, without any 
warning, from a state of certainty, rationality and stability, to a state where this 
assurance and stability are overthrown and are revealed to be deceptive (Unfinished 
System 135). When we laugh we slip from a sphere where we can anticipate the 
future, to a sphere where it is utterly impossible to predict the future.  
Bataille understood sacrifice, like laughter, as a moment where people slip 
from one state to another – from a rational, reasonable state of certainty, to a state of 
overwhelming uncertainty. That is, in sacrifice the rupture of a violent death pierces 
the isolation of the individuals who make up a crowd and, through their shared 
anguish and desire at viewing the death of the victim, forges a momentary sense of 
community and communication among the spectators. Bataille revisits this sacrificial 
narrative in his reading of Bergson’s ‘falling man.’ Bataille sees the ‘falling man’ as a 
variation of the sacrificial victim, and the people who laugh at the falling man, the 
spectators at the sacrifice.
83
 Bataille, of course, forms a very different interpretation of 
Bergson’s anecdote: for Bergson, we laugh at the falling person because they have not 
only failed to ‘adapt’ themselves to the situation at hand (that, for example, there was 
a rock in their path that they tripped on), but also because they continued in their 
trajectory rather than conforming to the situation at hand. That is, the human has 
momentarily lost their status as a human and has become more a ‘mechanical error’ in 
a system – they fall out of the system; the human momentarily loses their autonomy 
and becomes a thing that is acted upon. For Bataille, however, “[t]he man who 
unwittingly falls is substituting for the victim who is put to death [in a sacrifice], and 
the shared joy of laughter is that of sacred communication” (“Sacrifice” 68). As 
Bataille says:   
                                                        
83 It is worth considering laughter and ‘the fall’ in the dramatic work of Samuel Beckett – especially 
the vaudeville tactics employed in his plays Krapp’s Last Tape and Waiting for Godot. These 
characters’ actions, antics and misfortunes become metaphysical (the characters become metaphysical 
clowns).     
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An individual’s fall has only to reveal the illusory nature of 
stability, and the witnesses of that fall pass, with him, from a world 
in which all is stable to one of slips and slides. Barriers collapse, 
and the convulsive moments of those laughing break free and 
reverberate in unison. (“Sacrifice” 69) 
But of course laughter and sacrifice are not identical, and they do not produce the 
same outcomes. Perhaps the biggest difference Bataille sees between laughter and 
sacrifice is the communication of anguish. While laughter is connected with anguish, 
anguish is not the sole cause of laughter, but often a tension that is similar to anguish 
precedes laughter: “when anguish arises, the laughter begins” (“Sacrifice” emphasis 
in original 70). What is dispelled in laughter, Bataille claims, is the possibility of 
anguish, rather than a real, true experience of it. Bataille believes that the anguish at 
stake through laughter is not our own, but rather the anguish of others. What is 
communicated in sacrifice is anguish, and this anguish doesn’t necessarily disipate 
through the proceedings of the sacrifice. In mass laughter, where a group of people 
laugh together, Bataille believes that what is communicated is the cancellation of this 
anguish (73).  
In “The Laughter of Being” Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen works to answer the 
question of who or what exactly is being laughed at in the case of the falling person. 
According to Borch-Jacobsen, true Bataillean laughter “only bursts forth, solar and 
ravishing, on the condition of dying of laughter, of letting oneself be ripped apart by 
the hiccoughs of an impaling stake” (148). However, Borch-Jacobsen says that it is 
impossible to laugh sovereignly at oneself for to do so would mean to die laughing – 
to be the victim rather than the spectator. Therefore he proposes that it is necessary to 
laugh at someone else (to experience the fall/death) of someone else (162). Thus no 
one ever laughs alone; laughter is always communal. Bataille believes that laughter is 
not divine and sovereign “because it hovers over miserable human finitude” but rather 
laughter is divine and sovereign since it “falls along with that finitude into the 
impossible, into night” (Borch-Jacobsen 158). Borch-Jacobsen understands Bataillean 
sovereign laughter as that which “resides within the fall” (emphasis in original 158).   
Borch-Jacobsen also notes the connection between Bataille’s theory of 
laughter and his notions of productivity and useless expenditure: not only is laughter 
itself an unproductive activity that achieves no real purpose and that persists outside 
of coherent, utilitarian language, but the ‘topic’ of laughter is, Bataille observes, often 
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a narrative in which someone fails to carry out a productive task.
84
 As Borch-
Jacobsen suggests, we laugh at the person who falls because we are aware of their 
failure to achieve an otherwise productive goal – to arrive at a meeting on time, to be 
so driven by their desire to be productive that they do not see the crack in the 
sidewalk. Their fall also serves no purpose and is not productive in any way: the fall 
is glorious precisely because it is an end without means, not a means to an end 
(Borch-Jacobsen 161).   
Bataille believes that there are many sorts of laughter, but of all possible 
forms, Bataille is most fascinated with tragic laughter – the sort of laughter that 
Nietzsche experienced when describing his foundering characters. According to 
Borch-Jacobsen’s reading of “Nietzsche’s Laughter,” Bataille talks of a tragic form of 
laughter that imitates the Passion of the Christ. “Here the gasps of laughter are like 
the Stations of the Cross, all the more divine in that they participate in the divinity of 
the agony” (Borch-Jacobsen, my emphasis 158). This is the sort of divine laughter, 
Borch-Jacobsen says, where the laugher “dies of laughter and laughs dying” (158). 
Bataille, it seems, is interested in a near-breathless laughter, in which the laugher is on 
the brink of dying from laughing.
85
  
It is the very physicality of laughter in Bataille’s theory that situates Bataille 
as a philosopher of laughter.
86
 Bataille’s ‘philosophy’ of laughter, or, as Mikkel 
Borch-Jacobsen might say, his ‘philosophy’ of intoxication, is clearly influenced by 
the work of Poe and Baudelaire – specifically, Baudelaire’s 1869 posthumously 
published poem “Get Drunk” (Borch-Jacobsen 151; Bataille, Guilty 80). Borch-
Jacobsen even compares the style of Bataille’s philosophy of laughter to that of other 
theorists, including Bergson, Hegel and Heidegger. According to Borch-Jacobsen, 
these three theorists wrote and lived a sober philosophy, whereas Bataille not only 
wrote but also lived a philosophy of intoxication (151). Borch-Jacobsen argues that 
                                                        
84 Indeed, laughter, it seems, also erupts when language fails, when, for example, we are unable to 
explain what is so strange about bumping into an old acquaintance.   
85 That is, laughter is ecstatic in the etymological sense: it brings about a moment of standing 
outside of yourself. For Bataille, laughter “brings a movement of communion so sudden that [the 
laughers] stand abashed” (“Sacrifice” 69).  
86 Bataille was once accused of promoting a ‘forced’ form of laughter – an accusation that came to 
him in his 1944 lecture/discussion on sin. To this charge, Bataille replied: “forced laughter is the most 
foreign to me” (Unfinished System 70).  
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Bataille’s writing explores the experiential aspect of laughter, where other theorists 
avoid coming into contact with the phenomenon altogether.
87
 
But Bataille also makes his work ‘laughable’ in another way: while Bataille 
writes of the gory and grotesque, the tragic and the taboo, the sacred and the 
sacrificial, he does so with a sense of irony. In her article “Irony/Humor in the Fast 
Lane: The Route to Desire in L’Abbe C.,” Leslie Anne Boldt-Irons argues that 
Bataille’s 1950 novella L’Abbe C. possesses ironical and humorous qualities that are 
present not only through the central narrative of the work, in which a priest (the titular 
L’Abbe C.) gives into temptation, but also through the novella’s metanarrative – 
Bataille’s statement about language’s (in)ability to narrate desire. This dual 
ironic/humorous “itinerary” (Boldt-Irons, “Irony/Humor”) is also present not only in 
Bataille’s other fictions, for example, in Bataille’s description of Simone “who had 
lightly pissed down her leg” (Story of the Eye 56) in the church of Don Juan in Spain, 
but also appears in Bataille’s theoretical work, which takes on paradoxical and, at 
times, parodic tones. Bataille employs these paradoxical and parodic tones through his 
refusal to conform to a ‘system’ of philosophy, preferring instead to write a 
philosophy that is bound up with the biographical, the theological and the intoxicated, 
or at other times a philosophy that exposes the mechanics of the very style that it is 
critiquing. As Laura Wittman says in her interview with Robert Harrison, Bataille 
makes his writing deliberately choppy, deliberately difficult to read or understand. 
While the themes of Bataille’s theoretical work border on the humorous, the playful, 
the absurd, the horrifying, his written style also takes a turn from more traditional 




6.2 The Literature of Sacrifice: Bataille, Fiction and Poetry 
 
When I speak of literature it is not with a capital L; it is, rather, an 
allusion to certain movements which have worked around the limits 
                                                        
87 Borch-Jacobsen says that for Bataille laughter and the theorisation of laughter are, obviously, not 
the same thing. He believes that Bataille was generally dissatisfied with theories of laughter because 
he, Bataille, felt that theorists shied away from or disapproved of the experiential side of their work.  
88 This can be seen in Bataille’s interest in unusual essay topics, like his theoretical papers on the 
big toe, the language of flowers, the sun, the mouth, the anus, the obelisk. Indeed, Bataille’s entire 
philosophy of nonknowledge is, in a way, a self-referential joke: it pokes fun at philosophy’s 
etymological origins: philo ‘loving’ and Sophia ‘knowledge’ – Bataille, effectively claims 
nonknowledge within a field that ‘loves knowledge.’ For reference, see Bataille’s collected works in 
Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939.  
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of our logical concepts, certain texts which make the limits of our 
language tremble, exposing them as divisible and questionable. 
Jacques Derrida, “Dialogue,” 162  
 
In his introduction to Bataille’s 1944 war journal, Guilty, Kendall says that for all of 
its publicity as a ‘war diary,’ Guilty is not exactly a record of the war. Rather, Guilty 
was given its title because it is a work of ‘guilt’: “a diary of inactivity [ . . . ] a record 
of uselessness [ . . . ] a book written under erasure” (Translator’s Introduction, Guilty 
ix). The work, for Kendall, is not much of a diary at all. Guilty is a mixture of things:  
a diary and a workshop, an accounting and an experiment. The 
jittery prose veers wildly, jumping between topics and tasks, in 
search of a ground but reveling in groundlessness, literally and 
literarily falling apart. (Kendall, Translator’s Introduction, Guilty x)    
Kendall’s description of Guilty can also be applied to Bataille’s other works (to works 
like Inner Experience), in which Bataille infuses diary with theory and prayer, admits 
that he is intoxicated while writing or, in his “Method of Meditation,” he confesses 
that he “fell asleep” while composing his treatise (Unfinished System 81).  
In “Death, Communication and the Experience of Limits,” Michael 
Richardson contextualises Bataille’s work within a modernist context, saying that for 
Bataille, as for the Surrealists, social language exists in the realm of utilitarianism 
(Georges Bataille 111).
89
 That is, everyday forms of written and spoken 
‘communication’ function as a means to an end. Both Bataille and the Surrealists – 
and here it must be noted that Bataille had a very contentious relationship with the 
Surrealists – felt that this very form of ‘communication’ was not communication at 
all. Rather, social language, by its very nature, inhibited communication (Richardson 
111).
90
 But, “if I reject the utilitarian function of literature,” Richardson asks, 
[how] can I use language to communicate, [if] the process of writing 
down or publishing a work [implies] in itself a compromise with the 
very utility that one hoped to deny? (111).
91
   
                                                        
89 This was a concern for other philosophers like Julia Kristeva, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and the 
Dadaists, and, broadly, modernist artists. 
90 In his introduction to Bataille’s The Absence of Myth: Writings on Surrealism, Michael 
Richardson says that Bataille called himself Surrealism’s “old enemy from within,” and saw himself as 
standing at the periphery of the surrealist movement (1).  
91 Consider the curious case of Bataille’s lover, Colette Peignott (aka Laure/l’or/Claude Araxe), 
who grappled with the problem of writing and communication (indeed, one strain of modernism is the 
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I have already said that, Laura Wittman believes that Bataille attempted to overcome 
what he saw as the objectification or devaluing of language by creating works that 
‘inhabited the edge,’ by writing fiction and theory in which both theme and style were 
“disturbing and difficult and deliberately unpleasant” to read (Harrison). There are 
different interpretations of Bataille’s poetic theory and unadorned fiction – Robert 
Harrison, for one, says of Bataille’s work: “I tend to feel wretched when I’m forced to 
read him” and, “When I read him, I have the sense that I’m reading someone who’s 
using writing as a mode of therapy, and not a very successful one all the time either.” 
In 1925, on his friends’ and colleagues’ advice, Bataille underwent psychoanalysis. 
His analyst, and, curiously, the person who presented Bataille with the photographs of 
the Chinese torture victim, Fou-Tchou-Li, was the French psychologist and analyst 
Adrien Borel.
92
 While Surya remarks that Bataille would not have had the patience to 
submit himself properly to analysis, it is clear that, under Borel’s instructions, Bataille 
was prompted to write. While undergoing analysis, Bataille wrote The Story of the 
Eye, which Borel was said to have read (Surya 97). Though it is unclear when exactly, 
or for just how long, Bataille underwent analysis, Surya says that Bataille would have 
met with Borel sometime between abandoning his novel W.C. and completing Story 
of the Eye – sometime around 1928 (Surya 97). 
That Bataille used writing for therapeutic purposes is not surprising because 
so many other authors were using their fiction in the same way. That Bataille used his 
writing as a form of sacrifice is, perhaps, a little harder to grasp. According to 
Bataille, artistic productions, whether literature, visual art, theatre or music, can be 
divided into two categories; those that offer “real expenditures” and those that give 
way to “symbolic expenditure” (Visions 120). Bataille believes that architecture, 
music and dance constitute this first ‘real’ (perhaps, we might say, physical or literal) 
form of expenditure, while literature and theatre (those forms of art which not only 
provoke horror and dread through symbolic portrayals of tragedy, but also render 
laughter) are examples of the second, ‘symbolic,’ category. But of all forms of 
                                                                                                                                                              
questioning of the ability to communicate at all). According to Michael Richardson, Peignott ‘solved 
the problem’ of social language and communication in a very practical and straightforward way: “she 
never published anything in her lifetime, and she did not even show anything she had written to 
Bataille” (Georges Bataille 111).  
92 I say, ‘curious’ because the photos are ghastly images of extreme suffering – not the usual sort of 
thing that a therapist or counselor would, today, give their patient. Borel gave Bataille the dreadful 
1905 images of Chinese torture victim, Fou-Tchou-Li.  
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literature that inhabit this second category, Bataille takes the most care in his 
exploration of poetry:  
The term poetry, applied to the least degraded and least 
intellectualized forms of the expression of a state of loss, can be 
considered synonymous with expenditure; it in fact signifies, in the 
most precise way, creation by means of loss. Its meaning is 
therefore close to that of sacrifice. (Visions 120)      
In Bataille’s vision, modernist poetry is the very opposite of utilitarianism. He 
believes that poetry is sacred because it is an example of denudation because, of all 
writing, it is the form that is most ‘stripped,’ most ‘violated,’ the form that draws 
most attention to the nature of language itself, and therefore is most aligned with the 
rupturing of social language.
93
 Poetry, Bataille argues, is a form of communication 
while social language is not – it gives poets and readers access to a mode of 
communication that regular language cannot (Bataille qtd. in Richardson, Georges 
Bataille 112).
94
   
In “Surrealism and the Practice of Writing, or The ‘Case’ of Bataille,” John 
Lechte discusses poetry’s denudation and rupturing of language through his account 
of Bataille’s intellectual and artistic divorce from the Surrealists. Like Wittman and 
Richardson, Lechte proposes that, “for Bataille, writing itself constitutes a challenge 
to existing modes of integration in that it places the idea of a homogenous subject 
under pressure” (“Surrealism” 120). Lechte observes that, while the Surrealists 
privileged metaphor, Bataille tended to employ metonym in his fiction. Lechte is not 
alone in his assertion, for in Roland Barthes’ 1962 essay “The Metaphor of the Eye” 
(which is a response to Bataille’s 1928 novella Story of the Eye) Barthes argues that 
Bataille employs metonym as a way of disrupting social language’s ‘distancing’ that 
social language forms (126). Barthes observes that Bataille rejected metaphor because 
he felt that it was only another way of showing the similarities between things, 
whereas metonym demonstrated the contiguity between things: “the metaphor that 
varies [associations between symbols] exhibits a controlled difference between them 
                                                        
93 Bataille believes that “communication only happens between two beings at risk” (Unfinished 
System 29).  
94 Bataille initially published his 1962 collection of stories, essays and poetry, The Impossible, 
under the title La Haine de la Poésie – The Hatred of Poetry. In his preface to The Impossible Bataille 
notes the obscurity of such a title, saying that for him poetry could only be grasped through hatred and 
that it possessed no real power except in “the violence of revolt” (emphasis in original 10). For Bataille, 
“poetry attains this violence only by evoking the impossible” (emphasis in original 10).   
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that the metonym that interchanges them immediately sets out abolishing” (Barthes 
125). Thus Barthes says that, in Bataille’s fiction, symbols become blurred, objects 
are no longer separate from one another (125), and as readers we experience 
Bataille’s notion of ‘slippage.’ That is, within each metaphor in Story of the Eye, 
symbols metonymically exchange symbolic meaning and, for Barthes, become at the 
same time “identical and other” to each other (125).
95
 The metonym is therefore both 
a violation of language; as Barthes says, it is “nothing but a forced syntagma, the 
violation of a limit to the signifying space” (126), but it is also additive because it 
allows a sense of contagion and blurring among symbols.      
Lechte believes that Bataille’s writing “qua writing” is the result of the 
tension between what Jacques Lacan calls the metonym of desire (which, according to 
Bataille, leads the writer to write), and the themes in Bataille’s writing (sacrifice, 
death, eroticism) (“Surrealism” 126).
96
 This collision, Lechte says, between Bataille’s 
themes and style, brings writing to a point of death: “This, then,” Lechte declares, “is 
indeed a writing to the point of exhaustion and loss” (126). And it was Bataille’s 
rendering of both thematic and stylistic projections of exhaustion and loss that saw 
Bataille diverge from the Surrealists. “[S]o concerned were [the Surrealists] with the 
themes of Bataille’s fiction” – the themes of death and sacrifice and eroticism – that 
they failed to consider “the practice of his writing” (Lechte 126). That is, the 
Surrealists could not fathom the reality of death that was ‘embodied’ in Bataille’s 
writing practice and style (126). Lechte aptly articulates ‘death’ in Bataille’s practice 
and form when he describes Bataille’s writing style as “unadorned” (126). He even 
draws on twentieth-century French writer Marguerite Duras’ response to Bataille’s 
fiction, which she said possessed an ‘absence of style’ (Duras qtd. in Lechte 126).  
It is important to pause on this comment: that, for Duras, Bataille’s fiction 
may possess an ‘absence’ of style. Certainly it is true that Bataille’s fictions, 
particularly his Story of the Eye and his posthumously published 1966 novel My 
Mother, contain sparse description and are written in a largely expositional style. 
Such brief and clipped ‘erotic fiction’ no doubt contrasts with Bataille’s theoretical 
work, which, as I have said, takes on a more poetic, and florid form (incorporates 
                                                        
95  For example Bataille’s associating the eye with the egg, the egg with the testicle, the sun with a 
stream of urine, the cunt with a bowl of milk. 
96 Lacan believed that human desire was a metonym because the thing that is desired is perpetually 
lost (Lechte 126).  
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prayer, and intoxicated musings).
97
 Despite Lechte’s and Duras’ statements that 
Bataille’s work is ‘absent’ of style, notorious twentieth-century Japanese author 
Yukio Mishima understands Bataille as using a “hidden, strict, classical structure” in 
his fictions; structures that Bataille no doubt ‘chokes’ and perverts (“Georges Bataille 
and Divinus Deus” 16).
98
 Mishima says that in My Mother Bataille uses the form of a 
classic French psychological novel, where an enormous amount of emphasis is placed 
on internal characterisation and internal monologue. My Mother is told from the first 
person, inside the protagonist, Pierre’s, mind, and, as I have said, is largely 
expositional: as readers, we are told what happens, rather than shown. What is also 
interesting about this story is the way that Bataille incorporates biographical elements 
– his religious devotion and his father’s skepticism; his father’s illness (in reality, his 
father’s syphilitic paralysis and blindness), and his father’s alcoholism.  
Mishima believes that the succinctness of Bataille’s style does not produce a 
fiction that is ‘absent’ of style; does not dilute affect. Rather, according to Mishima 
Bataille’s fiction is anti-realism and conveys a sense of erotic intellectualism. It 
delivers “vivid, harsh, shocking and immediate connection between metaphysics and 
the human flesh” (“Divinus Deus” 11). Mishima also proposes that, in his fictions, 
Bataille incorporates elements of the bildungsroman, where he initiates his readers 
into an “education in corruption” (18). That is, the narrator of the story, be it Pierre 
from My Mother or the unnamed protagonist from Story of the Eye, represents the 
reader’s own “naïve investigative desire” (18) – a desire that not only locates both My 
Mother and Story of the Eye as coming-of-age stories, but which may also explain the 
direct but unadorned language that Bataille uses in his fictions. What is achieved 
through telling the story in first person is that the reader, in Mishima’s view, is ‘faced 
with the truth,’ a truth that the reader would otherwise avoid, be it an erotic, violent or 




                                                        
97 And indeed, Benjamin Noys supports my proposition that Bataille’s theory is, on occasion, more 
fictional than his fiction, when he says that “Bataille’s ‘theoretical’ works can have moments that are 
more literary than his literary writings” (“Transgressing Transgression” 318).  
98 I say ‘notorious,’ for his violent, homoerotic fiction and for his absurd/spectacular suicide atop 
the Tokyo Defense Force tower after a failed coup d’état (carried out with his secret militia Tatenokai) 
in 1970. 
99 But for all the horror that we witness in Bataille’s work, for all of the eroticism and corruption 
that Bataille’s fiction explores, Benjamin Noys defends Bataille’s work against those who would call it 
‘transgressive fiction.’ In “Transgressing Transgression: The Limits of Bataille’s Fiction,” Noys says 
that to define Bataille’s work as ‘transgressive’ is flawed because doing so limits transgression to a 
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In “Bataille and the Writing of Sacrifice,” David Kilpatrick argues that, by 
engaging in a stylistic analysis of Bataille’s prose and theory, it is possible to discern 
Bataille’s notion of sacrifice. Kilpatrick declares that the very mechanics and 
conventions of Bataille’s literary style recreate the experience (the mixed horror and 
desire) and impossibility of sacrifice, and that Bataille communicates the experience 
of sacrifice through a form of “language [that] enters finite transcendence as authorial 
subjectivity abandons itself through an ek-stasis, an opening or laceration” (1). 
Mishima expresses the same sentiment: that Bataille is no doubt aware that the quality 
of experience – be it sacrificial or erotic – “is something impossible for language to 
reach” (“Divinus Deus” 12). However, Mishima believes that “Bataille still expresses 
[the impossible] in words. It is the verbalization of a silence called God” (12).  
It is important here to remark on the differences between romantic and 
modernist writing. While the Romantics believed that it was possible to achieve 
transcendence through language, the modernists (including Bataille), regarded this 
belief with suspicion. Bataille abandons himself in his texts through a labyrinthine 
passage of words, through a sacrifice of language, through, for example, his use of 
ellipses, which do not express indecision, but rather denote a moment that goes 
beyond words. Bataille also uses subordinate clauses and additive-, agglomerative-
sentences; he repeatedly leaves sentences unfinished; images succeed each other 
bewilderingly; he blurs the boundaries between poetry and prose; and Bataille’s 
modernist style also explores the death of the ‘I.’ This combination of ellipsis and 
additive sentences gives Bataille’s writing a breathless quality, as though he is trying 
to say everything at once. Bataille’s writing might be compared to a sketch artist 
feathering hairs – Bataille adds and adds and adds. This, after all, is the writing of 
excess.   
Bataille’s 1962 book The Impossible comprises a collection of works that take 
on this very additive style. The works explore the nature of poetry and are pieces that 
are written in an essay-story form. One of the stories, “A Story of Rats” contains the 
following meandering (although impulsive and violent), dreamlike passage:   
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
                                                                                                                                                              
particular representation of ‘transgressiveness,’ when instead, for Bataille, ‘transgression’ is concerned 
with the disruption of all limits. 
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . A., his teeth chattering on the threshold, hurls 
himself at B., strips her naked, tears off her clothes in the cold. At 
that moment the father arrives (not Father A. but the father of B.), 
the weasel-faced little man, beaming like a fool, saying softly: “I 
knew it, it’s a farce!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the little man, the father, creeps up, 
jeering, and straddles the mad couple on the threshold (spread out in 
the snow, and next to them – bearing in mind the cassock, and 
above all the sweat of death – shit would look pure to me): he cups 
his hands (the father, his eyes glittering with spite) and cries in a 
low voice: “Erdon!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . .  (The Impossible ellipses in original text 50) 
What is immediately intriguing about this passage is Bataille’s repetitive and 
excessive use of ellipses – clearly, Bataille isn’t overly concerned with ending 
sentences or trains of thought, jumping, as he does, from, one idea to another. 
According to the OED, the three dots of ‘ellipsis’ suggest an “omission from speech 
or writing of a word or words that are superfluous or able to be understood from 
contextual clues.”  The word ‘ellipsis’ is derived from the Greek elleipsis, from 
elleipein meaning to ‘leave out’ (“Ellipses”). But this definition of ‘ellipsis’ does not 
capture the way that Bataille employs ellipses. Bataille doesn’t use ellipses to suggest 
that he has left something out or that he didn’t know what to say. Rather, he uses 
ellipses to suggest that saying anything would limit and detract from the magnitude of 
the experience. Bataille uses ellipses to speak for the impossible, for the impossibility 
of speech. The ellipses in this case are still silences or absences in speech, as the OED 
suggests, but this silence or absence of speech comes about for a very different reason 
and does not act as an omission.
100
 Kilpatrick explains Bataille’s use of ellipses as 
moments where  
                                                        
100 Indeed, Bataille wrote extensively on the relationship between language and silence. In his 
introduction to Guilty, Bataille says that “My language, can only be completed by death” (3). Later, in 
his chapter on “The Point of Ecstasy,” he tells his readers how he attained ecstasy: “First I had to create 
the greatest silence in myself” (28).  
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language is experienced in its essence. We are most aware of 
language – we most sense its immediacy – precisely when it escapes 
us.  Ellipses do not indicate an omission or suppression of language, 
but language exceeding itself (the language of ecstasy). (7) 
This very idea – that Bataille is writing a form of prose in which language is tested 
and challenged to the extent that it exceeds itself in the form of ellipsis – speaks to 
both Bataille’s writing style and his notion of sacrifice. As I have noted, Bataille 
understands sacrifice as a form of expenditure that rejects all forms of utilitarian 
production. His style, which can be called a sacrifice of form, opposes utilitarian 
language, opposes the reification of language. That is, Bataille opposes utterance if 
the experience goes beyond articulation. And yet Bataille, forever the paradoxical 
philosopher, also attempts to articulate himself up to the point of the unutterable. For 
example, his Story of the Eye is a fiction where, for the author, the characters and his 
readers, the ‘eye’ cannot stop seeing the depravity and horrors before it. As readers 
we witness Bataille’s characters asphyxiate, we watch a character fellate a priest, we 
see a bull gore a bullfighter and tear out his eye. And yet as readers we are also 
‘blinded’ (as when we look at the sun) by having seen too much, whether this is 
because we avert our eyes from the prose, or because, as Noys suggests, ‘overly-
transgressive’ themes can sometimes lead a story to become repetitive and, strangely, 
bland: “a writing which appears to be most transgressive can, in fact, be the least 
transgressive” (“Transgressing Transgression” 308).
101
 
But of course Bataille wasn’t the only author/theorist who was concerned 
with the social degradation of language. While the two were often at loggerheads, 
Bataille and Jean-Paul Sartre occasionally found common ground, and the drive to 
escape social language was one such meeting point. A meeting point, yes, but a point 
at which they still drastically diverged. Sartre explores the anxiety of language in his 
1938 novel Nausea, where he thematically and stylistically develops a sense of the 
deadening of the novel. Such a response to the social use of language is no doubt very 
different from Bataille’s reaction: there is no lack of affect in Bataille – his fiction, 
unlike Sartre’s, is almost over intensively ‘felt.’ In his introduction to Guilty Kendall 
observes that Nausea can be read as the opposite of Bataille’s work (Translator’s 
                                                        
101 Consider Darren Jorgensen’s “The Impossible Thought of Lingchi in Georges Bataille’s The 
Tears of Eros,” and his discussion on looking at photographs of human suffering and atrocity (for 
example, of looking at the images of Fou-Tchou-Li).  
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Introduction, Guilty xii). While the protagonist in Sartre’s fictional journal comes to 
gain a level of awareness of their ‘place in time,’ the ‘protagonist’ in Bataille’s real 
journal is a person (an author, perhaps) who has become, as Kendall says, displaced, 
in a Nietzschean sense, in time (Translator’s Introduction, Guilty xii).  
But to suggest that Bataille attempted to bring about sacrifice through 
fiction, through poetry – that is, to create something that brings about a rupture in 
everyday life; something that pierces the isolation between people and leads to 
communication – is also to propose that Bataille understood literature as bound up 
with sin and evil. As Bataille said in his 1944 lecture/discussion on sin, in order to 
communicate we must desire evil because communication is inextricably connected to 
suicide and crime (Unfinished System 30). Bataille saw literature as so caught up with 
sin and evil that he gave his 1957 work the fittingly provocative title: Literature and 
Evil. Literature and Evil was Bataille’s response to Sartre’s 1947 book What is 
Literature? in which Sartre proposes that, in order for literature to be able to 
communicate anything to a reader, it must contain an essence of morality – literature, 
Sartre believed, possessed a moral function.
102
 Bataille, however, believes that this 
morality (or what he would go on to call ‘hypermorality’) is connected to evil: “Evil – 
an acute form of Evil – which [literature] expresses, has a sovereign value for us. But 
this concept does not exclude morality: on the contrary, it demands a ‘hypermorality’” 
(Kendall, Introduction, Unfinished System ix). This hypermorality, Bataille remarks, 
emerges from writers’ collusion with evil (a complicity, which is necessary for 
communication to take place). It is a communication that is based (of all things) on 
loyalty. Thus in his introduction in Literature and Evil Bataille claims: “Literature is 
communication” (emphasis in original ix).   
In the only ever televised interview with Bataille, an interview which aired in 
1958, presenter Pierre Dumayet asks whether the title of Bataille’s book Literature 
and Evil indicates that evil and literature are inseparable, to which Bataille responds:  
Yes, I think so [ . . . ]. [I]t seems to me that if literature stays away 
from evil, it rapidly becomes boring. […] I think that soon it 
becomes clear, that literature has to deal with anguish and that 
anguish is based on something that is going the wrong way, 
something that no doubt will turn into something very evil. [ . . . ] 
                                                        
102 As Sartre says: “Although literature is one thing and morality a quite different one, at the heart 
of the aesthetic imperative, we discern the moral imperative” (What is Literature? 62-63).   
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[W]hen the reader is in that unpleasant situation the result is a 
tension which makes literature non-boring. (Bataille, Interview with 
Pierre Dumayet).  
According to Bataille, literature (and authors) must plead guilty to its/their own evil. 
Among all the other permutations of evil that Bataille sees as implicit in ‘non-boring’ 
literature, he argues that, like the spectacle of sacrifice (or rapturous moments of 
erotic passion, or laughter), “writing is the opposite of working [ . . . ]. Amusing 
books are efforts that went against real work” (Bataille, Interview with Pierre 
Dumayet). Bataille explains this no doubt seemingly bizarre statement in his chapters 
on the poetry of Charles Baudelaire and the work of Franz Kafka – Kafka who, 
Bataille believed, was stricken with a sense of powerlessness, of being caught up in 
systems, and of being shadowed by overbearing patriarchal figures. Kafka who, 
Bataille also believed, reveled in his own accursed status: his resolve to work in 
insurance and law, and yet his child-like rebellion which prompted him to write in his 
spare time. For Bataille, the definitive element or aspect of literature is this very 
return to childhood (Literature and Evil x). The child is always subordinate to the 
adult, but the child (in their subordination) nurtures feelings of resentment, 
rebelliousness and envy towards the adult (Literature and Evil 38). If, when the child 
is an adult, they can pretend to take on the responsibilities of an adult “but without 
acknowledging the obligations connected with them” they can obtain a ‘limp form of 
liberty’ – a form of liberty that, as Bataille sees it, “is traditionally the poet’s 
prerogative” (39). Thus Bataille believes that the poet/author either evades the 
utilitarian realm of work and produces poems or stories that have no real use value, or 
the poet/author suffers like those condemned: forced into the world of work yet 
nevertheless still producing art that has no use value. This is the very point of 
Literature and Evil: humans, Bataille says, cannot recognise themselves or love 
themselves “unless [they are] condemned” (39).      
The condemnatory nature of literature and the unproductive work of the 
author both coalesce in Bataille; Bataille, who wrote fiction and who, as an author, 
‘worked’ to develop a thematically and stylistically sacrificial form of literature. Yet 
sacrifice wasn’t just something that Bataille wrote about; it was something that he 
attempted to experience, to live. Bataille’s belief that sacrifice was connected with 
laughter and literature demonstrates the way that his investigations into sacrifice were 
not just of an anthropological bent. Sacrifice pervades all of Bataille’s work and every 
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facet of his life – from his creation of the secret society Acéphale and his mysticial 
meditations, to his attack on the bourgeoisie, and throughout his theory of the origins 
of human civilisation. Bataille used the metaphor and myth of sacrifice to explain his 
resacralising of communication and community, to clarify his resacralising of the 
material world, to explicate his economic theory and, as I have explored, to elucidate 
his position on laughter and literature. Through all of these seemingly disconnected 
aspects of human life and human history, Bataille has developed a curious cohesion, a 
network of ideas, that unite in and are united by his theory of sacrifice.     
 
7. To Practice the Impossible: Writing Bataille, Not Writing Like Bataille 
 
Literature is communication. 
Bataille, Literature and Evil, ix  
 
Literature is itself a crime. 
   Nick Land, Thirst For Annihilation 73 
 
The heart of literature is the death of God.  
Nick Land, Thirst For Annihilation, xix 
 
I have, in an earlier footnote, made reference to Benjamin Noys’ belief that to read 
Bataille’s work is, in a way, to fail Bataille. Noys opens his book on Bataille, Georges 
Bataille: An Introduction, by stating that any attempt to ‘assimilate or appropriate’ 
Bataille is a transgression, for “Bataille did not seek admirers and he regarded his 
apologists with suspicion” (1). In the same way that Nick Land opens Thirst For 
Annihilation with a confession that “[t]o succeed in writing a book of any kind about 
Bataille is already something wretched” (xii), I too would like to offer my own 
sympathies. Perhaps I, too, have failed the Grand Master. While there may be a 
certain truth to Noys’ and Land’s claims, I nevertheless believe that in order to have 
any understanding or appreciation of Bataille’s work, it is necessary not only to 
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Just as Bataille developed his own way of writing himself through the 
problem of sacrifice, I too have found my own path through that dark forest. While I 
have been influenced by the content and themes of Bataille’s work, his influence on 
my work has not just been confided to his theory. The core theoretical premise of 
sacrifice in Bataille’s fiction, his religious imagery, his recurring symbolic fixation 
with eyes and suns, have all informed my own creative work. I have been inspired by 
these themes, images and symbols with the proviso that I am not in any way 
attempting to reproduce Bataille’s fictional style, although it is almost impossible to 
avoid picking up some of his stylistic idiosyncrasies (his sentence structures and 
punctuation). I realise, however, that Bataille’s style is deeply connected to the 
impossibility of writing experience, and to his desire, we might say, to access a sort of 
inner experience. To extract only the content and theme of Bataille’s work is to 
overlook how integral his style is to his philosophy. Thus I have drawn from 
Bataille’s work without trying to rival or imitate his style (which would be 
impossible, utterly disastrous, and would constitute a form of betrayal for Benjamin 
Noys). Any attempt to recreate either his fictional or theoretical work, very much 
outside of the context in which Bataille was writing, is doomed to failure or ridicule. I 
have, however, been inspired by Bataille’s style, as I attest in the fictional opening of 
this very exegesis and with the fictional-essay style that I have adopted for one of my 
short stories. Again, it is important to acknowledge that Bataille, in both his theory 
and his fiction, blurs generic boundaries between philosophy and fiction.  
Like Bataille, who uses or, we may say, sacrifices, various modes, genres 
and styles (the confessional/diary narrative, the coming-of-age story) to express his 
ideas, I too am fascinated by the sacrifice of form. In several of my own stories I have 
employed the conventions of metafiction, which has enabled me not only to reflect on 
fictional devices, but also to blur genres and styles (I have mixed historical fiction, 
genre fiction, crime fiction, the confessional/diary narrative, the coming-of-age story, 
and the literary and the academic essay), to expose the mechanics of fiction and the 
occasional pomposity of philosophical writing. The five works of long short fiction in 
                                                        
103 For Noys, as I have already noted, this is not strictly true. According to him: “If we had never 
read Bataille at all then we would be the best readers of Bataille, but we would never know this unless 
we had read Bataille” (Bataille 128).  
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my collection are therefore generically hard to classify. Metafiction, or what William 
H. Gass describes in his 1970 work Fiction and the Figures of Life, is this very sort of 
fiction that is about fiction (25). I have also chosen to write several works of 
metafiction because this self-reflexive style enables me not only to reflect self-
consciously on Bataille’s biography and his themes and styles, but also allows me to 
explore the intellectual, social and political context in which he was living and 
writing. I have used the essay form in some of my stories to limn Bataille’s theory of 
sacrifice, yet also to tease my reader through my blending of fiction and theory, my 
commingling of fiction and biography, and my analyses of bogus works of fiction. 
While I take Bataille’s life and work seriously, I believe that it is nevertheless 
possible to have fun with his biography, as Bataille no doubt did with the creation of 
his own multiple identities.
104
 Further, this style allows me to make an example of 
Bataille’s fascination with the blurring of fiction and nonfiction. Inspired by the 
fictional essays of American author Mark Z. Danielewski and Iranian 
philosopher/author Reza Negarestani, I have chosen to write a story that not only 
parodies the style of a particular form of the poststructuralist academic essay, but that 
also pokes fun at the occasional pretentions of twentieth-century French theory. By 
drawing attention to the conventions of scholarly writing – through my use of 
footnotes, academic language/jargon, and essay style – I have investigated the way 
that Bataille carries out a sacrifice of style. Thus I explore a Montaigne-derived sense 
of the essay or essai as a trial, an attempt.  
Despite my indebtedness to Bataille’s theory, I have not simply employed 
Bataille’s concepts as a set of ideas on which to build my work but, rather, I have 
used Bataille’s work as a way of prompting or feeding my fiction, rather than 
determining it – as instigation or provocation, and not as a template. Thus I believe 
that to try to replicate Bataille’s confessional, obsessional, additive, allusive and 
elliptical style of fiction would not only be impossible, but would also be 
anachronistic. Obviously, I have also in no way attempted to write pornographies 
since to do so would only corrupt my reading of Bataille’s theory and fiction because 
I am writing in an entirely different context to that of Bataille; furthermore, the 
pornographies of the twenty-first century are very different from the ‘pornographies’ 
                                                        
104 Consider the hilarious penname under which Bataille originally published his 1928 novella Story 
of the Eye under – Lord Auch, that is, Lord of the shithouse (auch in French is short for aux chiottes 
(‘the toilet’), which can also be used as an insult or a way of telling someone off).     
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that Bataille was reading (and are clearly very different to the work of the Marquis de 
Sade, on which Bataille is self-consciously reflecting).  
While my fiction draws on Bataille’s notion of sacrifice and his reflections 
on Christianity, I am using his theory of sacrifice as a lens through which to explore 
sacrifice in broader religious, social and cultural ways. Through my fiction I show 
that sacrifice continues to fascinate, haunt, and trouble our society and culture even 
today. My preoccupation with the past’s haunting of the present has led me to develop 
a collection of stories that all possess some form of ‘incompletion.’ That is, the 
actions and events in each story occur either before or after the ‘fact’ of sacrifice 
(before or after a sacrifice has taken place) but never in the midst of a sacrifice. The 
sacrifice in each story occurs outside of the story (in the same way that in Ancient 
Greek drama violence always occurs offstage) because of the impossibility of writing 
or representing sacrifice. The incomplete or unfulfilled sacrifices in my stories also 
allow me to explore Bataille’s notions of unproductivity and purposelessness. While 
sacrifice is the central theme in my work, sacrifice never occurs. Although the longest 
story of my collection, “Journal of the Plague Week,” is in many ways the most 
complete story of all (it ends with the most conclusive of endings: a death) it is also 
the most unproductive: a child falls ill and no one is to blame.  
But aside from the work of the author being purposeless and unproductive (a 
form of evil, as Bataille saw it) how else did Bataille parallel literature with evil? In 
her exploration into Bataille, literature and evil, Melanie Nicholson says that “Evil is a 
slippery term and nowhere does Bataille provide us with a concise and workable 
definition” (7). I have already explored Bataille’s redefinition and inversion of 
religious terms like ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ where he proposes that evil is intrinsically 
connected to communication or the desire to communicate, and in Literature and Evil 
this is very much the way that Bataille pursues the concept of ‘evil.’ For Nick Land, 
Bataillean literature is “the dark and unholy rending of a sacrificial wound, allowing a 
communication more basic than pseudo-communication of instrumental discourse” 
(Thirst for Annihilation xix). And it is this dark and unholy rending of a sacrificial 
wound that Bataille explores in Literature and Evil. As a response to Sartre’s 
exploration of literature and morality, Bataille, in Literature and Evil clarifies his 
notion of ‘evil’ through his concept of “hypermorality”: an acute form of evil, which 
has a sovereign value. The hypermoral value of literature, Bataille believes – the evil 
of literature – is communicated in works that explore, as I have, the human 
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experiences of perversity, abjection, horror, sexuality, and self/mutilation. It was only 
through the reader’s aversion, disgust and tension brought about through the work of 
fiction, Bataille believed, that readers could experience a sovereign moment or, as 
Nicholson says, the author must “represent evil in order to produce a certain radical 
response in the reader” (8-9).   
Bataille and Land suggest that in literature the characters must in some way 
desire or do evil. All of the characters in my stories somehow desire evil, or do evil. 
Characters put themselves and others at risk (they perform historical/mythological 
sacrifices that are today tried as crimes, and they also revel in their desire for the 
crime (the evil) of sacrifice), they refuse to find productive ends to their self-
mutilation, and they are driven the communicate beyond themselves (not with God, 
who is dead, but with other people, and with the limitless beyond). It is the evil of (the 
desire for) death, and it is the very theme of death that pervades all of Bataille’s 
philosophy – the literal or metaphorical death of the sacrificial victim, and the 
religious narrative of a sacrificial death as securing life and securing community. 
Bataille, who was obsessed with the idea of translating experience through 
writing, understood that it was impossible for a reader ever to experience sacrifice (or 
eroticism) through writing alone, because writing is always representative and cannot 
ever be the experience itself. Nevertheless, Bataille – with his sacrifice of style, his 
explicit content – always attempted to shock his readers, to put them at risk. My 
offstage positioning of sacrifice has also led me to consider the importance of 
narrative perspective in each of my stories. All of the sacrificial violence in my stories 
is mediated through the eyes of characters who do not experience sacrifice themselves 
(or at least, not within the confines of the story). However, all of my characters in 
some way desire sacrifice. I have written my stories from these points of view to 
reflect Bataille’s belief that the desire to sacrifice was just as, if not more important 
than, actual sacrifice. The impossibility of experiencing sacrifice through fiction has 
prompted me to examine the form of the parable – or what Frank Kermode describes 
as a narrative that is at once a similitude and yet also a riddle; a story that reveals as it 
hides. Through the five thematically linked long short stories, which I have 
collectively entitled Parables of Impossible Bodies, I reimagine historical and 
mythological accounts of sacrifice in present-day Australia. The ‘impossible bodies’ 
in these stories, the abject, vulnerable bodies of those who would seek to annihilate 
themselves (with the exception of the child in the final story), to sacrifice themselves, 
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not to God, but to something beyond God – the erotic bodies of self-mutilating, 
anorexic mystics; the bodies of children who are riddled with disease, or children who 
plan, very carefully, the steps that are required to castrate themselves. 
And it is by writing through the eyes of these characters that I have also 
become aware of another key theme central to Bataille’s notion of sacrifice: 
vulnerability. For Bataille, all of the ‘characters’ in a sacrifice must be made 
vulnerable. It is not only the sacrificial victim who is made vulnerable, but also the 
spectators (in fiction, these spectators are both the other characters in the story, but 
also the implied readers of the fiction) who must fear and desire the thought of being 
put at risk, and who must also allow themselves to be put at risk, in order to (have the 
chance to) communicate. As Bataille says: “I communicate only outside of myself, 
only in letting myself go or throwing myself outside” (Unfinished System 29). It is 
this vulnerability – this desire to put ‘the self’ at risk – that informed one of the major 
principles in all of my stories: my protagonists’ drives to escape themselves. In 
accordance with Laura Wittman’s belief that Bataille wanted “to explode this ‘self’ 
that is so inconvenient and so artificial” (Harrison), the central characters in my 
stories try to annihilate themselves through their mystical meditation and their ascetic 
self-harm (from self-mutilation to self-starvation), and are also driven to annihilate 
others (a young man ritualistically slaughters a bull). But their desire to be made 
vulnerable, their desire to escape the prison of their ‘self’ is always, unwittingly, tied 
up with their desire to communicate. Just as the recovery of community and 
communication at the expense of the self is central to Bataille’s theory of sacrifice, 
my characters wound themselves or allow themselves to be wounded in an attempt 
(wittingly or unwittingly) to open themselves up to communication.  
The stories in my collection, like Bataille’s fiction, contain recurrent 
characters, symbols, and intertwining themes. However, these stories are not 
connected narratively and are not sequential. While individual stories may conform to 
a particular form of narrative logic, the collection as a whole does not obey an 
Aristotelian plot with either a climax or a dénouement. These stories do not need to be 
read in any particular order, although I believe that the longest and final piece in my 
collection should be read last. My stories are interlinked and associative, and, while it 
is possible to read them in isolation from one another and in isolation from the 
exegesis, I believe that they should be read as a collection. Although my exegesis is 
tightly connected to my fiction, I believe that it is entirely possible to read the fiction 
 
 84 
before reading the exegesis. My exegesis is not extraneous to my fiction, and when 
both are read together it is my hope that the exegesis assists in articulating the 
thematic and stylistic approaches to sacrifice in my stories. Nevertheless, for the 
purpose of this exegesis – and for the sake of my examiners – I have decided on an 
order in which to present my stories.  
Like Bataille’s work, my stories balance precariously on the edge of realism. 
In my fiction I have blended the mundane with the ekstasis of the sovereign moment, 
with the ritualistically violent: a young girl on a camping trip with her family 
contracts bubonic plague, a humble librarian finds an excessively violent photograph 
while scanning books, a newspaper runs a story about a dairy farmhand who has 
slaughtered a bull and claimed that the sun told him to sacrifice the animal. Yet 
because I have written my stories through anthropological, religious and philosophical 
lenses, I have worked to avoid pathologising my characters or their actions – 
specifically, I have avoided pathologising the mutilating/self-mutilating actions of my 
characters: the character who desires his own castration, the character who obtains a 
form of mystical ecstasy from starving himself, or the character who unwittingly 
ritually sacrifices an animal. It is true that Bataille underwent psychoanalysis while 
writing fiction, and it is also true that several characters in his stories are 
insitutionalised. Nevertheless, I believe that Bataille avoided pathologising his 
characters and their actions, instead drawing greater attention to the religious logic 
that governed their sacrificially or erotically violent behaviour.  
Curiously, one of the thematic and theoretical elements that characterises 
Bataille’s fiction – and yet, one that has received very little critical attention – is his 
fascination with children and young adults. Bataille not only believed that in order to 
write ‘well,’ an author must “[remain] in touch with [ . . . ] childhood as the time of 
‘young savages’ with an ‘innocent sovereignty’” (Noys, Bataille 65), but he also 
wrote many of his most famously violent and erotic fictions from the perspectives of 
adolescents – consider the young lovers in Story of the Eye, or the oedipal dynamic 
that emerges in his posthumously published novel My Mother.
105
 I have explored 
                                                        
105 For Bataille, the child symbolically stands in opposition to the adult realm of productivity and 
utility; the child focuses on themselves and their own pleasures regardless of social or cultural 
ramifications. The child, therefore, exists only in the present and doesn’t forego immediacy with 
concerns for the future. According to Bataille, good authors – like Kafka or de Sade – are aware that 
their literary pursuits are not ‘work’ in the same way that, for Kafka at least, working for an insurance 
company was ‘work.’ However, far from being ashamed by their return to childhood, Bataille believed 
that authors should revel in their ‘childish,’ unproductive practice. 
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Bataille’s fascination with the child’s point of view in my fiction – I have worked to 
blend and also reimagine the coming-of-age narrative and the literary tropes of the 
sacrificial virgin and the child sacrifice. Unlike the popular child/virgin sacrifice 
narrative, where the victim is captured and (nearly) sacrificed against their will, I have 
worked to invert these literary tropes by implying that the children in my stories 
desire their own sacrifice, even (or especially) as they cannot gauge the meaning or 
consequences of their desires. While I address the bodily horror of puberty with two 
of my adolescent characters, I explore a range of ages in my stories, from the young 
(two eleven year-olds, one who contracts bubonic plague and begins menstruation for 
the first time while in a coma, another who dreams of castrating himself before his 
voice changes at the onset of puberty) to the young adult (a twenty year-old who 
ritualistically slaughters a bull before mutilating himself) to the elderly (a self-
martyring, self-starving octogenarian). This variation of ages has allowed me not only 
to articulate the theme of sacrifice through different voices, but has also allowed me 
to explore the presence of sacrifice as it affects and simultaneously shatters/builds a 
community of characters, and the way that it continues to fascinate and terrify people, 
reardless of age.  
In writing the creative section of my project, I have also been given the 
chance to discuss elements of Bataillean sacrifice that went beyond the scope of this 
exegesis. It is through my fiction that I have had the opportunity to explore Bataille’s 
broader theories and to address the discussion that has emerged out of the study of, 
and critical readings of, Bataille’s work. There is no greater collection of symbols in 
Bataille’s work than eyes, testicles and the sun. In Story of the Eye, Bataille parallels 
the three orbs: the first, eye which sees too much before it is poked out, the second, 
sun which not only illuminates the world and as it blinds us, the sun as both a symbol 
of God’s blind eye as well as an anus, a ‘solar anus,’ and the third, the slaughtered 
bull’s testicle which, once peeled, is like the eye and sun – a white ball – and which, 
although it was once the vehicle of sexual reproduction, it has now been excised.
106
 I 
have incorporated these symbols into my stories, not simply as an act of homage to 
Bataille, but because, when interwoven, these three symbols all touch on broader 
religious, historical and mythological narratives, for example, the symbolic 
                                                        
106 Consider Bataille’s essay “Solar Anus” (in Visions of Excess), in which, among other 
comparisons and arguments, Bataille proposes a symbolic parallel between the sun and the anus – both 
excrete waste (the sun, through its ‘excretion’ of light and heat).   
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association between eyes and testicles, and blinding as a form of castration.
107
 The 
link between blinding and castration is not new – we need only think of the castrating 
self-inflicted blindness of Oedipus – and in my story “Anatomy of the Sacred” I 
explore not only the ritualistic removal of a bull’s eyes and testicles, but also the sun’s 
commanding a young farmhand to carry out the ritualistic act: the blind God 
commanding the blinding of another. The link between blindness and castration has 
also allowed me to explore the erotic fascination with androgyny and castration that 
developed because of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European musical 
phenomenon of the castrato. Thus, in my story “The Singer,” I explore a young boy’s 
desire to castrate himself for the sake of art; his blindness, his inability to see the 
consequences of his actions.  
Another of the elements that I have had the chance to explore is Bataille’s 
allusion to the impersonal space of the modern slaughterhouse, which he addresses in 
his essay “The Slaughterhouse.” According to Benjamin Noys, Bataille believes that 
pre-modern animal slaughter may have its origins in temple sacrifice and may have 
possessed sacrificial or religious significance.
108
 In the modern world, however, 
consumers are alienated from the slaughtering process in two ways: “firstly,” Noys 
says, “we do not wish to see what happens [in the slaughterhouse] and secondly, its 
activities turn death into a productive and neutral event” (Bataille 24). Noys argues 
that the public’s enforced alienation from the slaughterhouse and from the methods of 
slaughter effectively blind it from the horror and the reality of animal slaughter. Such 
ignorance, however, doesn’t put an end to the violence or brutality of the slaughtering 
process but rather changes the slaughterhouse from a space that at one time may have 
been sacred to something utilitarian. Bataille’s investigation into the modern and pre-
modern social function of the slaughterhouse has thematically and symbolically 
prompted my fiction, in which I have explored the religious and sacrificial nature of 
animal sacrifice – specifically, the sacrifice of the bull in the origin stories of the 
Roman soldier religion of Mithraism – and the mystical associations with strict 
vegetarianism.  
                                                        
107 In Story of the Eye, for example, the eye and the testicle become conflated: the castration of the 
bull is a form of blinding, just as the blinding of the bullfighter and priest symbolise castration. 
108 Bataille opens “The Slaughterhouse,” with the assertion that “the slaughterhouse is linked to 
religion insofar as the temples of by-gone eras [ . . . ] served two purposes: they were used both for 
prayer and for killing” (10).  
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The creative component of my project has also allowed me to explore the 
connections Bataille makes between sacrifice, religion and architecture – specifically, 
the significance of the obelisk in Bataille’s work. While obelisks have their origins in 
Ancient Egyptian architecture, where they were often placed at the entrances to 
temples, symbolising petrified rays of sunlight, Bataille rereads this symbolic 
significance.
109
 In his 1938 essay “The Obelisk,” Bataille discusses the beheading of 
Louis XVI, and the actions of king Louis-Phillipe, who in 1836 raised an obelisk at 
the site of the beheading, at the Place de la Concorde – a public square that had been 
empty since the statue of Louis XV had been torn down during the Revolution. 
According to Jesse Goldhammer, Bataille rejects Louis-Phillipe’s motivations in 
raising the obelisk. Bataille believes that the Place de la Concorde is the “space where 
the death of God must be announced” (Visions of Excess 215), because the obelisk 
cannot replace the fallen king, just as the dead God cannot resurrect. The execution of 
Louis XVI, Goldhammer says, was not only a literal decapitation, it was also the 
annihilation of “monarchical authority” (Headless 157).
110
 The execution, 
Goldhammer continues, also demolished “the possibility of founding any authority” 
(157). Thus the obelisk at the Place de la Concorde is not, as Louis-Phillipe may have 
intended, a monument of peace, but rather turns the square into a place of “permanent 
disorientation and subversion” (157). In my fiction I have used the symbol of the 
obelisk to invoke this permanent sense of disorientation and subversion that 
Goldhammer speaks of. However, I attempt to achieve this disorientation and 
subversion through the symbolic obscurity of the obelisk – the obelisk which, since 
World War I has become a standard symbol of mourning (geometrically, a relatively 
simple structure), possesses an occult meaning and is religiously ambiguous. In my 
story “Night is Also a Sun,” the disorientation created through the symbol of the 
obelisk is the uncertainty of its symbolic value.          
It is intriguing that music, as a form of sacrifice, has also entered the realm of 
my fiction. While Bataille does not discuss music in any great detail, it is true that 
music played an integral role in his life. In his commentary to his 2014 translation of 
Bataille’s Louis XXX, Kendall says that “we should remember the significance if 
                                                        
109 It is also worth considering the significance that both the sun and obelisks played in Ancient 
Egyptian religion – specifically its importance to heretic pharaoh Akhenaten and queen Nefertiti, who 
reigned during the eighteenth dynasty of Egypt (approximately 1353-1336 BCE).    
110 For Bataille, the obelisk also becomes a symbol of a headless person, standing upright (an 
Acéphalic man (Goldhammer, Headless 157; Hollier, Against Architecture xxii). 
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nevertheless minor place of music in [Bataille’s] oeuvre” (Postface: Larvatus Prodeo 
84). Kendall goes on to say that the headless figure of the acéphalic man had been 
created while Bataille and Masson listened to Mozart’s 1787 opera Don Giovanni 
(84). Although Bataille does not say anything of the sacrificial qualities of music, 
Patrick Barbier, in his 1989 work The World of the Castrati: The History of an 
Extraordinary Operatic Phenomenon makes an intriguing aside: that for da Vinci, 
music, “however sublime it might be, died as soon as it was born” (89). That is, 
music, like Bataillean sacrifice, is always momentary. It is the momentariness of both 
sacrifice and music that situates them as ruptures in an otherwise controlled system. 
At least, such is the belief of French economist Jacques Attali. Attali, in his 1970 
work Noise, explores the trichotomy of silence, music and noise, and argues that 
music is a form of controlled sacrifice.
111
 Clearly influenced by the work of Bataille 
(although without acknowledgment), Attali argues that noise is synonymous with 
sacrifice because it is the subversion of a religious (Christian) attempt to silence the 
world. Thus music is the ‘chanelliser’ (the organised form) of this noise. Attali also 
proposes that music, before commoditisation, was a form of organised sacrifice: a 
momentary rupture of the norm, a form of ritual violence. I have used both the erotic 
and sacrificial qualities of music to feed my fiction: I have examined the 
paradoxically sensual and yet disembodied nature of a beautiful operatic voice, and I 
have written about the unrecoverable and otherworldly voices of the castrati (that is, 
the voices of male singers whose voices were irreversibly altered before the onset of 
puberty through, we might say, the ‘sacrifice,’ of castration) mesmerised seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century Italian music.
112
          
The final thematic, or, perhaps I should say ‘atmospheric,’ ‘Bataillean 
element’ that informs my fiction is the largely unacknowledged katabatic quality of 
Bataille’s life and work: Bataille’s descent, his ‘going down,’ into the underworld, his 
travelling back in time, and his fascination with and despair at the unrecoverable loss 
of the sacred. I am aware of this atmosphere as a literary trope (Virgil and Dante both 
invoke the feeling of ‘descending’ in their works), and I was intrigued by the 
                                                        
111 I have become so fascinated with the link between Attali and Bataille, and their observations of 
sacrifice in music that I have even written and published a conference paper on the very topic – “Danse 
Sacrale: The Political Economy of Noise in a Sacrificial Society.”  
112 Castration has also played a tremendously important role in Christianity. Consider the self-
castration of early Christian theologian Origen, the tale of the castration of Noah, and even the peculiar 
practices of the nineteenth-century Russian castration cult, the Skoptsy, whose male members were 
castrated and whose female members had their breasts removed.    
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possibility of taking my reader back to earlier notions of sacrifice by moving down 
through archaeological time. Though all set in the present, each of my stories reflect a 
historical era, event or location: seventeenth-century Italian opera, plague-ravaged 
medieval Bohemia, the underground cave-like temples of the cult of Mithras. I am, 
however, also interested in the connection between katabasis and the concept of  
‘hidden things.’ Despite the often explicit nature of Bataille’s fiction, Bataille lived a 
‘hidden’ life – a life that took on a mythic status after his death. Theorists and 
biographers have long puzzled over Bataille’s alleged double life and his involvement 
with the secret society Acéphale. I have incorporated the concept of ‘hidden things’ in 
my fiction through my exploration of the secret and often obscure and solitary 
practices of the mystics, and the hermetic and secretive qualities of books and 
libraries. I have, however, worked to maintain these mythic or hidden qualities. My 
stories are not revelatory, but are rather unrevelatory. Neither my characters nor my 
readers end up any closer to discovering any sort of ‘truth’ than they did at the 
beginning of the story. In my fiction, secrets remain secrets, hermetic practices remain 
hermetic. My characters are simultaneously tormented by, and yet also take pleasure 
in, keeping secrets, or keeping things hidden (or in feeling that they are required to 
keep things hidden): children secretly steal things from their parents, others feel that 
they cannot voice the sacrificial horrors that they have witnessed, or the sacrificial 
practices that they are planning to perform. In all of the stories, my characters are 
most troubled by and therefore most secretive of their (in many ways, erotic) desire 
for sacrifice, a desire that is intimately connected with anguish. 
 
8. Œuvres (In)complètes: Inconclusive Closing Rites 
 
And Finally, Incompletion 
Michel Surya, Georges Bataille: An Intellectual Biography, 490 
 
The impossibility of finishing such a thought (one that seeks the 
impossible). 
Paul Hegarty, Georges Bataille: Core Cultural Theorist, n.1, 85 
 
In a footnote in his chapter on Bataillean sovereignty, Paul Hegarty remarks that 
“[a]lmost all commentary on Bataille attributes great significance to the incompletion 
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of much of his writing, noting also the plethora of barely started books” (n.1, 85). 
However, he says, the sense of ‘incompletion’ in Bataille’s work “seems to me far 
more interesting when it appears in an apparently complete text, where the 
incompletion is ‘integral’” (n.1, 85) – for example in a work that was “not deemed 
complete enough to be published” – one such text, Hegarty believes, being the third 
volume of The Accursed Share (73). While only a footnote, Hegarty’s remark has 
broader implications for Bataille’s theoretical and practice-led notion of sacrifice than 
initially meets the eye. It is this very blurring of the theoretical and the practice-led 
that has informed this doctoral thesis as a whole, as I have demonstrated in the first 
section of this exegesis, and it is this sense of ‘incompletion’ that not only marks each 
of the stories that follow this exegesis, but it is also something that will forever 
shadow Bataille’s life and work in mystery.  
This exegesis has analysed and contextualised Bataille’s theory of sacrifice – 
contextualised his theory not only within his vast network of asystematic ideas, but 
also within the fields of anthropological, theological and philosophical thought in 
nineteenth and twentieth century France. Through this analysis I have discussed the 
ways that Bataille’s notion of sacrifice interacts with his reinterpretation of religion 
and mysticism as well as the way that Bataille’s position on sacrifice was political 
(consider Bataille’s disdain for the boredom of bourgeois life). I have argued that 
Bataille contemplated sacrifice all his life, from his time at the seminary, to his later 
writings on war and the economy. Bataille believed that in the modern world, 
sacrifice could no longer be carried out as a bloody spectacle, but rather that it 
appeared through the ‘useless waste-products’ of eroticism, laughter and literature.      
In reading the collection of stories that follow this exegesis, a collection 
entitled Parables of Impossible Bodies, it is my hope that the reader will notice that 
neither part of this doctoral thesis has been researched for or written in isolation from 
the other. Both aspects of this doctoral thesis go hand-in-hand, although both can also 
be read separately. Both the exegesis and creative project form a commentary on and 
a contextualisation of Bataille’s life and thought, and of the intellectual climate in 
France at the time. Furthermore, both the exegesis and creative project address the 
new forms of discussion about religion and sacrifice that have emerged in the wake of 
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